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ABSTRACT
Public officials are frequently required to make. choices that
will have uncertain consequences. Particularly in public health and
environmental policymaking, decisions are made with information that
leaves much room for conjecture. This difficulty can be seen readily
in the siting of hazardous waste facilities. Despite a nationwide
call for better management of hazardous chemical wastes, few treatment
facilities have been sited in the past ten years. Whenever sites are
proposed, disputes erupt among various publics and experts over the
likelihood of adverse impacts and the margins for safety that are
appropriate in light of uncertainty. This thesis seeks to explain why
divergent perceptions emerge in facility siting disputes and to pre-
scribe how agreement might be achieved in the face of these differ-
ences.
A range of government interventions capable of shaping risk
perception in hazardous waste facility siting are examined. Siting of
these facilities raises concerns about (1) predictions: do we know
enough to forecast the likely effects of a hazardous waste disposal
plant? (2) detection: if hazardous conditions develop, will we be
able to detect them quickly? (3) prevention: can we design and
manage systems for effectively reducing the potential risks? and (4)
mitigation: if serious hazards are detected, do we know how to
reverse the dangers and the negative impacts? Strategies for coping
with differing perceptions of risk currently focus on information
exchange about physical properties, technological systems, and safety
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estimates. The efficacy of these prediction and prevention strategies
are compared with alternative detection and mitigation strategies. In
addition, the research compares improvements in technical safety rela-
tive to innovations in social control as devices for coping with risk
perceptions.
Gaming-simulation research was used to evaluate the usefulness
of these different frameworks for understanding risk perceptions.
Particular strategies for implementing a risk management system based
on each of these frameworks were simulated by providing participants
with appropriate materials. The study points to several findings.
From the perspective of local residents, the risks of hazardous waste
treatment are most effectively controlled through improved detection
and mitigation of hazards and through better management of facilities.
Perceptions of risk are not easily altered by changes in technological
systems for predicting and preventing hazards. Moreover, these
perceptions circumscribe the effectiveness of compensation as a tool
for increasing the acceptability of potentially hazardous facilities.
Dynamics of risk perception depend significantly on the per-
ceiver. Participants in risk management disputes generally hold one
of three distinct positions: that of sponsors, of guardians, or of
preservationists. Sponsors value business activity and judge propos-
als by their benefits. Guardians value orderly change that protects
and promotes the public interest and judge proposals by evaluating
tradeoffs. Preservationists value stability and a traditional life
and judge proposals by their potential disruption and uncertainty.
Sponsors generally believe that the risks of hazardous waste treatment
facilities are insignificant and manageable, guardians believe they
are significant but potentially controllable, and preservationists
believe they are significant and highly unpredictable. The conse-
quences of these underlying values and perceptions are explored in
depth.
The dissertation develops a rationale for each of these find-
ings, and examines their potential implications for social risk
management policy. The thesis supervisor was Professor Lawrence
Susskind. The dissertation committee also included Lawrence Bacow,
Gary Hack, Michael O'Hare, and Howard Raiffa.
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Preface
This dissertation is about perceptions of risk, how these
perceptions alter public policymaking disputes and how consensus might
be developed when these perceptions vary widely. In many policymaking
disputes, disagreements over the likely consequences of a decision
erupt among experts and various publics. Planners, policy analysts,
engineers and scientists commonly argue that risks are best estimated
using special analytic skills. Subjectively held perceptions, when
they differ markedly from analytically derived perceptions, are
thought to be irrational or biased by comparison. The problem of
diverging risk perceptions is defined as one of lay "misperceptions"
or "self-interestedness." Consequently, in their search for solu-
tions, the professionals most closely linked to these disputes tend to
focus on ways of reeducating the lay public, of overriding their
political voice, or of changing their primary motivation.
In the course of examing this problem, this dissertation pre-
sents a fundamentally different conception of why perceptions diverge
and what policies are most likely to create effective public risk
management systems. The dissertation focuses on policymaking for
siting hazardous waste treatment facilities. Siting disputes are
generated in large part by conflicting perceptions of risk. Analysis
of these disputes suggests that lay perceptions diverge from expert
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opinion not simply because the lay public distorts the process of
information search and analysis (because of irrational or self-serving
biases), but more fundamentally because they use different criteria
for what constitutes a significant risk. These criteria are not
measured by technical indices of risk, and hence important elements of
the risk management problem (as defined by laypeople) are overlooked
by technical analysis.
The dissertation does not seek to answer the epistomological
question of whether expert perceptions are, in some absolute sense,
more realistic appraisals of uncertain risks than are lay perceptions.
Rather, it seeks to answer the more pragmatic question of how we might
best manage these risks when perceptions fundamentally differ. To
this end, the dissertation examines the sources and dynamics of lay
and expert risk perceptions, explores the effects of each pattern of
perceiving on public policy disputes, and suggests a process by which
the difficulties of coping with conflicting perceptions of risk might
be better managed.
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Foreword
It was summer, and the evening breezes tempered the gloriously
bright day. My drive from Cambridge had taken me beyond the urbanized
finge of Boston and into its still rural edge. Here, in the gently
rolling town of Worcesterville,* I had organized a meeting with town
officials and residents.
The town center in Worcesterville is organized along a common,
with the town hall, fire and police departments, schools, and churches
in close proximity. The center is small yet spacious, a place of
meeting for Worcesterville's 5,000 residents. This evening, we were
gathering in the Community House. At one time a private residence,
the house had been donated to the town. It housed a kitchen, a living
room large enough to fit a small group, and numerous other small
rooms.
By 5:30, we had gathered on the porch over cider, crackers and
cheese. I was the only stranger, and so was introduced around. Most
served on the Board of Selectmen, Town Planning Board, Conservation
* The name of the town and its residents, as well as descriptive
details about both, have been changed to protect the identity of the
respondents. The town is located in Worcester County, Massachu-
setts. The county stretches from New Hampshire to Rhode Island. It
generally demarks the end of the urbanized area in the eastern
portion of Massachusetts, and the beginning of the more rural
portions. A second exercise was conducted in a town north of
Boston. Located in Essex County, I call this town Essexton.
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Commission, Industrial Development Commission, Zoning Board of Appeals
or Town Finance Commission. Several were town employees: the police
chief, the fire chief, the assistants to the Selectmen and the Board
of Assessors, a fireman (with a specialty in hazardous waste and
chemical fires), and the local Hazardous Waste Coordinator. Still
others were politically active local residents involved in the League
of Woman Voters or local business associations. Altogether: sixteen
residents of Worcesterville representing government, business, land-
owner and environmental interests found in the town. All participants
were from the community in which the simulation was run and shared a
commitment to and experience with the political life of the town.*
I had invited these particular individuals to attend because I
was interested in simulating the make-up of a Local Assessment Commit-
tee. The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act mandates
the formation of this committee in any community in which the siting
of a hazardous waste facility has been proposed. The law dictates the
make-up of the committee and gives authority over local hazardous
waste facility siting issues to this group.** The committee is
designed to represent the range of local interests affected by a
* In Essexton, eighteen residents participated, including three
selectmen; the director of Public Works; members from the Board of
Health, Planning Board, Solid Waste Study Committee, Historic
Commission, Finance Committee, Water Study Committee, and Conserva-
tion Commission; and five additional residents representing land-
owner and business interests.
** The Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act requires that within thirty
days of proposal to site a hazardous waste treatment facility in a
town, the chief executive officer of that community will establish
a local assessment committee, to be comprised of the local chief
executive officer; the chairs of the local Board of Health, Conser-
vation Commission and Planning Board; the fire chief; and eight
local residents (O'Hare, et al., 1983: 201).
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facility. I wished to study how people perceive the risks associated
with the siting of hazardous waste treatment facilities, by gathering
with residents who might be central to this process. I designed the
meeting to help me understand how perceptions affect their decisions
when the consequences of choices are uncertain, and to explore the
policy changes that might facilitate an alteration of these percep-
tions.
The individuals present in Worcesterville, then, were selected
because it is they who would make the policy choices if a developer
ever proposed to site a hazardous waste treatment facility in their
town. They had come together to simulate this decision making process
in as realistic a setting as possible. Before the evening was over,
they would hear proposals, argue their merits, and negotiate among
themselves. They faced a difficult task, for they would need to
accomplish in one five-hour meeting what usually takes place over many
months.
I began the meeting by presenting a hypothetical proposal to
site a hazardous waste treatment facility in Worcesterville. On the
wall were pictures and flow charts describing the operations of such a
facility. The plant would be a rotary kiln incinerator, designed to
burn hazardous organic wastes.* By using temperatures high enough to
decompose wastes into gases and ash, incinerators convert change
highly noxious wastes to relatively benign compounds. For the most
part, the end products of incineration are carbon dioxide and water,
* A rotary kiln incinerator was selected because it is largely self-
sufficient and requires little infrastructure support from the
community. Hence, it could be located in virtually any community.
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but thirteen percent of the original waste remains as a hazardous ash,
and toxic gases must be cleaned from the air before it was released
out the smoke stack.
Using diagrams and pictures (see Appendix A), the character-
istics of the facility were described in detail. Information about
probable hazards of these processes, plant design, safety features and
aesthetics were presented. The facility was designed to meet all
state and federal safety standards, but had no additional safety
features. Costing $35 million to build, it would provide $850,000 in
property taxes each year.
I described not one, but three companies that were competing for
permission to build a rotary kiln incinerator in Worcesterville.
While each company offered the same basic design (sufficient to meet
state and federal standards), each had a different system in mind for
further reducing risk. Waste Technology Incorporated stressed tech-
nological improvements: more stringent vehicle safety standards,
additional spill prevention and containment measures, oversized
pollution control systems, a buffer zone -- the best and most advanced
technologies currently available. WTI argued that by careful atten-
tion to prevention, the facility could be made relatively risk-free.
The Pollution Control Corporation argued that nothing could be
technologically risk-free, but by carefully monitoring material flows,
ambient environmental conditions, and routine operations, problems
could be corrected before they became serious. Pollution Control
proposed to use standard technology, but to also implement evaluation
systems for detecting problems (e.g., systems for monitoring air
quality, combustion flows, groundwater quality, and neighborhood
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conditions), vehicle inspections, and a strengthened system for
tracking the shipment of wastes from generators to the treatment
facility. To deal with problems as they might develop, PCC would
adopt mitigation and spill containment measures, organize an emergency
response corps, and prepare detailed contingency response plans. The
company argued that through such measures they could remain on top of
any hazard that might develop.
Finally, Environmental Management Incorporated's position was
presented. Environmental Management argued that the risks of hazard-
ous waste treatment developed not so much because of inadequate
technology, but because of less-than-ideal management practices. They
offered to open the operations of the company to public scrutiny and
to subject safety decisions to community review. The core of their
proposal was a safety board on which community residents would sit.
The board would oversee the safety of the plant, manage its own annual
budget for making improvements, and have emergency powers should
hazards develop. The facility and its records would be inspected by
an engineer hired by the town. Payments would be made to the town
fire department so that it would have the specialized equipment and
training to cope with emergencies. Agreements on how to resolve
disputes would also stipulate the creation of emergency action trust
funds to ensure the availability of necessary funds. Finally, EMI
indicated that it would own all delivery trucks, specifying the routes
they could travel and the hours they could operate. By careful
attending to issues of liability, accessibility, and open management,
Environmental Management offered reassurances that no shortcuts would
be taken that might undermine the safety of the plant.
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When the presentations were over, we broke for a quick dinner.
In little over an hour, everyone had been given more information than
some companies ever reveal. Numerous visual displays helped keep
information about the companies straight. The dinner revived spirits
and gave a needed respite.
By 7:30, we were back in the meeting room. Participants now
needed to select the company with the package they felt would be
safest. Objections came quickly: "We don't want to choose, we want
all three." Since each offered a different strategy for reducing
risk, all three together would undoubtedly reduce risk the most. The
discussion shifted to the advantages and disadvantages of each com-
pany. "Is it advantagous to incorporate only the best available
technology or should we rely on what has proven the most reliable in
the past?" "Will monitoring data do us much good if it remains in the
hands of the company?" "If we accept authority over the plant,
doesn't that mean we accept liability as well?" After 45 minutes and
despite a continued desire to form a new company out of parts of all
three companies, a bare plurality of Worcesterville residents voted to
select Pollution Control as the company with whom they would most like
to do business.*
After a brief break, we reconvened for the final (and probably
most enjoyable) phase. The committee of town residents now had a
negotiating partner, and needed to decide what they should demand from
the company. They were free to ask for anything that any of the other
* In Worcesterville, 43% voted for Pollution Control, 36% for Environ-
mental Management, and 21% for Waste Technology. In Essexton, 56%
of participants voted for Environmental Management, 37% for Pollu-
tion Control, and 7% for Waste Technology.
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two corporations had offered. In addition, they could insist on
compensation of various kinds: community service improvements, trust
funds to cover damage caused by accidents or to guarantee the value of
land and the supply of water, technical assistance, free local hazard-
ous waste disposal, facility landscaping, or direct cash compensation
(over and above property taxes).
I imposed one restriction: their requests could not exceed
three million dollars annually. This was the amount that by my
estimate a private corporation with net revenues of $30 million per
year could afford to pay (above what its competitors paid). Thus,
unless the plant was heavily subsidized by the state or federal
government (a possibility I precluded in this exercise), $3 million
annually was a realistic restriction.
To enforce the budget, I provided the participants with prices
for each possible form of compensation. Each option had a price tag:
this option costs $70,000 per year; that one costs $210,000. The
proposals for the three companies were designed to cost approximately
$1.9 million each. In addition, a compensation package of $2.5
million was available. All told, then, $3 million would buy somewhat
less than half of everything that had been proposed. A game board was
used to facilitate discussion of possible tradeoffs. The price of
each option was designated on the board. The initial position of the
board included $1.9 million annual budget for safety features offered
by Pollution Control* and $1.1 million in annual cash payments to the
town treasury.
* In Essexton, the initital position of the board included $1.9
million annual budget for safety features offered by Environmental
Management (since EMI had been chosen by the participants) and $1.1
million in annual cash payments.
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Participants broke up into three groups of approximately six
individuals. Each group was free to make tradeoffs among the re-
maining safety and compensation features as they wished (see Appendix
A for more details).
The arguments resumed: "Let's give up some of this monitoring
to buy this technology... Don't you think we should have more au-
thority over the plant? After all, the greatest risks emerge from
situations where operators are trying to cover up... Perhaps we
should move money currently earmarked for general revenues into an
emergency trust fund. If we don't, the selectmen will use it on some
pet project... Isn't safety more important than compensation? Let's
move money out of community revenues into a safety board."
Finally, over an hour later, the three groups had reached a
resolution of one kind or another. By now, each group had cut funds
reserved for Pollution Control's initial safety package in half, and
reduced unrestricted compensation to near zero. With the released
money, one team bought two-thirds of Waste Technology's risk reduction
package and one-third of Environmental Management's ideas. The other
two teams divided their redistributed money evenly between the safety
devices of Waste Technology, the participatory management of Environ-
mental Management, and restricted compensation funds designed to
guarantee land values, water supplies, and liability payments.*
* In Essexton, the results were more varied. One team (which by
coincidence included most of the participants who had voted for
Pollution Control) shifted the Environmental Management budget
entirely into Pollution Control and left unrestricted compensation
largely untouched. The other two teams left Environmental Manage-
ment's initial safety budget 80% intact, but reduced unrestricted
compensation to near zero in one case, and in half in the other.
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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It was after 10:00 pm. The excitement carried some individuals,
but others were obviously weary. We talked about differences between
the teams for a few minutes, and adjourned the meeting. Some stayed
to talk and help clean up, others drifted out into the cool night.
I met with each of the participants within a week and a half for
an interview. My findings are based in large measure on the revealed
perceptions and hopes of these 16 men and women from Worcesterville
and a similar group of 18 men and women from Essexville. My gaming
simulation had three purposes. It was an experiment, a probe, and a
school. As an experiment, it was designed to test how people develop
arguments and form perceptions about the risks of hazardous waste and
how they would react in a relatively realistic decision making set-
tings. As a probe, it was designed to raise questions which could be
pursued in the interviews that followed. And, as a school, it was
designed to inform a divergent group of local decision makers about
the risks of hazardous waste, the potential for managing such risks,
and the process for siting hazardous waste facilities in Massachu-
setts. With this knowledge, and the experience of trying to make such
decisions, these individuals had become informed spokespersons for the
position of local residents in the siting process.
I completed extensive interviews (between 60 and 90 minutes),
with each participant. The interviews were relatively unstructured.
A general list of topics were covered: What are the most important
aspects of these facilities that causes you to oppose them? In what
* (continued from previous page) The released money was evenly
divided between restricted funds for covering damage due to acci-
dents and the monitoring features of Pollution Control. Virtually
no funds were redirected into the safety equipment of Waste Technol-
ogy by any of the three teams.
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way are the risks of these plants different from other risks you now
face? Independent of the structure of the game, how might the risks
of these plants to the town be most readily reduced? What role should
private enterprise, the town, the state and the federal government
play in the siting process? How do you feel about the use of compen-
sation to promote the siting of hazardous waste facilities? How do
you make trade-offs between expenditures for safety and those for
compensation?
These interviews explored with participants their perceptions of
and feelings about the hazards of chemical waste, their hopes for
their communities, and ideas for improving the siting process. From
this, a story emerged. Better yet, three stories emerged. The people
of both towns tended to cluster into three categories: sponsors,
guardians and preservationists.
This thesis examines the structure of these risk perceptions and
the patterns of risk acceptance in local public policymaking. The
first three chapters provide a context for understanding the problems
of risk and uncertainty in public choice. Chapter 1 provides an
overview of problems of perceptions in the context of siting hazardous
waste treatment facilities. Chapter 2 describes the historic problem
of improper disposal practices and suggests that scientific under-
standing of the consequences of these practices are neither so precise
nor so reliable as to preclude controversy from developing. As seen
in the example of Love Canal, the scientific uncertainty and the
controversy it engenders has important implications for how people
perceive risk. In Chapter 3, opposition to the siting of new hazard-
ous waste facilities is examined. While new processes for managing
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hazardous waste are far superior to those used in older, existing
facilities, residents do not believe that these newer facilities are
safe enough to be located in their town. These perceptions have
effectively blocked all attempts to promote hazardous waste management
through replacement of outdated treatment systems with better designed
facilities. Without these facilities, application of more stringent
safety standards is not feasible, and policymaking for hazardous waste
is stalemated.
Why do perceptions of risk have such widespread implications?
To understand the links between perceptions and opposition, we next
examine perceptions and values as revealed by the participants of the
simulation. Chapter 4 presents these stories in detail, and discusses
differences between three types of individuals: sponsors who value
business activity or safe waste management, believe risks to be
insignificant, and judge proposals by their potential benefits;
guardians who value orderly change that protects and promotes the
public interest, believe risks to be significant but controllable, and
judge proposals by their potential impacts; and preservationists who
value a traditional life style with autonomous decision making,
believe risks to be highly significant, and judge proposals by their
potential disruption and the uncertainty they engender.
In the final four chapters, we consider the implications of
these perceptions on public policymaking and propose how society might
better cope with the siting of potentially hazardous facilities.
Chapter 5 examines the dynamics behind the perceptions of sponsors,
guardians and preservationists. Two aspects of perception are given
particular attention: the intellectual and cultural frames used to
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define risks, and the cognitive and social processes used to evaluate
risks. Based on an understanding of these dynamics and data derived
from this study, Chapters 6 and 7 argue that particular strategies of
risk management are likely to be more effective than others, and that
these strategies will more readily promote acceptance of potentially
noxious facilities than will preemptive or compensatory strategies
currently being used. We close with a discussion of principles for
improving the siting of potentially hazardous facilities in Chapter 8.
Chapter 1
Perception and Acceptance in the Resolution
of Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Disputes
Public policymaking frequently requires elected and appointed
officials to make choices that will have uncertain consequences.
Policy choices likely to affect environmental quality and public
health, in particular, must be made with less than perfect information
in hand. Disagreements can erupt among experts and various publics
over the likelihood of adverse impacts, the margins for safety that
the government ought to ensure, and the appropriate government res-
ponse in light of uncertainty. Such disputes are now quite common and
they are straining our regulatory and policymaking system.
The difficulties of coping with conflicting perceptions of risk
are readily seen in the hazardous waste facility siting disputes that
have arisen throughout the country. Former EPA administrator Douglas
Costle has called hazardous waste managment the single greatest
environmental challenge of the next few decades (Morell, 1982:1). The
call for better managment of hazardous chemical wastes is nationwide,
but few treatment facilities have been sited in the past ten years
(U.S. EPA, 1979). From the perspective of policymakers, new treatment
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plants can help reduce illegal dumping and permit the government to
clean up dangerous landfills. From the standpoint of potential
abutters of these new facilities, however, the risks associated with
these plants are often unacceptable. What is generally good for the
majority seems bad for a minority. While waste disposal plants are
regionally desirable, they are invariably opposed once particular
sites are selected.
The failure to develop workable hazardous waste facility siting
policies is significant. Each year, approximately 43 million metric
tons of nonradioactive hazardous wastes are generated in the United
States (Morell, 1982:5). These wastes are generated in the normal
course of industrial production. The demand for chemicals, drugs,
metals, energy, textiles, petroleum products and other goods is
growing. While processes may become more efficient, the production of
these products ensures the continued generation of hazardous wastes.
The continued production of these wastes, combined with the
perceptions of risk they evoke, has led to a potentially dangerous
stalemate. The EPA estimates that only 10 percent of these wastes are
properly disposed (Epstein, 1982:7). More effective disposal requires
better designed facilities. However, we are a nation that does not
trust centralized power. We have empowered individuals and localities
to oppose the imposition of new facilities. The use of administrative
and judicial review as a delaying tactic is widespread. Costly delays
can certainly be reduced with more efficient procedures, but workable
hazardous waste facility siting policies will require a more compre-
hensive approach.
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Government and industry have attempted to streamline the hazard-
ous waste facility siting process by altering perceptions of likely
impacts (U.S. EPA, 1979). Most frequently, agencies try to convince
potential abutters that the adverse affects are not really so bad as
the abutter thinks. Sometimes the government or industry will even
promise to take steps to minimize or mitigate some adverse effects if
they do indeed occur. These efforts have been haphazard and ineffec-
tive.
Workable public policies for handling hazardous wastes are not
likely to be forthcoming at the federal, state, or local levels in the
absence of a new consensus (or at least a workable detente) over what
is desirable. Risk perceptions play a dominant role in numerous
hazardous waste facility siting controversies, a role which at times
overpowers all other difficulties. The siting of hazardous waste and
other regionally necessary but locally noxious facilities requires
that government develop approaches for coping with environmental risk
perceptions. While basic research into the perceptions of individuals
making isolated decisions has been conducted, the effort to understand
risk perception in the context of social decisions and to develop
strategies for coping with these perceptions in a public policymaking
context is only just beginning.
This thesis is aimed at clarifying the patterns of risk percep-
tion that emerge in facility siting policy disputes, the sensitivity
of these patterns to various public policies aimed at ameliorating
hazards, and the possibility of developing consensus when risk percep-
tions vary widely. By pinpointing differences in the perceptions of
various groups and by exploring key public policies that may enhance
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the ability of government to develop consensus around these differ-
ences, I have sought to understand ways to better structure the siting
process when perceptions of risk are widely divergent. I emphasize
the social or group aspects of risk perception, aspects which are
potentially alterable within the public sector. These publicly
conditioned aspects of perceptions are a legitimate concern of public
policy, and the conflicts they generate require public policy solu-
tions.
I. Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Disputes
The Hazardous Waste Controversy
The problem of chemical contamination of land and underground
water supplies is of recent concern. Twelve years ago, when Earth Day
was first celebrated, hazardous waste was hardly mentioned. Percep-
tions changed with the generation of new information about toxic sub-
stances and a few highly publicized tragedies involving hazardous
waste.
Love Canal is of course the most infamous of the modern hazard-
ous waste dumps. Love Canal defined the image of "hazardous waste"
more than any other single event, but numerous local waste sites have
fueled widespread concern. In Massachusetts, which generates approx-
imately two percent of the nation's hazardous waste, the state Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality has closed 70 public and private wells
in 30 communities due to chemical contamination. Thirty-six communi-
ties are known to have hazardous waste sites within their boundaries
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(Blake, 1982a). Nationally, up to one third of the 100,000 known
hazardous waste disposal sites may possibly cause future problems
(Senkan & Stauffer, 1981:36).
The threat to public health and to the environment posed by
these wastes is stongly dependent on the quantity and characteristics
of the wastes involved. Problems often arise in attempting to manage
hazardous substances because many of the substances involved are
neither qualitatively nor quantitatively well understood. Regulation
of substances with obvious properties such as reactivity, corrosivity,
ignitability or acute toxicity can be developed relatively easily, but
questions about chronic toxicity, changes in a chemical's health
impact at various concentrations, its potential for degrading into
toxic products, its persistence in nature, and its potential for
bioaccumulation are considerably more controversial (Senkan and
Stauffer, 1981:40).
Controversy begins when public health standards are first
proposed. The problems of determining the response of an organism to
pollutants are enormous. The National Research Council's Board on
Toxicology and Environmental Health Hazards has noted difficulties in
deciding which pollutants to measure, how to ensure that they are
adequately measured, what corrections to make for widely differing
exposure patterns and sensitivities, and how to relate measured
pollutants to health effects. Investigators are further restrained by
their limited success in replicating models of human disease in
animals (in order to examine the response of more vulnerable elements
of the population) (National Research Council, 1978; Trieff, 1980).
Under these conditions -- where absolute proof of chronic disease
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induction can not be traced to exposure to specific substances --
overall assessment of risk based on available epidemiologic and
experimental animal investigations is subject to widely varied inter-
pretations (Lee and Mdd, 1979; President's Science Advisory Commit-
tee, 1973; NAS, 1975).
Equally controversial is the safety of technologies developed to
handle these wastes. Where economical, new technologies have been
used to recycle and otherwise reprocess chemicals. But chemicals with
no economic worth have frequently been discarded with few safeguards.
Generally, today's problems emerge from these lax (and sometimes
illegal) disposal procedures. Public perceptions about hazardous
waste are based on some of the worst case examples of waste handling.
How common these practices were remains unclear.
Improvements in waste handling will depend largely on industry's
willingness and ability to innovate. The development of technically
sophisticated approaches to handling individual waste streams is time
consuming, but necessary. In trying to innovate, however, industry
will create new uncertainties. To date, public perceptions of the
risks associated with hazardous waste treatment and disposal have not
been quieted by technological improvements. Unless new disposal
facilities can be sited, these improvements will be of little use.
Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities
The political impasse over the siting of hazardous waste treat-
ment and disposal facilities has been amply documented nationally (US
EPA, 1979). Local perceptions of the risks involved seem to be the
limiting constraint. Construction of a plant is visible and location
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specific. The plant, and its treatment activities, will become a
permanent neighbor when built and operational. In light of this
permanence, perceptions of potential risks gain local prominence.
Almost invariably, impasses develop over the siting of locally
noxious but regionally beneficial projects. Because siting policies
are redistributive, potential host communities have little incentive
to support such policies. Benefits of a hazardous waste facility are
spread widely across a region; no single beneficiary feels especially
well rewarded. At the same time, the risks and costs are concentrated
in a very small area of the host community. Diffuse regional support
is counteracted by concentrated local opposition. The resulting
conflict in interests is aggravated by traditional regulatory systems
because they give complete authority to central governing bodies to
enforce siting decisions and fail to acknowledge the power and in-
sights of local governing bodies.
The Massachusetts Experiment
In July of 1980, the Massachusetts Legislature adopted the
Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act (Bacow, 1982). The new law vested
primary authority for siting hazardous waste facilities with local
communities; established a process of negotiation and compensation
involving the community, the developer and the state; and mandated a
broad public information program on hazardous waste management prac-
tices. By enabling those who stand to lose from a project to share in
the gains of those who benefit, the state hoped to ameliorate local
opposition.
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Three years into the process, however, no siting process has
reached the stage where local residents have negotated with developers
over compensatory benefits. Using the siting law, four waste manage-
ment companies (IT Corporation, SRS, Liqwacon Corporation, and General
Chemical Corporation) have tried to locate a treatment facility in
Massachusetts. The experience of General Chemical is most dramatic.
After successfully operating a treatment plant in Framingham for more
than a decade, General Chemical sought to locate a second chemical
recycling plant in the nearby industrial city of Gardner. After a
stormy debate, the company agreed to accept as binding the results of
a local referendum on the acceptability of its proposal. Gardner
voters turned the plant down almost three to one. Moreover, Framing-
ham residents, alerted to the hazardouse waste processing capability
of the existing plant, began work to revoke General Chemical's license
to operate its Framingham plant (Lewis, 1982). Both Liqwicon and SRS
withdrew their proposals under equally intense local pressure. IT
Corporation is continuing in the process despite a non-binding local
vote of six to one against the proposal (Linda Smith, 25 January 1984
interview). In each case, potential host communities have argued that
the risks involved are too great to even permit bargaining over
appropriate compensation and mitigation measures.
The Massachusetts experience underlines how little we know about
effecting agreements among disputing parties when their positions are
based on widely divergent perceptions of risk. The Siting Act insti-
tuted a system of negotiation and compensation for managing risks. On
the surface, the system is quite capable of coping with differing risk
perceptions. However, the Act and the disputants who have come under
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it rely heavily on traditional approaches to regulatory decision
making. Massachusetts has relied on information dissemination as a
means of improving the quality of the debate and has sought to design
a process of bringing about a convergence in perceptions of risk
through technical studies. Policies for more creatively coping with
risk perceptions are needed if improvements in the decision making
process (such as negotiated dispute resolution) are to be effective.
II. The Dynamics of Risk Perception
Uncertainty and Risk in Public Choice
"Risk" is an elastic and multipurpose word. Technical defini-
tions tend to emphasize the gamble and venture connotations of the
word risk; randomness and probability of loss are the most important
features. In everyday use, however, risk has more subjective mean-
ings. To the lay person, the connotations of danger (the possibility
of loss or injury) and hazard (a perilous situation) are psychologi-
cally powerful associations.
These associations are important in public policymaking. In
hazardous waste facility siting and similarly high risk ventures,
perceptions are crucial to decision making. Estimates of risk are not
strictly objective because the range of probable events is not known
and the probability distribution of those events that are known is
subject to significant disagreement. We have what Rowe (1977:17)
calls descriptive and measurement uncertainty. Questions of fact
associated with environmental risk management cannot be answered by
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the scientific method either because their answers require impracti-
cally expensive research, their subject matter is too variable to
allow strictly scientific rationalism, or their implications are
essentially incomplete unless coupled to moral and aesthetic judgments
(Weinberg, 1972:213).
The uncertainty that results frequently cripples public decision
making. These uncertain risks lead to predictable behaviors. In many
public policy debates, uncertainty is systematically denied or treated
as a predictable effect, an inadequate theory is claimed as most
appropriate in light of no clearly adequate alternative, or action is
prevented in the absence of greater certainty. Hazardous waste
management debates have all these characteristics.
Improved risk management, therefore, depends on improved
treatment of risk perceptions. Public systems function to provide
services, and perceptions influence the demand for, opposition to, and
satisfaction with those services. As a basis for knowledge, percep-
tions are most important when public policy has no firm factual
foundation upon which to rest. Perceptions of risk can overpower any
analysis that is attempted if the analysis and its supporting theory
are subject to dispute. As a basis for behavior, perceptions con-
strain the range of feasible risk management strategies. Perceptions
can generate substantial opposition to proposed facilities. As a
basis for experience, the fears generated have demonstrable psycho-
logical and social costs. (Kasper, 1980). Perceived risks, even when
not substantiated by analytic estimates, can cause considerable
distress. If we are to break out of the cycle of denial, claiming,
and inaction associated with uncertain and risky public policies, we
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must learn to cope with risk perceptions in the face of uncertainty.
Current research into risk perceptions in public policymaking is
based largely on studies of individual perceptions. This research
helps explain individual predispositions toward risk. Yet, risk
perceptions are not incorporated into policymaking by individuals in
isolation from others, but rather as part of a larger bargaining
process. Hence, in addition to studies of individual perceptions, an
understanding of interactive risk perceptions is essential.
Studies of Individual Risk Perceptions
As currently practiced, risk analysis is based largely on
engineering theories. The analysis builds on prescriptive theories
about how we ought to measure risk and make decisions when uncertainty
exists. The indicator of overall hazardousness generally preferred by
risk analysts is "expected outcomes per unit time" (e.g., expected
increase in deaths per year). By estimating the probability of
various potential futures and amalgamating the data into a single
measure of expected outcome, the essential characteristics of risk and
uncertainty that are of interest to engineers can be incorporated into
the analysis. Use of this scale as a measure of hazardousness,
however, blurs the distinction between risk estimation and risk
preference. Not only does the scale imply that fewer deaths are to be
preferred to more (an opinion against which few would disagree), but
because expected outcome is presented as the only significant indica-
tor of risk, the scale also implies that other characteristics of
outcomes which have not been estimated (e.g., the manner of death or
the degree of uncertainty) are less important.
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This implicit link between estimations of and preferences for
particular characteristics of hazards is more explicitly recognized in
expected utility theory. By encouraging decision makers to state
preferences for many possible pairs of potential outcomes (each with
some subjectively held probability of occuring), the decision analyst
can derive a more refined understanding of tradeoffs over the entire
range of possible alternatives. The resulting estimate of expected
utility, however, is highly subjective. Utilities cannot be compared
among individuals. Moreover, only measurable characteristics that are
amenable to probability analysis can be incorporated.
In observing patterns of lay perceptions, psychologists have
concluded that laypeople do not perceive risks as prescribed by
technical analysts. Laypeople are as concerned with the range of
possible consequences as they are with expected value or utility. In
portfolio theory developed by Coombs and associates (1975) the psy-
chological importance of three different forms of variability are
emphasized: the range of outcomes, probability of extreme outcomes
and variance for any given expected value.
Additionally, in complex decision making, information is fre-
quently processed sequentially (Schoemaker, 1980). Perceptions about
the consequences of particular alternatives are constrained by com-
parisons with other alternatives. Alternatives are evaluated by
tightening criteria until the subset of acceptable alternatives is
managable. Criteria are used to eliminate options below thresholds of
acceptability. Thresholds are established for probabilities (e.g.,
the chance of failure exceeds a critical value) or consequences (e.g.,
an option has the possibility of exceeding a specified maximum cost).
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Rejection rules are more frequently applied to potential losses than
to potential gains because losses more strongly alter minimum aspira-
tion levels than do gains. (Slovic, 1967; Slovic and Lichtenstein
1968; and Andreissen 1971). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that
losses become increasingly important while gains become decreasingly
important the further removed they are from an individual's point of
psychological neutrality.
Perception theorists have further demonstrated that individuals
use simplifying procedures to analyze complex problems of probability
and consequences. Representativeness (similarity to other objects or
events along some dimension) is usually used to classify a new object
or event into an existing, subjectively held class or process.
Availability (ease with which instances can be brought to mind) is
used to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a
particular development. Adjustments to an anchor (re-evaluation of an
initial estimate) is employed to make predictions when a relevant
value is available (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
The hazardous waste debate provides ample opportunity for
systematic bias to enter through each of these heuristics. To illus-
trate: an individual's estimate of the likelihood of a hazardous
waste catastrophe is likely to depend on whether hazardous waste is
perceived to be more similar to nuclear waste, to recycling, or to
city dumps (representativeness); whether the individual can easily
visualize potential catastrophes because of news coverage (availabili-
ty); and whether the individual's initial estimate is colored by the
estimates of advocates or opponents to the project (anchoring).
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Estimates of risk based on these heuristics, once formed, are
difficult to change because they are based on inherently subjective
processes of classifying objects, correlating events, and imagining
consequences. Both laypeople and sophisticated experts are typically
overly confident in these intuitively based judgments (Slovic et al.,
1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980), and hence are generally resistant to
alternative analyses. Inconsistencies within subjectively derived
judgments are difficult to pinpoint, and no compelling argument for
changing opinions can be made unless a subjective estimate can be
shown to be inconsistent with a person's total system of beliefs.
If laypeople evaluate the riskiness of an event by the range of
potential outcomes, paying more attention to potential losses than
gains and systematically simplifying complex problems in ways which
are highly subjective, it is little wonder that their evaluations
differ from those of professional risk analysts. However, the differ-
ences between lay and technical perceptions run deeper than these
alternative approaches to information processing would suggest. When
consequences are potentially catastrophic, the social context accen-
tuates differences between lay and technical perceptions of risk.
The Social Context of Risk Perceptions
Differences between lay and professional perceptions of risk are
rooted in the social and cultural environment in which the individual
perceives and decides. This social context is eclipsed in most
studies of individual risk perceptions. In these studies, the out-
comes are monetary, the solution set is discrete and well defined, the
consequences of risk taking are immediately apparent, and the decision
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maker is an individual. Models of risk perception and preference such
as these are of limited relevance when the decision maker, the risk
bearer, and the beneficiary are different; when associated risks and
benefits can be used to compensate losses, trade risks, or otherwise
plan for contingencies; or when consequences are potentially catas-
trophic.
Nonetheless, a key to understanding how the lay public perceives
large scale technological risks can be found in these germinal stud-
ies. Even more so than when choosing among small gambles, laypeople
focus on variability in potential outcomes and the possibility of loss
when faced with large scale risks. This focus is not simply a conse-
quence of shifts in statistical reasoning and risk averseness.
Laypeople's approach to large scale risk is not probabilisitic (that
is to say, quantitative). The riskiness of large scale technologies
appears to be evaluated by characterizing potential effects rather
than evaluating probable effects. In assessing accidents, neither the
annual number of lives lost nor the lives lost in one mishap are
indicative of the perceived seriousness of the risk. Innumerable car
accidents go unnoticed and plane crashes are given only passing
concern because they occur as part of a familiar and well-understood
system. A small accident in a poorly understood system, however, is
frequently perceived as a harbinger of catastrophy (Slovic, 1982b:88),
and consequently is viewed as having great importance.
The subjectivity of evaluations based on qualitative character-
istics helps create enormous discrepancies between technical and lay
risk perceptions. Research is increasingly suggesting that the per-
ceived risks of large scale technologies are built on perceptions of
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both knowledge and consequences. Risks are perceived as greatest when
an individual believes that little is known about and little can be
done to prevent potentially catastrophic consequences. Currently,
public policy relies most heavily on improved information about
technologies and physical systems to reconcile divergent opinions
about risk. Because information about rare events is not definitive,
however, risk perceptions are not easily altered by such information
(Nelkin et al, 1980:189). Moreover, disputants argue less about
information than about how to interpret such information (Schon,
1971:13). The result has been partisan use of analysis to "prove"
what is really perceived through more basic qualitiative character-
istics. The debate is not compelling because it fails to address
issues of fundamental concern.
Even more importantly, public policymaking is stalemated by this
failure to accept the potential validity and to actively engage lay as
well as technical patterns of risk perception. In the absence of
active engagement, risk management strategies developed by the tech-
nical community are increasingly resisted by organized communities of
lay publics. Our policymaking process is strained. We are unable to
cope with risks that we recognize as endangering our environment.
If we are to develop public consensus around perceptions of
risk, we cannot do so by altering each person's psychology, group
identity or culture. We must do so by altering factors that are
rooted in the social context and are legitimately part of public
decision making. We need to explore the patterns of lay perceptions
and their sensitivity to alternative policies of risk reduction. We
need also to explore patterns of lay risk acceptance and their
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sensitivity to policies of compensation. Through such exploration, in
the context of policymaking, we might design policies for better
coping with risks.
III. Strategies for Coping with Risk Perceptions
Perception research underscores the importance of variability as
a determinant of perceived riskiness. What seems to place large scale
technical facilities in a class by themselves is their perceived
unpredictability and potential for extreme outcomes. Images of
catastrophes and cancer dominate. Small accidents seem less important
because they are familiar and controllable. Social mechanisms for
coping with small hazards, of defining and limiting their effects, are
widely trusted. Similar mechanisms for coping with large scale
hazards are given little credance.
The task of designing better ways for coping with risk requires
a fundamental shift in risk management techniques. We must devise
systems for reducing the variability, for limiting the potential for
extreme outcomes. Moreover, these systems must be percieved as
reliable and trustworty. Otherwise, they will make little difference
to the siting process.
Whether risk is estimated quantitatively or qualitatively,
questions about four aspects of risk management must be answered to
the satisfaction of participants in the decision making process.
These include:
- Prediction: Do we know enough to forecast the likely
effects of a hazardous waste treatment facility? Is
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this knowledge being impartially examined and pre-
sented?
- Prevention: Can we design systems for effectively
reducing the potential risk? Will these systems be
reliably managed?
- Detection: If hazardous conditions develop, do we have
the means to detect these changes? If so, will that
data be collected and scrutinized so as to detect
changes quickly? and
- Mitigation: If serious hazards are detected, do we know
how to reverse the dangers and the negative impacts?
Will these mitigation measures be applied with suffi-
cient speed and skill to be effective?
Perceptions of risk depend not just on predictive knowledge, but also
on detective knowledge; not just on efforts to prevent consequences,
but also on efforts to mitigate them should they occur. A preoccu-
pation solely with technical definitions of risk lead us to emphasize
prediction-prevention strategies for managing those risks. Technical
analysis focuses most readily on events in the planning and construc-
tion phases of risk management: on technologies being installed and
systems being built. Because built systems and infrastructures are
difficult to alter, the risk management strategy is limited to the
adequacy of our current knowledge. Unfortunately, this adequacy is at
the core of the hazardous waste facility siting debate.
Detection-mitigation models, with their focus on the operating
phase of risk management, are more future oriented and adaptable.
They do not limit control to present actions, but offer a way of
integrating new concerns through time. Inasmuch as problems evolve
toward extreme outcomes by building on lesser problems, variability
can be greatly reduced though detection and mitigation of these lesser
problems. By bargaining over methods of detection and mitigation, we
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can reduce feelings of uncertainty, increase perceived control, and
hence alter perceptions of risk.
But our current emphasis on improving technology and learning
more about the resilience of natural systems is still too limiting.
We need new approaches to risk management aimed directly at recon-
ciling opposing perceptions of risk. As Clark (1980:308) notes, when
knowledge is incomplete and the future uncertain, mistakes and sur-
prise are inevitable. Effective policy must rely on a strategy of
recognizing mistakes, learning from them, and modifying future actions
accordingly. Our problem is not just of knowledge, but also of
learning; not just of consequences, but also of coping. To effect
changes in perception, efforts to manage risk must extend beyond a
focus on technology and physical systems to the design of organiza-
tional learning and control strategies.
Alternative approaches to risk management can be illustrated by
the experience of IT Corporation in Warren, Massachusetts (Blake,
1982b). In June of 1981, IT announced plans for a $100 million
hazardous waste treatment plant. The firm currently operates 26
plants in California with a combined total output 10 times that of the
proposed Massachusetts plant. The proposed plant is larger than any
single plant it now operates.
IT is simultaneously proposing to build large plants in Louisi-
ana, Texas and Massachusetts. In all three states, the arguments both
for and against the proposal are essentially based on perceptions of
risk. Proponents feel that without these or similar plants, illegal
dumping will continue posing significant health hazards. Opponents
feel that the proposed plants are too large, use untested technolo-
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gies, and present health hazards themselves. In Massachusetts, the
state Secretary of Environmental Affairs and a statewide public
interest group, the Coalition for Safe Waste Management, promoted
consideration of the project while a local citizen's group, STOP IT,
expressed strong opposition.
The groups involved in the IT siting process tried to affect the
perceptions of members of the state mandated Local Assessment Commit-
tee as well as the public-at-large. For the most part, each group
relied on analysis of the safety record of IT and on predictions of
likely consequences to convince others of the rightness of its posi-
tion. Information, propaganda and documentary evidence were ex-
changed. IT claimed to have a good waste management record. STOP IT
pointed out numerous code violations in existing plants. IT countered
that it had rectified problems whenever they become apparent.
Information was adapted by both sides to convince specific
audiences. As O'Hare (1981) has noted, users of information vary.
Because factual information is difficult to analyze, most individuals
rely on the interpretation of others. For these people, the problem
of information analysis is reduced to the task of selecting appro-
priate advocates and adopting their view. Recognizing this, IT tried
to convince opinion leaders, especially environmental organizations,
of their view. STOP IT responded with charges that the firm was
saying different things to different audiences.
The two strategies used in the Warren debate represent the most
common approach to altering risk perceptions. But bargaining need not
be restricted to an exchange of views. Alterations of physical
systems is a second often used approach to risk perception management.
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Traditional regulatory and permitting processes frequently require
alterations such as redesigning the plant or adding back-up safety
features. Bargaining over preventive physical systems, however, can
increase a sense of risk as well as decrease it. Large expenditures
in prevention is frequently cited as evidence of a plants fundamental
lack of safety. IT claims its plant is safely designed. STOP IT
counters that the possibility of leaks is not infinitesimal. The
bargaining stances are predictably opposed.
A third stance is possible. Agreement might be reached on the
appropriate systems for detecting breakdowns in the system and for
mitigating and managing the effects if breakdowns occur. Wells could
be sunk to monitor changes in water quality and pump systems added to
confine leachate should it be detected. Candor about the possibility
of accidents and a willingness to commit resources to detect and
mitigate damage are at the core of this bargaining strategy.
Contingency planning, however, has not been present in past
hazardous waste facility debates. By itself, it does not resolve
disputes based on risk perception because future events signal very
different possibilities to individuals who perceive risks differently.
In the absence of a trusted arbiter to enforce contingency agreements,
differences in risk perceptions will remain.
The impossibility of fail-safe design underlines the importance
of developing reliable mechanisms for coping with hazards (Clark,
1980; Thompson, 1980). Our willingness to believe that certain
institutions or organizations can and will function effectively shapes
our perception of risk. We evaluate private organizations by their
willingness or ability to invest in the necessary technology, attract
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and retain competent workers, enforce appropriate work practices, and
develop and implement effective managment procedures. We evaluate
public agencies by their willingness or ability to investigate poten-
tial hazards and, if necessary, enforce changes in operating proce-
dures, capital investments or mitigation measures. Thus, managers and
public officials can alter perceptions of risk through the sense of
competence and trustworthiness they create.
Governmental and organizational arrangements determine who
wields control. The major social system for managing risks today is
owner onsite management coupled to a regulatory and permitting over-
view. This system entrusts the greatest control to those with the
greatest vested interests: the owners. Uncertainty is largely
shifted onto host communities. With permission to site the facility,
the community gives up its ability to alter an important aspect of its
future while openning itself to the vagaries of the facility's opera-
tion. Public control is largely limited to a priori permit reviews.
Changes in this system of control may well be the key to coping
with differences in risk perceptions. Prescribed arrangements for the
detection and mitigation of hazards could include the establishment of
overseers or review boards with contingent powers to manage or close
plants under certain specified conditions. For example, IT Corpora-
tion or the state of Massachusetts could provide funds to Warren to
hire an industrial engineer who would help co-manage the plant, or
they might create a trust fund to limit local liability should an
accident occur.
Surprising as it may seem, innovative modifications to systems
of management have rarely been an item of negotiation in siting
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disputes. Instead, bargainers have focused on the acceptability and
distribution of perceived risks. Strategies for minimizing adverse
consequences if hazardous conditions do arise have been given little
or no attention.
Under these circumstances, the efficacy of these approaches will
not be easily tested. There are no case studies to be done because
none exist. But experiments are possible, experiments in which
individuals confront their perceptions in light of these risk manage-
ment policies. Real life decision making can be simulated. Such
research can explore the structure of opposition to hazardous waste
facilities, examine risk perceptions in the context of siting these
facilities, and experiment with the impact of systems of contingency
planning and management on risk perceptions.
IV. An Overview of the Research Approach and Methods
Using Gaming Simulation in Research
The analysis was aimed at clarifying the patterns of risk
perception that emerge during facility siting disputes, the sensitivi-
ty of those patterns to various actions of public officials, and the
possibility of developing consensus when perceptions of risk vary
widely. Gaming simulation provided a structure for exploring siting
disputes in both their wholeness and in detail. Because simulations
are holistic, they provide a laboratory for studying linkages other-
wise left uncovered, linkages which appear only when interactions
actually take place. Because simulations are controllable, specific
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alternatives can be introduced, tested, and probed.
Other research methods were inadequate for my purposes. Single
person behavioral studies allow for highly focused experiments, but
cannot be used to analyze the interactions between and among competing
interest groups that are an essential feature of siting disputes.
Survey studies elicit an individual's perceptions but do not impose a
shared context through which perceptions are shaped. Case studies and
other field studies reflect on a stream of events, but leave little
room for understanding what might have been. Finally, mathematical
modeling and computer-based simulations require a prior understanding
of system features that are precisely the object of the research.
Each of these research methods is important to the study of risk
perceptions and siting disputes, but gaming simulation is the logical
choice for the questions I seek to raise.
The simulation was designed to learn more about resolving
conflicts that grow out of differing perceptions of risk. How are
these perceptions fine tuned? Do conflicts in risk perception stem
mostly from disagreements about the ability (or willingness) of
government and industry to accurately predict impacts, to detect
harmful impacts before they reach crisis proportions, to prevent
adverse impacts, or to mitiate harmful impacts if they do occur? Are
we more concerned with proposed technological improvements that limit
the likelihood of hazard or with organizational arrangements for
coping with the risks inherent in all technological systems?
The simulation was used to compare the efficacy of prediction
and prevention strategies with alternative detection and mitigation
strategies, and technological systems of control with alternative
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management systems. To facilitate this comparison, the simulation
needed to accomplish three purposes: to communicate information about
hazardous waste in an educational format, to promote dialogue about
and careful consideration of this information, and to extract informa-
tion and opinions from the participants (Duke, 1974; Greenblat and
Duke, 1981).
The communities in which I ran the simulation were ones in which
a hazardous waste dispute had not occurred. I assumed that the
details of an individual's perceptions can be quickly submerged in the
rhetoric of a dispute. In struggles, people become strategic. The
language they use for communicating their concerns is hard to separate
from their position in the dispute. I wished to examine perceptions
in light of disputes, but before the language for describing those
perceptions had become stylized by the debate. By choosing partici-
pants naive to the struggles of hazardous waste disputes but sophisti-
cated in the politics of local governance, I hoped to tap this level
of perception.
Because most participants had no professional experience with
hazardous waste, however, I needed to present information within a
context they could quickly grasp and integrate into their thinking.
Strategies for coping with the risks of hazardous waste needed to be
specified and simulated by the materials and information provided the
participants, and by the structure of the decision making process.
The simulation also needed to promote dialogues and interactions by
which the participants' initial impresssions could be tested in a
realistic decision making setting. From this dialogue and decision
making, I hoped participants would frame an understanding of their
- 49 -
concerns and perceptions about hazardous waste facility siting.
Through observation of behavior in the context of the simulation,
questionnaires and interviews, I would then be able to explore these
perceptions and concerns with each participant.
The Simulation
The gaming exercise was mounted in two Massachusetts communi-
ties. The communities were selected based on a few minimal criteria
applicable to the siting of hazardous waste treatment facilities.
Each community must be readily accessible to an interstate highway and
contain large tracts of undeveloped land. Densely populated cities,
highly sensitive ecologies, and towns in which a hazardous waste
controversy had occured were excluded. I have named the two communi-
ties Essexton and Worcesterville.
Essexton is located in the coastal county of Essex, north of
Boston. With a population of 6,000 and development concentrated along
the main road and town center, Essexton is a tightly developed commer-
cial and residential community. The town has only one heavy industry
and very little light industry. Income levels in the town are
slightly below state averages, while unemployment and educational
levels are slightly above. Because development has been concentrated,
half the town remains wooded and undeveloped. Railroad tracks cut
through this undeveloped area, and a major interstate highway cuts
along one of its edges. The town draws its water from a shallow
aquifer that underlies most of the town.
Worcesterville is located in Worcester County, west of Boston.
While the county contains considerable industry, large sections are
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rural residential. Worcesterville, with a population of 5,000, is
predominantly residential. Low density development is scattered
throughout the town, but large tracts of undeveloped land remain. The
town has some light industry. Residents are relatively affluent.
Income and educational levels are above state averages. Almost half
the working population are employed in professional, technical or
managerial positions. Interstate highway and railroad transportation
to the town are excellent.
Participants from these two communities were identified from
four interest groups: public officials, businesses, environmental-
ists, and landowners. Eighteen and sixteen participants each took
part in the Essexton and Worcesterville simulations. All participants
were from the community in which the simulation was run and shared a
commitment to and experience with the political life of the town.
As discussed in detail in the foreword, the participants were
selected to mirror the make-up of a Local Assessment Committee. The
Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act requires that towns
form these committees whenever a facility is proposed for siting in
their community. The law dictates the make-up of the committee and
gives authority over local hazardous waste facility siting issues to
this group. By mirroring this committee in the simulation, particip-
ation need not involve difficult role playing. Each of the public
officials, business people, environmentalists and landowners were
making a decision very much akin to one they might make in real life.
With the roles of the developer's spokesperson and the town's expert
consultant being played by research associates and simulated in the
materials provided to the participants, the simulation was designed to
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provide as realistic a setting as possible for making siting deci-
sions.
The foreword also described in detail the simulation as con-
ducted in Worcesterville. Essexton closely parallels this experience.
Each simulation had three phases: presenting the siting proposals,
discussing and selecting a negotiating partner, and making tradeoffs.
The researcher presented participants with a proposal for a rotary
kiln incinerator to be sited in their community. Using diagrams and
pictures, the characteristics of the facility were described in
detail. Three hazardous waste management firms were then presented as
competing for permission to build this facility. Incorporated into
each package was one of the three major approaches to risk management
discussed above. Waste Technology Incorporated offered additional
technical hazard prevention features. Pollution Control Corporation
offered detection and mitigation features. Environmental Management
Incorporated offered alternative management and power sharing fea-
tures. Finally, participants were presented with a range of possible
compensation proposals, divided into groups of approximately six
individuals, and given the freedom to make tradeoffs among the safety
and compensation features as they wished. Details of these stages are
presented in the foreword. The materials used in the simulations are
presented in Appendix A.
The Research Tools
Close observation and documentation of the simulations provided
an important component of the research data. However, detailed
descriptions of participants behavior are difficult to interpret.
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Research tools are needed to understand the perceptual basis for this
behavior. This study incorporated three research tools specifically
designed to explore perceptions that motivated observed behavior.
Each individual was given a pre-simulation test of general perceptions
about and preferences for risk and hazardous waste treatment, two
questionnaires probing changes in their perceptions (to be answered as
the simulation proceeded), and a post-simulation interview.
Before commencement of the simulations, the attitudes and
perceptions of each participant were evaluated using a simple ques-
tionnaire. The questionnaire was aimed at determining attitudes
towards hazardous waste, industrial development, environmental protec-
tion, the state and federal governments, and public regulation of
industry. Beliefs about risk management options and knowledge about
hazardous waste were also explored (see Appendix B). The question-
naire was designed to facilitate evaluation of group behavior in light
of individual preconceptions.
During the simulation, each individual was provided with two
voting questionnaires. The form was designed as a simple recording
device to assist the individual in reflecting on his or her ongoing
perceptions of the siting process. The record was confidential, and
was used as a basis for exploring perceptions that public statements
did not reveal.
After the simulations were completed, each individual was
interviewed privately. The sixty to ninety minute interviews were
used to integrate the results of the questionnaires and observed
behavior. The interviews were designed to provide a time for "picking
the minds" of the participants. The simulations had greatly enhanced
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the understanding of these city officials, business people, environ-
mentalists and land owners about hazardous waste facility siting.
Interviews probed the trade-offs that participants made during the
simulation and examined the relative importance of the various factors
that shaped their risk perceptions. Participants were questioned
about perceptions, decision making, discrepencies between perceptions
and behavior, the relative value of different approaches to risk
management, the suggestions they had for improving the siting process,
and their reaction to other, untested proposals.
The realism of the simulation and its ability to elicit mean-
ingful comments are difficult to evaluate. It can only be truly
experienced from within -- as it was by the researchers and the
participants -- for it is essentially a sophisticated form of commun-
ication and interaction among these individuals. But fully a third of
the participants made spontaneous comments about the simulation. The
flavor of these comments can be summarized with the statements of
three individuals.
I take this exercise seriously. I've tried to give
you input, to tell you what you need to hear because it
is what I as an official feels really reflects what is
best for the town without shirking responsibility for the
problem. But it's really hard to grapple with a problem
that's so damned important.
A Selectman
The game was marvelous. It really put put us in
places where we had to push and think about these prob-
lems. The things that individuals felt were most impor-
tant were really brought out into the foreground and
discussed.
A Conservation Commissioner
Is anyone really considering putting a hazardous
waste treatment plant in Essexton? We talked about this
in our group. Yes, we have the land. Yes, we have the
wind currents that would carry any air pollution away
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from populated areas. There's 400 acres of open land
available in close proximity to a railroad, with a super
highway coming right in. A plant like this could con-
ceivably be sited here. The proposal was very realistic.
An Industrial Process Engineer
Before examining the outcomes of these simulations, however, we
need to first understand the dynamics of existing and past hazardous
waste controversies. The next chapter focuses on problems historical-
ly associated with hazardous waste disposal and treatment facilities.
Two questions are addressed. First, what are the causes and how
widespread are the impacts of improper management of hazardous waste?
Second, how unequivocally can the hazards of an existing treatment or
disposal problem be determined once a condition of hazard is known to
exist? We explore these issues because they form the historic base on
which prediction of potential impacts of new facilities will be based,
and inasmuch as the consequences of hazardous conditions remain
uncertain even after the condition exists, these examples clearly
demonstrate the limits to our predictive and analytic capabilities.
CHAPTER 2:
HAZARDOUS WASTE IN THE 1970s:
THE PAST AS PROLOGUE TO AN UNCERTAIN PRESENT
In biblical Jerusalem, Christians redefined the meaning of hell.
Fire and brimstone replaced the cold subterranean darkness of Hades.
The Valley of Gehenna, filled with the burning and stench of
Jerusalem's wastes, proved a powerful metaphor for this new hell.
Garbage heaps, it would seem, are graphic embodiments of undesirable
places.
As the urban landscape has evolved over the last two centuries,
waste has become even more ubiquitous. Waste repositories, however,
have become cleaner. Sanitary landfills and engineered incinerators
have replaced the firey pit. For the most part, notorious city dumps
are now merely unpopular neighbors (see Wilson, 1977). In their stead
a new waste problem has emerged. Not smoldering wastes but chemical
waters are now a serious cause of concern.
Love Canal is the most infamous of these chemical landfills.
Love Canal has set the image of "hazardous waste" more than any other
single place or event. Throughout the country, however, local hazard-
ous waste sites have fueled widespread concern. In Massachusetts
alone, the state Department of Environmental Quality has closed 70
- 56 -
public and private wells in 30 communities due to chemical contamin-
ation. Thirty-six communities are known to have hazardous waste sites
within their boundaries (Boston Globe, 3/20/82:1). The contamination
of water, land, and air with chemical wastes stem from lax (and
sometimes illegal) procedures widely used for the last 40 years.
Whether the chemical industry can reverse public perception
through more appropriate management procedures remains unclear. To
date, public perceptions of the risks associated with hazardous waste
treatment and disposal have not been quieted by technological improve-
ments. In trying to improve the technology of waste management, the
industry can hardly help but create new uncertainties. These uncer-
tainties, when coupled with widespread contamination from older
facilities, have led to an impasse. Local communities have become
universally opposed to the siting of a hazardous waste treatment
facility within their borders. Despite nation-wide support for
improved treatment facilities, no major facility has been successfully
sited in the past eight.*
This chapter examines hazardous waste controversies caused by
treatment practices of the past. These controversies have done much
to color the current debate. They also pinpoint uncertainties that
will influence virtually all hazardous waste siting disputes in the
future. This chapter focuses on the nature of uncertainty and its
impact on perceptions of risk.
* Between 1976 and 1984, several facilities for onsite treatment of
hazardous waste by the generators of those wastes have been con-
structed in this time period, but to the best of my knowledge, no
commercial facility designed to accept multiple waste streams from
many different generators has been constructed.
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I. Emerging Problems Due to Improper Disposal Practices
Fourteen years ago, when Earth Day was first celebrated, haz-
ardous waste had few detractors. Until the debates over the 1976
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the public was most
attentive to industrial pollution of the air, water, and ocean.
Perceptions changed rapidly with the availability of new information
about toxic substances and with several highly publicized tragedies
involving hazardous waste. Love Canal is the most famous, but
national concern was based less on this one incident than on the
widespread discovery of more localized problems. By 1979, EPA had
documented approximately 700 "damage incidents" caused by hazardous
waste. Many hundreds more were suspected. While remedial action was
considered necessary in most of these cases, cleanup had been attempt-
ed in only a few (US Senate, 1979a:IV-37).
The extent of damage in these incidents varies considerably.
Widespread contamination of all three major Long Island aquifers has
affected 54 public wells serving 100,000 residents (US Senate 1979a:
IV-32) and could eventually affect the water of the three million Long
Island residents who rely on ground water (US Congress, 1982:II-J-5).
In another locale, trichloroethane found in the groundwater aquifer of
Grey, Maine, affected only 750 families, but to those families forced
to use trucked water and to the municipality forced to spend $600,000
to extend the water system to them, the cost remains high.
Damage created by the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, located near
Denver, is more typical. Use of unlined holding ponds to store
pesticide wastes began in 1943. Contamination of the soil became
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apparent with repeated crop damage on adjacent farms starting in 1951.
The contamination was traced to the holding ponds in 1954. The
pesticide wastes had also infiltrated into the shallow water table
aquifer. The unlined ponds were used for three more years. The
wastes were then transferred to lined ponds, but contamination contin-
ued to spread. By 1975, when the Colorado Department of Health issued
a cease and desist order, contamination had spread to 30 square miles
of aquifer and six and a half square miles of farmland. Sixty-four
domestic, stock, and irrigation wells were abandoned. The estimated
cost of decontaminating the Arsenal property is 78 million dollars.
Full decontamination has not been attempted (US EPA, 1975).
These and scores of similar cases have given rise to a growing
local consciousness about the risks of hazardous waste. In Massa-
chusetts, one-third of the state's 351 communities have chemical
contaminants in their well water in excess of state and federal health
standards. Private and public wells have been closed or restricted in
22 towns, including all municipal wells in two of these towns (US
Congress, 1982:II-J-6). Four waste sites have serious enough problems
to warrent inclusion on EPA's first list of 115 superfund sites
(Epstein, 1982:448-449). A well publicized dispute exists between the
W. R. Grace Company and the town of Acton over waste migration from
lagoons. The wastes are contaminating a major aquifer supplying 40
percent of the town's drinking water (Epstein, 1982:441). In the
industrial city of Lowell, Massachusetts, the waste processing firm of
Silresim Chemical declared bankruptcy in 1977. Some 20,000 barrels,
many rusted and leaking and containing over a million gallons of toxic
waste, were left behind (US EPA, 1980a:21). The runoff from storms
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carried high concentrations of wastes into both the Lowell sewer
system and into a stream that flows into the Merrimack River. The
cost of cleanup exceeded 1.5 million dollars (Hanrahan, 1979:22). As
Figure 2.1 shows, hazardous waste and related chemical pollution are a
state-wide problem in Massachusetts.
Problems associated with past processing and disposal practices
have led to widespread concern throughout the United States. While
each instance of contamination is unique, residents and abutters share
several common concerns: fear of health effects (even in the absence
of supportive data); anger over the turmoil (and in some cases econom-
ic loss) generated by uncertainty; and frustration at the failure of
public institutions to eliminate the hazards. A closer look at one
case will illustrate these concerns.
II. Risk and Relief in Love Canal
The Love Canal controversy is a story of uncertainty and com-
peting interests. The story is described in detail here because it is
indicative of more local but less well documented disputes across the
nation. A close look at the Love Canal controversy reveals a range of
uncertainties and competing interests, as well as the inability of
institutions to reconcile the resulting disputes. (The major sources
for this account include Brown, 1981; Levine, 1981; and Epstein,
1982).
Ironically, Love Canal was born of a grand vision. William Love
began excavating a canal in the 1880s as part of a plan to build a
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model city. The economy of the city was to be based on the plentiful
supply of direct current electricity. By connecting the river from
above Niagara Falls to the water below via a canal, water power could
be distributed along the entire length of the canal. The discovery of
alternating current electricity destroyed the raison d'etre for the
canal and the new town because, unlike direct current, alternating
current could be easily transmitted over distances. Industry no
longer needed to be located adjacent to sources of water power. The
canal was abandoned until the Hooker Chemical company purchased it for
use as a dump site. Between 1947 and 1952, Hooker used the canal to
legally disposed of 20,000 metric tons of chemical waste containing
300 different chemicals (US EPA, 1980b:1). They thereafter donated
the land to the Niagara Board of Education. The 99th Street Elemen-
tary School was built over the chemical landfill in 1954. Housing
developments soon followed.
By the mid-sixties the production and migration of leachate from
the landfill caused odors and visible problems in the surrounding
neighborhood. Huge holes and lagoons filled with brown-black liquid.
Children came home with chemical burns. Only dandelions grew where
the chemicals were present. In the early seventies, basements nearest
the canal began to flood, carrying leachate into homes after each
heavy rainfall.
The first state sponsored investigation, conducted in 1977,
discovered heavy contamination of both ground and surface water. It
was not until May of 1978, however, that a resident named Lois Gibbs
petitioned the neighborhood to close the school. At the same time,
the New York State Departments of Health and of Environmental
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Conservation conducted a series of tests to determine the level of
contamination. Fears long held but never openly voiced by local
residents were confirmed by the investigation. News announcements,
official inquiries and meetings led to feverish discussions among
neighbors.
What had once been covered was now open: as a community,
residents feared that something "ominous, huge, and destructive might
be in store" (Levine, 1981:25). When the state health commissioner
ordered the school closed and the evacuation of pregnant women and
young children, the streets were filled with the crying and shouting
of residents left behind. When dioxin was found on the site, violence
erupted.
By the summer of 1978, residents of Love Canal felt a sense of
abandonment, isolation, and loss of control (Levine, in NY Times, 16
May 1980). The loss of control stemmed from decisions made long ago
in which the residents had not participated. Official disorganization
in developing a rescue plan deepened these feelings. The agencies to
which residents looked to find solutions were unable to act decisive-
ly. Responsibility was divided among Hooker Chemical, which had
deeded the land to the school board with specific provisions absolving
it of all future liability; the school board, which had in turn deeded
the land to the city in 1960 and had neither the expertise nor the
resources to generate a solution; and the city, which owned most, but
not all of the land, but had never managed the site.
In the end, the state and federal governments bore most of the
investigative and cleanup costs. The State Departments of Health,
Environmental Conservation, Transportation, Housing, Social Services,
- 63 -
Banking, and Insurance, the Office of Disaster Preparedness, and the
Division of Equalization and Assessment worked with the federal
Environmental Protection Agency and Federal Housing Administration and
a host of local agencies to provide disaster relief and develop a
management plan for the Canal (Worthley, 1981:152). In the absence of
clearly delineated lines of responsibility, many of these efforts were
counterproductive.
One hundred families were temporarily relocated during remedial
construction. Conditions were cramped, families were separated, meals
were unavailable, and people were moved from room to room. Three
months later, the homes of these relocated residents were deemed safe
enough for habitation. The residents returned to find that the
Federal Housing Administration had instituted new regulations effec-
tively forbidding FHA insurance in the area. The reason given: homes
were potentially too hazardous for habitation. Ad hoc decisionmaking
and shifting responsibility continued until the final evacuation of
550 families from a 30 block area in 1980.
Uncertainty in Managing the Process of Relief
With local government and Hooker Chemical either ignoring the
situation or denying responsibility, conflict between these parties
and Love Canal residents was inevitable. The state's willingness to
assume at least some responsibility for the cleanup should have
helped, but its relationship with the residents also broke down. As
Levine (1981:24) notes:
The more that officials met with residents, the more
negative feelings and relationships developed. When
professionals presented raw data, it confused people.
When they tried to interpret the data in down-to-earth
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terms, describing risks as some number of deaths in
excess of the usual number expected, people interpreted
that to imply their deaths and their children's deaths.
When they tried to calm people by saying that, despite
all the serious possibilities, there was no evidence of
serious health effects, the officials were seen as
covering up.... What officials thought of as privileged
advisory conferences were viewed as conclaves that
excluded affected citizens. What officials saw as
preliminary studies conducted to assess the situation
were viewed by residents as wasting resources on repeti-
tious research projects rather than doing something
helpful. When they took action quickly or tried to do
everything at once, for everyone, they overloaded facil-
ities, made errors, and were faulted for bungling.
The conflict separated not just resident from outsider, but
resident from resident. No one could be held solely responsible for
the contamination. Frustration and anger were therefore diffuse; the
victims felt themselves to be at the mercy of the state and federal
government. Legitimate claims for relief did not translate easily
into politically effective demands for action. Residents viewed their
plight as personal and economic rather than as communal and political.
Groups of victims felt themselves to be in direct competition for
money (Moldenhauer, 1982:220-221), and bitter arguments divided the
Love Canal Homeowners' Association. Those living nearest the chem-
icals formed a splinter group to demand that they be the first to go
(Brown, 1981:36). Homeowners and renters did not work to meet their
common interests.
The psychological stability of the residents and the social
fabric of the community deteriorated under the strain. Many remained
at home, unable to cope with jobs. Children experienced nightmares of
death. Among the 237 families evacuated in 1978, 40 percent of
married couples became divorced or separated before 1980 (Holden,
1980:1243). Residents felt like "hostages" (NY Times, 16 May 1980)
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and "American refugees" who had been "pushed, frustrated, pulled,
hauled" and left homeless (Epstein, 1982:107). Finally, when resi-
dents were removed from the neighborhood, the community dissolved.
The alienation and emotional turmoil that the residents of Love
Canal experienced need not have been so dramatic. Much of it stemmed
from the fact that no political institution had both a mandate and the
means to act in the interests of the residents. The United States has
a well rehearsed disaster relief system that is triggered by natural
disasters. These systems are not designed to respond to slowly
evolving tragedies.
Particularly for those responsible for the problem -- Hooker
Chemical, the school board and the city -- the risks associated with
accepting any liability were enormous. By 1981, over 125 million
dollars had been expended, mostly by the state and federal govern-
ments, to bring the wastes under control and to relocate the families
(Worthley, 1981:160). From 1978 to 1979, out of a total city budget
of 45 million dollars, seven million was spent on remedial work in the
canal area. Claims against the city for personal injury and property
damage amounted to three billion (Epstein, 1982:110 & 103). Hooker
Chemical has been sued for 15 billion dollars* (US Congress, 1982:II-
J-8). In late 1977, a Love Canal study group -was formed including
representatives of Hooker Chemical, the city, the county and the
school board. The group cooperated with the state to develop an
* These costs should be compared to the cost of constructing and
sealing a secure hazardous waste facility. According to Douglas
Costle, EPA's administrator in 1979, the equivalent of four million
dollars in 1979 funds would have covered the cost of closing Love
Canal in 1952. (Source: US Senate, 1980:1).
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engineering plan for rehabilitating the site. Cooperation broke down
in mid-1978 as the question of financial responsibility loomed.
While competing interests of different parties helps explain
their actions, an important element of the problem remains. Much of
the alienation and emotional turmoil sprang from differences in the
perceived risks of Love Canal. Because the risks remained highly
uncertain, even after repeated scientific study, perceptions became a
central force in the debate.
Love Canal: The Scientific Debate
The more than 20,000 metric tons of chemicals buried at Love
Canal (US EPA, 1980:1) created problems from the beginning. When
excavation for the 99th Street school uncovered barrels of wastes in
1954, the school was moved and the planned basement was eliminated.
When a number of children were burned by chemicals that surfaced in
the late 1950s, parents called Hooker's health dispensary for informa-
tion about treatment. When a child fell into a pit filled with a
muddy black liquid and became sick in 1965, residents fought to have
the city fill the hole. When basements flooded with the same liquid
in the early 1970s, parents sent their kids outside to play. When
vegetable gardens, shrubs and lawns refused to grow, residents with
green thumbs planted hardier varieties, or gave up.
Throughout this period, many of the children developed chronic
health problems, especially asthma, liver damage, hepatitis, hyper-
activity, rashes, loss of hair, bronchitis and gastroenteritis. In
the first nine houses of a block adjacent to the Canal, five women had
miscarriages. Neighboring women had given birth to six children with
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birth defects, a still born, and two chilren who died in their cribs
(Epstein, 1982:100). Most of these parents considered these health
problems as a quirk of nature. The burns and property damage clearly
caused by the chemicals were seen as unrelated to problems of chronic
health deterioration (Brown, 1979:7).
In May of 1978, two residents reshaped local perceptions. As
part of a petition drive to close the 99th Street school, Lois Gibbs
and Debbie Cerrillo interviewed residents door-to-door. They uncov-
ered a pattern of widespread illness. In 1977, the city of Niagara
Falls hired an engineering consulting firm to analyze the disposal
site. The firm concluded that massive leakage had occurred from drums
located near the surface of the canal, contaminating both groundwater
and surface topsoil.
The State Departments of Health and Environmental Conservation
had collected samples from Love Canal in 1976. Because funds to
finance the necessary tests were not available, testing was delayed
more than a year (Wothley, 1981:153). In 1978, the departments
initiated more extensive sampling of groundwater, soil and air contam-
ination and began a survey of local health problems for residents
living adjacent to the Canal. Contamination was found to be wide-
spread and highly toxic. Miscarriages were four times the normal rate
among some populations of women (Epstein, 1982:101). Based on these
data, a first ring of homes was evacuated.
The stage for the scientific debate was now set. In the fall of
1978, the Love Canal Homeowners Association designed its own health
survey under the direction of Beverly Paigen, a cancer researcher.
The Association believed the health problems of Love Canal were more
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extensive than the state survey showed. Eleven hundred residents were
contacted by phone. Participants were not screened nor were medical
records collected (US HOR, 1979:60; Paigen, 1981). But from this
survey grew a theory of contamination that had not been considered
before. By examining the historic topography of the area, residents
identified old marshes and streambeds. These "wet" areas highly
correlated with the incidences of miscarriages, asthma, birth defects
and nervous disorders identified in the survey. Nine of sixteen
children born in these areas in the previous five years had birth
defects.
The State Department of Health conducted its own limited survey.
It also found a higher incidence of problems in wet areas.* In early
1979, the state authorized a limited evacuation of pregnant women and
children under the age of two, but did not believe that a general
evacuation was warranted. The Home Owners' Association asked to
review the state's data, but the request was denied on the grounds of
confidentiality.
In the ensuing uproar an independent panel of scientists was
established to review the results of both studies. Chaired by David
Rall, director of the National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences, the panel concluded that both studies demonstrated the
existence of health problems adjacent to the canal and in wet areas,
but that disagreements over interpretation of the data were inevita-
ble. Rall observed (Epstein, 1982:105):
* The study documented adverse effects in liver function, low-birth
weights, spontaneous abortions, and possibly congenital defects
(N.Y. Department of Health, 1981).
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We don't have the appropriate tools or even the appro-
priate background with scientific knowledge to evaluate
these problems. Scientists probably don't even know what
the short term effect of half to a third of each of the
chemicals found in the canal have on laboratory animals.
Without this basic knowledge, assessing the immediate
effect on people is almost impossible. We have even less
understanding of what each of the chemicals may do over a
long period of time (or) the effect of combinations of
chemicals.
By the summer of 1979, the city began its remedial efforts
designed principally to reduce further leakage (not to remove wastes).
Removal was prohibitively expensive and no host site was willing to
receive the wastes. The process of reconstruction created additional
problems. Trucks working on the site contaminated new areas with
material on their tires. The work stirred up dust and odors. New
holes opened as the ground subsided. Residents feared that the
chemicals might explode.
In January of 1980, the EPA contracted with Biogenics Corpor-
ation to conduct a pilot study of chromosome abnormalities in 36 Love
Canal residents. The study was designed to determine whether chromo-
some damage could be detected. Residents with the greatest likelihood
of suffering such damage were selected as subjects. With limited
funding, the study relied on published data to establish background
levels of abnormalities in healthy populations. No control group was
established (Picciano, 1980a). ' If abnormalities were detected, EPA
planned to conduct additional studies to establish a causal link
between injuries and the chemicals, and to more systematically survey
residents throughout the Love Canal area. The data would then be used
by the U.S. Department of Justice in a suit against Hooker Chemical,
the city of Niagara Falls, the Board of Education and the county
Health Department.
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Biogenics concluded that 11 of the 36 residents had major
chromosomal abnormalities and that this rate was well above normal.
In the absence of a control group, Biogenics stressed the need for
cautious interpretation of the results. When the report was leaked to
the New York Times, the EPA held an impromptu Saturday press confer-
ence to head off confusion. In the news stories that resulted, the
limitations of the study were quickly lost amid the more spectacular
news of chromosomal damage. By the following Wednesday, after a
violent confrontation between two EPA experts and Love Canal resi-
dents, EPA announced that the approximately 550 families remaining
would be evacuated.
The chromosome study was heavily criticized in scientific
circles (Kolata, 1980). It also received some support (Picciano,
1980b). The scientific community did agree on one point: the study
was certainly insufficient for assessing the general health dangers to
Love Canal residents. In addition to the sampling limitations of the
study, chromosomal damage has not been causally associated with
genetic damage. The author of the study, however, pointed out the
potential seriousness of health effects (Picciano, 1980b:754). Of the
last 18 pregnancies among the residents included in the study, two
births were normal, nine chilren had birth defects, four spontaneously
aborted and three were stillborn.
In response to the scientific controversy, New York Governor
Hugh Carey organized a second scientific panel to review the available
health data. In a series of stinging criticisms, the panel concluded
that the Department of Health studies lacked proper control groups,
that the Paigen studies were impossible to interpret, and that the
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Picciano chromosome study was so poorly designed that it should not
have been launched in the first place. The report emphasized how
little evidence had actually been accumulated to document health
damage, and suggested that the studies. had done more to fuel public
anxiety than to resolve scientific questions (Thomas, 1980). To
prevent further scientific controversy, the panel recommended that
(1) only government-sponsored surveys be conducted in the future; and
(2) an advisory panel of distinguished experts be established to
review the results of such studies but not make public its disagree-
ments (Levine, 1981:168). Thus would the public be protected from its
own anxiety! As Judge Bazelon (1979) has noted:
In reaction to the public's often emotional response to
risk, scientists are tempted to disguise controversial
value decisions in the cloak of scientific objectivity,
obscuring those decisions from political accountability.
The technical debate over health effects will probably never be
settled. The objectivity of the panel report has also come under
serious question. Some biostatisticians and public health specialists
independently checking the studies reviewed by the panel have claimed
that the evidence of serious health damage is strong (Epstein,1982:
117). Canal residents have refused to cooperate with further attempts
to study their health.
The controversy underscores the difficulty of using science to
resolve politically volatile problems. The controversy over health
effects at Love Canal was caused not just by the political turmoil and
fears of residents, but also by inherent scientific limitations. The
scientific method is ill equipped to produce unequivocal answers to
questions regarding the likelihood of health effects from hazardous
waste.
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III. Uncertainty in Evaluating Toxic Chemicals and their Consequences
Evaluations of Love Canal health and environmental problems vary
considerably. To some, Love Canal is one of the worst public health
tragedies in recent years -- in all likelihood accounting for numerous
miscarriages, birth defects, and probably the death of at least one
child (Epstein, 1982:89-91). To others, Love Canal is an example of
mass hysteria in which no physical health effects were ever proven,
and the psychological trauma was caused by fumbling bureaucrats,
overzealous scientists, anxious residents, and the mass media (Levine,
1981:169). It is not at all surprising that Lois Gibbs holds the
first opinion while Armand Hammer holds the second: Ms. Gibbs headed
the Love Canal Home Owners' Association and Mr. Hammer is chairman of
the board of Hooker's parent company, Occidental Petroleum.*
Differences in the perception of risk are not always so easily
associated with differences in self-interest. Disagreements exist
among similarly trained experts with no stake in the dispute. Any
system of ranking potential hazards is sure to be fraught with ambi-
guity given the gap in knowledge that exists. The hazardousness of
many substances is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively well
understood. Regulatory standards for substances with obvious physical
properties (e.g., reactivity, corrosivity, or ignitability) or acute
toxicity can sometimes be easily delineated, but questions of chronic
toxicity, changes in a chemical's health impact at various concen-
trations, its potential for degrading into toxic products, its
* In late 1979, Dr. Hammer told a national audience on Meet the Press
that the danger of Love Canal was minimal and "has been blown all
out of context." (Source: Epstein, 1982:132.)
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persistence in nature, and its potential for bioaccumulation are
considerably more controversial (Senkan and Stauffer, 1981:40).
The siting of hazardous waste dumps pose particularly complex
problems. Although general agreement exists among most scientists
that hazardous waste disposal poses great risks, the manner in which
the risk of exposure and the potential health effects are to be
determined is the subject of considerable debate (US Congress, 1982:I-
28). To effectively determine potential health risks would require
data on waste constituents, environmental transport pathways, exposure.
and absorption pathways, and toxicity. Collection of these data are
problematic.
Waste Constituents
The easiest task is usually identification of constituent
chemicals (US Surgeon, 1980:45-50). At Love Canal, chemicals migrated
into basements and topsoil, where they were easily collected for
analysis. Leachate, however, is not a reliable sample of the stored
chemicals. To sample these chemicals is difficult. Chemicals are
typically stored in containers and dispersed among innocuous material.
Except in the very worst cases, in which significant leaching has
occurred across all sectors of a site, many chemicals may remain
hidden from all but the most systematic field sampling.
Identification of most organic substances, if available in
sufficient concentrations, is possible using mass spectrometry. The
results of this test can be compared to data published for most
industrial chemicals. Since many industrial wastes are by-products of
organic synthesis, the spectral characteristics will not have been
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published. These by-products can be identified only through their
similarity to industrially useful chemicals.
Existing methods for sampling and identifying wastes have not
been standardized or validated. Most were developed for analyzing
specific chemicals in a particular medium, and consequently are
expensive and time consuming to apply to heterogeneous waste mixtures
(US GAO, 1981a:17). Further difficulties exist in preserving samples
at onsite concentration levels, preparing samples for analysis, and
identifying interference effects when the presence of some compounds
are hidden by the effects of others. These limitations can be over-
come, but the costs are substantial (US GAO, 1981a:20).
Detecting certain substances in highly dilute leachate poses
still other problems. The EPA currently lists 387 compounds as
hazardous. The US Office of Technology Assessment (1982:251) has
concluded that current capabilities for detecting a majority of these
compounds is questionable, either because appropriate analytical
protocols are not available for waste constituent analysis or because
analysis is limited by the concentrations of constituents in waste.
Finally, detection of pollutants in water or soil may not be
indicative of problems stemming from a hazardous waste site. Not all
contamination stems from hazardous waste. Many household products,
pesticides, fertilizers, and industrial solvents find their way into
the environment (US CEQ, 1980:83-100). These contaminants can mask
the chemical sources as well as distort their apparent concentrations
by creating anomalies in the levels of background contamination.
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Environmental Transport Pathways
The fate of any released hazardous waste depends on its affinity
for particular elements of the environment. Chemicals disperse along
four major pathways: water soluble chemicals are transported by
runoff to groundwater and streams; volatile chemicals evaporate and
are swept away by the wind; most chemicals can adhere to or be absorb-
ed by dust and soil; and chemicals that bind to organic material move
through the food chain. Chemicals rarely are found in only one
medium, but shift through one to another over time, as shown in
Figures 2.2a to 2.2b. The fate of waste constituents is difficult to
predict because of the complexity of physical, chemical, and biologi-
cal properties that determine pathways in the environment.
For most dump sites, the critical dispersion medium is water.
An EPA study (1977:11-12) showed that 60 percent of all documented
hazardous waste damage cases involve groundwater contamination, with
over half of these causing contamination in water supply wells. Forty
percent cause surface water pollution. Groundwater, once polluted,
remains contaminated for decades. Since over half of all United
States drinking water is from ground water and 40 million people
depend on untreated domestic well water (Maugh, 1982a:491), the
potential for problems is extensive.
The determination of pollutant pathways in underground water is
frequently difficult to either predict or detect. How wastes move
through soils to groundwater, how groundwater moves, and what happens
to both along the way are not well understood (US GAO, 1981a:23).
Because of the uniqueness of each site, consensus does not exist on
drilling methods, sampling frequency or protocol, standard quality
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assurance procedures, or the number and location of wells needed to
define problems (US Congress, 1982:1-29). Costs for estimating
groundwater contamination of a disposal site typically range from
$50,000 to $250,000. Plume shapes, rates of movements, and concen-
trations over time cannot always be predicted accurately, even with
extensive study (Maugh, 1982a:491).
In about 12 percent of the documented damage cases, poisoning
occurs through direct contact with chemicals (US EPA, 1977:11-12). At
Love Canal, children came into direct contact with leaching chemicals
that had migrated into basements and top soil. These pathways are
easily identified when the point of contact is adjacent to the source
of contamination and the concentrations are high. When chemicals are
widely dispersed by air, water, or biotic transport mechanisms,
however, the source cannot always be traced. Identifying toxic
substances in small concentrations and isolating the effects of
contamination from a particular disposal site from other sources of
environmental pollutants is difficult. In industrialized areas, the
problems may be insurmountable. At Love Canal, despite extensive
contamination from the landfill, early identification of hazardous
substances found in well water could not be reliably tied to the waste
site bacause of inadequate information about pollutant pathways (US
GAO, 1981a:23).
Exposure and Absorption Pathways
Health effects of chemical exposure depend not just on the
nature of the chemical, but also on the quantity and duration of
exposure. Chemicals acting in. large doses over short periods of time
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produce acute effects; small doses administered over long periods of
time produce chronic or latent effects. Since contamination from
hazardous waste dumps generally produces exposures at low concentra-
tion that may go undetected for years, a major difficulty exists in
estimating the actual exposure and absorption pattern for individuals
living in a contaminated area.
The most reliable ex post facto tool for monitoring exposure to
chemicals is direct measurement of chemical content in the body.
Direct measurements, however, have serious shortcomings. Water
soluble chemicals, easily detected in blood or urine, are quickly
washed from the body. No trace may be found on the day of examination
despite continuous exposure. Chemicals that bind to fat, bone, or
tissue accumulate within the body. Most require minor surgery to
obtain samples for examination. Milk is an easily accessible body
fat, but milk can be obtained from only a small subgroup of women
within a narrow age range. These women may not be representative of
the population and milk can easily be contaminated during collection
of samples. Moreover, studies conducted on milk, adipose tissue,
urine, and blood indicate that almost everyone carries significant
quantities of DDT, DDE, PCBs, dieldrin, heptachlor epoxide, and other
chemicals (Maugh, 1982a:492-493). Estimating exposure caused by a
particular hazardous waste site therefore would require extensive
baseline studies with controls.
An alternative to direct measurement of a body's chemical
content is to study chromosome abnormalities. Damage to chromosomes
can be caused by toxic chemicals, but their detection is difficult.
The number to be expected from even high doses of chemical contamin-
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ation will be less than one in 300 cells, so extremely large numbers
of cells are needed to observe a statistically significant increase.
Since people are exposed to many agents that can cause chromosome
damage -- such as x-rays, caffeine, viruses, and other environmental
pollutants -- a proper control group is essential. Moreover, the
presence of such aberrations does not necessarily indicate a potential
health problem, the absence of visible aberrations does not indicate
the absence of nonvisible mutations, and an individual whose sample
showed an aberration on one occasion might have none later (Maugh,
1982b:643).
Analysis may also be misleading. Analysis requires strict
quality control to insure the integrity of the samples. Heat, light,
dissolved oxygen, water, biological activity, and the container itself
can all cause chemical alterations (NAS, 1975b:304). The Center for
Disease Control has shown that quality control is often poor. Samples
of lead nitrate tainted blood are consistently evaluated correctly
(that is, measurements within 15 percent of actual value are obtained
on more than 70 percent of the samples) by only 35 percent of labs.
When PCB tainted blood was sent to labs for testing, only 10 percent
produced values within two standard deviations of the correct value.
Since lead and PCB contamination has been widely studied and should be
readily measurable, analysis on less well known substances may be much
worse (Maugh, 1982a:492).
Toxicity Assessment.
The causal link between environmental pollutants and health
problems is very difficult to establish. The usual methods of
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toxicology, clinical examination, and epidemiology are difficult to
apply to hazardous waste sites. In toxicological assessment, dose-
response curves are traditionally used to relate an organism's reac-
tion to various concentrations of pollutants. Ideally, dose-response
curves are predictive and can be translated into technical standards.
Unfortunately, the problems of determining dose-response relationships
for a widely diverse population are enormous. The National Research
Council's Board on Toxicology and Environmental Health Hazards has
noted difficulties in deciding which pollutants to measure, how to
ensure that they are adequately measured, what corrections to make for
widely differing exposure patterns and sensitivities, and how to
relate measured pollution to health effects.
The cause-effect relationship between toxic substance in the
environment and human health is highly uncertain. Long term tests of
chemical toxicity are usually conducted on specially bred animals.
Rodents are almost always selected, not on any biochemical, physio-
logical or anatomical basis, but rather because rodents are relatively
inexpensive and short lived. Even so, long term bioassays now cost a
half million dollars per compound (US EPA, 1980c). Extrapolations of
results to humans must be done cautiously: rodents generally give
reliable identification of carcinogenic and other toxic effects, but
tumors in other species are not necessarily found in the same tissues
(NAS, 1975b:135) and dose response may vary significantly. Humans,
for examples, are 60 times as sensitive to the effects of thalidomide
(a tranquilizer that caused birth defects) as are mice, 100 times as
sensitive as rats and 700 times as sensitive as hamsters (US EPA,
1980c). Investigators are further restrained by their limited success
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in replicating models of human disease in animals so as to examine the
response of more vulnerable elements of the population (National
Research Council, 1978; Trieff, 1980).
Because of the very large number of animals needed to test the
relatively rare effects associated with very low doses of chemicals,
risk values at low doses are not generated directly from data.
Rather, they are extrapolated from the dose response relationships
found in higher doses. A combination of biological theories, some
experimental evidence and statistical conventions have yielded several
extrapolation models. As Figure 2.3 shows, the choice of model can
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make enormous differences in estimates of low dose toxicity. At one-
half a standard dose ("1/2 D" in the figure), predicted excess tumors
range from zero to ten percent. In a population similar to Love
Canal's 4,000 residents, estimates of the number of people who might
get tumors might range from zero to four hundred. Under these circum-
stances, overall assessment of risk based on available experimental
animal investigations is subject to widely varied interpretations (Lee
and Mudd, 1979; President's Science Advisory Committee, 1973; NAS,
1975b).
The continual production of new chemical substances makes the
careful testing of our chemical environment even more difficult. The
number of chemical compounds recognized in the United States exceeds
three million and approximately 3,000 new ones are being added per
year. Present chronic assay methods require at least three years at
substantial cost to test one chemical (Task Force, 1978:4).
The most prominent strategies for overcoming these difficulties
rely on short term tests. Cell transformation in vitro can provide
preliminary evidence of the need for further testing in vivo, but they
cannot, in and of themselves, indicate potential carcinogenesis (NAS,
1975b:144-147). Furthermore, the tests measure only one type of
biological effect (i.e., damage to genetic material) and are not
sensitive enough to show the effects from very low levels of waste (US
GAO, 1981a:26).
Moreover, the measurement of effects in the laboratory only
approximates the effects in the environment. The complex combinations
of chemicals found in most hazardous wastes are even more difficult to
evaluate. Experience in testing and predicting health effects of
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these mixtures is limited. Yet the potentiation of toxic effects of
one chemical by another, the enhancement of latent neoplastic change,
and even the elimination of carcinogenic properties have all been
demonstrated with chemicals found in the Love Canal waste site (US
Surgeon, 1980:39).
Clinical examinations are conducted to diagnose individual
diseases. While some acute effects such as burns and allergic reac-
tions might be directly traceable to exposure, many chronic and latent
effects are not so directly correlated. Exposure to chemicals may
produce effects which are sub-clinical or similar to commonly ex-
perienced ailments such as headaches, fatigue, irritability, and
depression. Respiratory discomforts, miscarriages, and birth defects
are likely to be a cumulative response to long term exposure.
Moreover, since clinical exams require considerable labor by
trained professionals, such exams are very difficult to conduct on
large populations. When the state Department of Health expanded its
Love Canal study in late 1978, it sent a medical team to take blood
samples from families. The makeshift clinic was overwhelmed with
hundreds of residents. The technicians gave up, telling the people to
go home and fill out a health questionnaire (Epstein, 1982:102). The
chromosomal damage study discussed above relied on clinical exams of
blood samples, but limited its attention to 36 residents and used no
control population.
Epidemiological studies are more useful for correlating disease
patterns with exposure to hazardous substances when many individuals
have been exposed. The studies examine the health and exposure
histories of a particular population group. A control group is used
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to determine general environmental and social influences on health
problems. In Love Canal, all studies, excluding the chromosomal
damage study, were epidemiological.
Well designed epidemiological studies are expensive, time-
consuming, and complex. Most past studies have been conducted on
specific pollutants. In these studies, special problems exist in
obtaining good historical health and exposure data, obtaining a
representative control population, controlling for other influences,
and collecting and analyzing data from large numbers of people (US
GAO, 1981a:25). These problems are compounded in hazardous waste
cases because the mixture of chemicals is unknown, the effects are
spread over years of exposure, and many changes are difficult to
detect.
Since most toxic waste dump exposures involve small populations,
the efficiency of methods for establishing potential health hazards
are also of considerable importance. Reproductive dysfunctions, such
as sterility, spontaneous abortion and low birth weight, are consider-
ed to be the most sensitive indicators of health effects due to
chemical exposure. Sterility and abortion are not easily studied
because, despite their high incidence, a large number of cases are
never brought to the attention of the medical profession. Birth
weights, however, are routinely recorded on hospital records. Low
birth weight babies are, therefore, generally the most convincing
indicators of reproductive dysfunction. Low birth weight, defined as
less than 2500 grams, occurs in approximately seven percent of all
live births in the United States. Depending on age, race, previous
pregnancy history, weight at conception, alcohol consumption, and
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smoking habits, the background incidence of low birthweight can range
from five percent to fifteen percent. Assuming that these variable
characteristics could be accounted for with appropriate analysis, it
would still take at least 200 births to detect as statistically
significant a 50 percent increase in the proportion of low weight
birth babies. Even if a clearly comparable group were available for
determining the average birth weight for a particular area, 100 births
would be needed to detect as significantly different a three percent
shift in average birth weight (US Surgeon, 1980:30). These large
samples frequently cannot be obtained among the limited populations
exposed to hazardous waste contaminants.
The difficulty of showing significant increases in disease
generation is nowhere more pointedly demonstrated than in studies of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In these cities, no significant increase in
birth defects and miscarriages were detected. Given the high doses of
ionizing radiation, which is known to cause both defects and miscar-
riages, the effect was undoubtedly present. However, 11 percent of
all children have genetic defects and an estimated 50 percent of
pregnancies end in spontaneous abortions. Given these high normal
incidences and the small populations available for study, significant
increases could not be shown (Kolata, 1980:1240).
Many of the diseases associated with hazardous waste are common.
Moreover, survey instruments which are resistant to the emotional
issues of hazardous waste are difficult to design. Clinical end-
points are not specific enough for any chronic ailments like headaches
and depression. The use of physician records and other verifiable
data may be the best that can be done, but such data clearly varies
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among individuals. Moreover, even if a change is detected in a
population, it will be almost impossible to isolate out individuals
actually affected by chemical exposure from individuals not directly
affected.
The difficulties with toxicology, clinical diagnosis, and
epidemiology as methods of establishing causality are even more
apparent when a disease like cancer is considered. The relatively
high background incidence, long latency, nonspecificity of cancer type
to chemical source, and mobility of the population make causal link-
ages difficult to establish in the best of circumstances.
The public health debate that grew up around Love Canal under-
scores these problems. Love Canal had one of the most direct exposure
pathways of any dump discovered to date. The chemicals had migrated
into the basements of homes. The dump had been around since the 1940s
and the school that breached the clay barrier since the 1950s. EPA
identified over 200 chemicals, many of them with known acute and
latent effects. Yet the toxicological information on most chemicals
was deficient or missing. Of 241 chemicals actually identified, one-
third had been tested for mutagenicity and slightly less than that for
carcinogenicity. In each case, approximately half of the tested
chemicals had shown positive results in at least one published study
(US Surgeon, 1980:95-132). Many of the chemicals had never been
tested because they were not commercial products but rather their
precursors or process intermediates. None had been tested in combin-
ation with other chemicals (US Surgeon, 1980:19-20).
The epidemiological studies were similarly inconclusive. No
other hazardous waste site has been studied as much as Love Canal.
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The cost for EPA's and the Center for Disease Control's study was five
million dollars, but science remains unable to link the health effects
experienced by Love Canal residents conclusively to the chemicals
found at the site (US GAO, 1981a:26-27). A close examination of the
health effects could not unambiguously answer the most important
questions: who was actually affected and to what degree, and hence
who should be compensated and who should not. Neither the overriding
issues setting the locus of responsibility for analysis and action,
nor the detailed issues of designing protocols for defining the area
of impact, method of analysis, apportionment of costs, and criteria
for relief have since been resolved.
IV. Implications of the Uncertainties of Love Canal
This chapter has examined the risks associated with past haz-
ardous waste disposal practices and the uncertainties involved in
analyzing these risks. The Love Canal case and others like it bring
four principles into sharp relief: hazardous waste disputes are
marked by divergent perceptions of risk; differences in perceived risk
place considerable strain on the policymaking process; differences in
perception spring from underlying uncertainties in the scientific
understanding of the health effects of hazardous waste; and these
uncertainties are further exacerbated by ambiguities in the assignment
of organizational responsibility for disaster relief.
Hazardous waste disputes are marked by divergent perceptions of
risk. Risk springs from the randomness of future events. New infor-
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mation is almost always useful in reassessing risks. Our estimates of
risk shift as we act, gain new insights, and learn from our mistakes.
But when our strategies yield no results and our theories are implau-
sible explainers of crisis situations, then we can no longer account
for nor control the risks we will face. We are lost, as Don Schon
(1971:12-14) notes, with more information than we can handle. Sorting
through the array of social, technological, and theoretical signals
becomes difficult. Many claims are plausible because no claim is
dominant. This uncertainty is often irresolvable.
Differences in perceived risk place considerable strain on the
policymaking process. In Love Canal, these differences led to behav-
iors that are inconsistent with effective policymaking. Denial of the
uncertainty led to sharply delineated perspectives. This denial took
on many forms. Hooker Chemical, the School Board, and the City of
Niagara systematically denied the significance of the risks long after
early relief actions showed substantial problems. The Governor's
review panel set up to study the problems of Love Canal recommended
that uncertainty by kept from the public and out of the decision
making process by using experts to provide the best available estimate
of risk which would then be used as if it were certain. In a similar
vein, inadequate theories were claimed by both the Love Canal Home
Owners' Association and the State Department of Health as most appro-
priate in light of no clearly adequate alternative. This cycle of
denial and claiming exacerbated the strains resulting from divergent
perception of risk. Action became impossible for virtually everyone.
Differences in perception spring from underlying uncertainties
in the scientific understanding of the health effects of hazardous
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waste. Risk management under uncertainty hangs on questions which can
be asked but not strictly answered by science. These questions
"transcend" the scientific method because their answers require
impractically expensive research, their subject matter is too variable
to allow strictly scientific rationalism, or their implications are
essentially incomplete unless coupled to moral and aesthetic judgments
(Weinberg, 1972a:213).
The environmental health risks of hazardous waste have all of
these characteristics. The subtlety of public health changes that can
be detected and attributed to hazardous waste contamination depends on
the amount of resources expended. Small changes can be detected only
if large resources are expended. But, as we have seen, variability is
introduced into the assessment of the effects of hazardous waste at
every stage of the analysis: identifying waste constituents, environ-
mental transport pathways, exposure and absorption pathways, and
toxicity assessments. This variability cannot be adequately control-
led, especially within the time and resource constraints imposed by a
crisis.
Ultimately, the interpretation of data must be a choice about
what type of error is most important to avoid. Scientific norms guard
against the acceptance of a false conclusion because such conclusions
mislead future research. In the context of a hazardous waste contro-
versy, application of the norm would tend to support conclusions that
the community continues to be safe. Only in rare circumstances would
a scientist be able to determine with near certainty that a community
was significantly at greater risk. To residents of the community,
however, the most important error is the failure to recognize a health
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problem before it becomes serious. Avoidance of this error (the
failure to recognize as true something which is actually true) is in
direct opposition to the scientific norm. The first errs on the side
of protecting public health and safety even if relief is given to some
communities unnecessarily; the latter errs on the side of protecting
the substantial resources that would be needed to correct a problem
that might not be serious. Risk assessments which are precise enough
to overcome divergent perceptions of risk are therefore not currently
possible. The scientific debate in Love Canal did not lead to con-
sensus, but rather to greater dispute.
These uncertainties are further exacerbated by the ambiguities
in the assignment of organizational responsibility for disaster
relief. In the absence of clear responsibility at Love Canal, all
decisions became risky. The resources needed to carry out decisions
were substantial. Any decision made by a public official or private
manager was open to criticism by people with greater authority as
inappropriate or unnecessary. Small actions became complicated
because they might serve as a precedent for the resolution of bigger
problems. In the resulting disarray, decisions were ad hoc, slow in
being made, and difficult to justify.
The uncertainties and ambiguities that exist in past hazardous
waste disputes are a basis upon which people evaluate proposals for
siting new hazardous waste treatment facilities in a community. As
several of the participants in the simulation study remarked:
My biggest concern is the uncertainty. We've all become
better educated and made more aware of the problems of
hazardous waste. Love Canal made all the headlines not
for just a short period of time but over quite a while.
It's imbedded in our minds: hazardous waste has many
problems, it can cause birth defects and other problems,
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its long lasting, and nobody can make the problem go away
once the land is contaminated. What's worse, what we've
learned from Love Canal may only be the beginning of it.
A lot of everyday items have been found to be carcino-
genic. Certainly hazardous waste must be. The unkown
risks may well be worse than those we know.
The next chapter focuses on how perceptions of risk and concern
for uncertainty are translated into opposition to the siting of new
hazardous waste treatment facilities.
Chapter 3
Opposition to the Siting of Hazardous Waste Treatment Facilities
In the wake of growing public concern about the impacts of
hazardous waste, the federal government enacted two major pieces of
legislation. To prevent deterioration of active treatment and dis-
posal sites, Congress authorized the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to regulate hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976. In 1980, Congress also enacted the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980.
This "superfund" bill provides funding and assigns responsibility for
the cleanup of improperly designed hazardous waste disposal sites. If
sites can not be upgraded, wastes must be removed (for treatment or
disposal) to alternative sites.
The design and siting of improved facilities for treating and
disposing of hazardous waste is integral to any cleanup strategy.
Neither cleanup nor effective regulation is feasible until facilities
exist for safely handling waste. Proposed new facilities, however,
have met strong opposition whenever sites have been selected. As a
consequence, virtually no new chemical waste facilities have been
built since the mid-1970s.
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This chapter examines the dynamics of opposition to the siting
of new hazardous waste facilities. New processes for managing hazard-
ous wastes are far superior to those available in older facilities.
Local residents, however, believe that new facilities are not "safe
enough" to be located in their communities. Moreover, competition
from loosely regulated and relatively inexpensive existing facilities
has restricted the apparent cost-effectiveness of risk management
features incorporated into new facilities. The twin forces of local
opposition to the risks of new facilities and corporate concern about
cost-effectiveness have created a stalemate in which no new facilities
can be sited. Yet, unless new facilities are built, the capacity to
cleanup existing dumps or treat newly produced waste will not exist.
This chapter examines the social impact and causes of this
stalemate. Are hazardous waste treatment facilities needed? Will
these facilities improve the managment of hazardous waste? Why is
opposition to their siting so vociferous? The chapter argues that
despite the regional benefits that accrue from siting these facili-
ties, communities will continue to oppose local sitings because the
impacts of a facility on a host community are undesirable. In parti-
cular, divergent perceptions of risk catalyze and intensify this
opposition.
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I. Existing Practices for Managing Hazardous Waste
Methods of Disposal and Treatment
The last chapter focused on the potential dangers of improperly
disposed hazardous waste. Improper disposal, unfortunately, is far
from unique to the cases sited. EPA studies of 17 major industries
indicate that 90 percent of the wastes generated in the late 1970s
were being disposed of by environmentally unsound methods and failed
to meet the RCRA standards proposed in 1979 (EPA, 1980a:21).* Most
disposal sites used unlined surface impoundments or landfills that
would not prevent migration of chemicals. EPA estimated that in the
late 1970s, 173,000 surface impoundments (pits, ponds and lagoons) and
94,000 landfills were used for the disposal of hazardous waste (USGAO,
1980:3).
Estimates prepared by the EPA regional offices suggest that
between 30,000 and 50,000 sites contain potentially dangerous amounts
of hazardous waste (US Surgeon, 1980:22-23, citing Hart, 1978:66-74).
Eighty percent of all hazardous waste is disposed of at small sites
located on the generator's property (US Senate, 1980:1). More than 75
percent of all landfill sites are located in wetlands, flood plains or
over major aquifers. A 1977 EPA study of 50 industrial waste land-
fills indicated that in 47 of these sites, hazardous substances had
migrated beyond the boundaries of the disposal area (US Senate,
* The breakdown is as follows: the 10% sound disposal consisted of 6%
controlled incineration, 2% secure landfills and 2% recovery; the
90% unsound disposal consisted of 48% unlined surface impoundments,
30% land disposal, 10% uncontrolled incineration and 2% other (EPA,
1980a:21).
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1979a:IV:33-34). All told, between 1,200 and 2,000 sites may cause
serious danger to health (Hart, 1978: 66-74).* Of the 115 sites
selected in 1981 as high priority for superfund consideration, EPA
identified 24 as being potentially worse than Love Canal (Epstein,
1982:448-449). EPA has further estimated that 1.2 million Americans
are currently exposed to health hazards from hazardous waste disposal
sites (Lennett, 1980:7).
The quantity of hazardous waste disposed of in these sites is
subject to wide speculation. A Congressional survey of the 53 largest
chemical manufacturers showed that between 1950 and 1979, 765 million
tons of processed chemicals were deposited in 3,383 sites (US Surgeon,
1980:19). Because of inadequate records, a more systematic analysis
of past waste disposal practices has not been attempted.
The cost of remedial action for these sites is enormous.
Emergency containment of waste is expected to cost $3.6 million a
site, while permanent remedies will average $25.9 million. These
second level remedies must provide for excavation of wastes and
contaminated soils and for proper disposal offsite at a safe facility.
If 1,200 to 2,000 problem sites require remedial action, the total
cost for first level treatment would be 3.6 to 6.1 billion dollars,
while second level treatment would cost 26.2 to 44.1 billion. These
estimates do not include compensation for property damage, direct or
consequential economic loss, or personal injury (US Senate, 1979a:IV:
* These figures (like much of what is known about the hazardous waste
problem) are subject to dispute. In reporting estimates, some EPA
regional offices reported that all landfills may contain hazardous
waste, while others omitted sites that could pose serious risk.
Only 232 sites were actually inspected. Estimates of potential
problems were extrapolated from these numbers (US Congress, 1982:
I:22).
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37-38, citing Hart, 1978). Second level treatment is, of course, only
possible if safe offsite facilities exist to receive the wastes.
The Generation of Hazardous Wastes
Despite some efforts to reduce hazardous waste generation
through new production processes and recycling, the volume of waste
increases yearly. Quantities of hazardous waste generation are
difficult to estimate, both locally and in total. Neither community
nor industry-wide inventories exist for several reasons. Industries
generally regard production and waste stream information as proprie-
tary. Commercial establishments and domestic households are numerous
and frequently do not know the hazardousness of their waste streams.
Hazardous waste is itself not clearly defined.
Estimates of annual volumes can consequently differ by a factor
of ten within a single industry (see Murray, et al., 1981:36-41). EPA
estimates hazardous waste production at 35 to 60 million metric tons
(10 to 17 percent of all chemical wastes produced by the 17 industries
studied by EPA). Net increases in production and reclassifications of
wastes as hazardous results in a 5 to 10 percent yearly growth rate.
These numbers only include wastes specifically regulated by EPA. The
Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials,
in a survey of state data based on state definitions of hazardous
waste, estimated the rate of hazardous waste generation to be 265
million metric tons per year (US OTA, 1983:120).
Hazardous waste cannot be isolated from air and water pollution.
With the enactment of the clean air and water acts, pollutants cleaned
from air and water emissions were disposed of as hazardous waste.
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Consequently, hazardous waste volumes increased rapidly in the 1970s.
The chemical and petroleum industries currently account for 62
percent of the chemical wastes produced. The primary metals electro-
plating industry accounts for an additional 10 percent. Hazardous
wastes generated in the production of paper, coal products, fabricated
metals, electronics and transportation each exceeds a million metric
tons per year, while rubber, leather, agriculture, and railroad
transportation industries exceed a half million metric tons each
(Booz-Allen, 1980:III-2). Other sources of hazardous waste can
include, in addition to these industries, battery shops, car washes,
chemical and paint storage warehouses, city equipment yards, research
and hospital laboratories, construction companies, dry cleaners,
electric utilities, electronic and radio repair shops, almost any
industrial plant, pest control agencies, photographic processing
facilities, newspapers, and service stations (Tchobanoglous, et al.,
1977:384).
EPA estimates the number of hazardous waste producers to be
760,000. Of these, 67,000 produce waste streams that exceed 1,000 kg
per month and account for 99 percent of the total waste (Murray, et
al., 1981:47). Sixty percent of waste is generated in just ten
industrial states,* while twenty percent is generated in eight
* The 10 states that generate the most hazardous waste (and the
percentage of U.S. waste they generate) are: New Jersey (8.0%),
Ohio (6.8%), Illinois (6.8%), California (6.6%), Pennsylvania
(6.5%), Texas (6.3%), New York (6.2%), Michigan (4.6%), Tennessee
(4.4%), and Indiana (3.6%) (US EPA, 1980a). These states account
for 60% of the waste generated and 55% of the national population
(1981 Statistical Abstract of the United States).
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others.** Excluding California and Texas, all are located east of the
Mississippi. These figures, while suggesting a regionalization of
hazardous waste problems, in fact closely parallel the population
distribution of the United States. New England accounts for 4 percent
of the wastes and 6.3 percent of the waste generators (Senkan and
Stauffer, 1981:37). Half of this activity is in Massachusetts, the
state in which the simulations used in this study were conducted.
II. The Possiblity for Improved Treatment of Hazardous Waste
In 1982, EPA assessed 929 hazardous waste disposal and treatment
sites that had caused environmental damage and on which information
had already been collected. Fifty-six percent of these facilities
were still active. Most of the contamination sites were discovered
between 1979 and 1981 as a result of growing federal and state en-
forcement activity. The typical site according to the report,
was undesigned, with little information on file to
suggest that adequate operating and maintenance proce-
dures were routinely employed. Most sites contained no
liners, leachate or runoff collection systems and/or
containment facilities and inactive sites almost invar-
iably received inadequate closure. In addition, most of
the sites evaluated were located in poor hydrogeologic/
environmental settings. For example, in the majority of
** The eight states that generate between two and three percent of the
national total are Massachusetts, Missouri, Wisconsin, Florida,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Louisiana (US EPA,
1980a). These states account for 20% of the waste generated and
20% of the national population (1981 Statistical Abstract of the
United States).
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cases, the facility was located in moderate to highly
permeable soils within 10 feet of groundwater and 100
feet of a surface water body. In many cases the facility
was also located within one-half mile of shallow drinking
water wells (US EPA, 1982b:xi).
Clearly, when the design of disposal sites is this faulty, damage is
likely to occur. The methods for selecting and operating such sites
were fairly standard in the years before RCRA was enacted. How much
better can we do with new facilities?
Advances in the Treatment and Disposal of Wastes
Many technical options exist for managing hazardous wastes.
Waste can be treated using a number of physical, chemical, and bio-
logical processes. The waste stream can be reduced at the source by
altering feedstocks or modifying industrial processes. Recycling is
an increasingly viable alternative as the price of raw materials and
waste treatment both increase rapidly.
Process modification and source separation are the most prefer-
red methods of waste reduction. Source separation, in particular, is
being used increasingly. Many production processes can be easily
modified to isolate hazardous constituents in concentrated waste
solutions, and thereby prevent contamination of large volumes of
nonhazardous waste. The more efficient uses of toxic substances also
offers potentially great reductions as new process technologies are
adopted. Estimates of the quantity of hazardous waste that will be
produced by new industrial plants range from 30 to 80 percent of the
amount now produced by existing plants. Waste cannot be so easily
reduced in existing plants (US OTA, 1983:142).
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Resource recovery and recycling, while highly desirable, has
numerous obstacles to effective implementation. When in-plant re-
covery is relatively easy, the savings can be substantial. But
controlling the consistency of deliveries and the composition of the
wastes deliverd to offsite recovery facilities is difficult. Differ-
ent firms using different processes create variations in the waste
streams that cause problems. Waste exchanges are also unpopular
because generators must assume all liability in transferring wastes
(USOTA, 1983:139). Currently, only six percent of all hazardous waste
is recylced (Booz-Allen et al, 1980).
Approximately 80 percent of hazardous wastes is currently
disposed of in landfills (Krag, 1982a:7). Modern secure landfills are
designed to overcome the problems of early sanitary landfills.
Chemicals are isolated from each other and from the environment.
Sites are lined with impermeable clay and are designed to allow runoff
to drain in a controlled manner. Under the provisions of RCRA, EPA
has required ground water monitoring and leachate entrapment and
treatment for 30 years. These landfills are a significant improvement
over older "sanitary" landfills, but the longevity of many chemicals
suggests that they are not a final solution. While new disposal
technologies are likely to perform better than their earlier counter-
parts, experience with these more advanced designs is insufficient to
predict their performance. The effectiveness of disposal techniques
relies on the continued integrity of the engineering structures and
operating procedures over many decades and potentially for centuries.
By comparison, waste treatment technologies destroy or detoxify
wastes. This permanent reduction in risk is an overwhelming advantage
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when wastes are toxic, persistent, and bioaccumulative. Many chem-
ical, biological and physical treatments are designed specifically to
destroy or neutralize particular waste streams. For example, bacteria
can be selected from nature, acclimated to live in particular sub-
stances, and mutated to accomplish particular tasks. As a general
technique for destroying or degrading organic hazardous materials,
incineration offers the greatest range of options. By decomposing
wastes at high temperatures, these technologies are designed to
achieve destruction efficiencies of up to 99.99 percent (USOTA,
1983:159). The advantage of this very high destruction is substan-
tial. While difficulties remain in monitoring methods, knowledge
about toxic by-products of incomplete combustion, and uncertainties of
long term performance capabilities, these systems of treatment provide
clear benefits relative to disposal options.
The option used by the waste producer, however, is likely to be
the least costly within options acceptable to government regulations.
At the high end, incineration of solids costs up to $800 per metric
ton, while either incineration or engineered storage of liquids costs
up to $240 per metric ton. The cost of most processes ranges between
50 and 150 dollars per metric ton. At the low end, deep-well injec-
tion, aerated lagoons, land treatment, and illegal dumping can cost as
little as $5 per metric ton (US OTA, 1983:196; Senkan and Stauffer,
1981:43). Figure 3.1 displays costs in greater detail. These costs
provide powerful motivation to resist adoption of more sophisticated
technologies.
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The Hazardous Waste Industry
Improvements in hazardous waste handling will depend largely on
the hazardous waste industry's willingness and ability to innovate.
The size and nature of the market, however, is not obvious. The Booz-
Allen study (1980:V-26) of the hazardous waste treatment industry
concluded that current offsite treatment capacity has not been ex-
hausted. National capacity utilization ranges from 17 percent for
deep well injection to 59 percent for incineration. Landfills for
handling 10 years of hazardous waste generation are currently permit-
ted. Aggregate national capacity, however, may not be indicative of
the need for new capacity. Aggregate capacity is estimated based on
the maximum utilization rate technically possible for each treatment
process. Local restrictions on when facilities can operate, the
management of the flow and mix of wastes into the facility, and
technical limitations and equipment failures make maximum utilization
Type of Type or form Sltonneb
waste management of waste Price 1981 1981
Landfill Drummed S0.64-S0.911gal $168-$240
($35-$50/55 gal drum)
Bulk $0.19-$0.28/gal $55-$83
Land treatment All $0.02-$0.09/gal $5-24
Incineration clean Relatively clean liquids, $(0.05)c-$0.20/gal $(13)-S$53
high-Btu value
Liquids $0.20-$0.90/gal $53-5237
Solids, highly toxic liquids $1.50-$3.00/gal $395-$791
Chemical treatment Acidslalkalines $0.08-0.35/gal $21-$92
Cyanides, heavy metals, $0.25.$3.00/gal S66-$791
highly toxic waste
Resource recovery All $0.25-$1.00/gal S66-5264
Deep well injection Oily wastewater $0.06-0.151gal $16-$40
Toxic rinse water $0.50-$1.00/gal $132-$264
Transportation $0.151ton mile
alnterviews were conducted in May of 1980 and February of 1982.
bFactors used to convert gallons and tons into tonnes are described in the appendix.
CSome cement kilns and light aggregate manufacturers are now paying for waste.
SOURCE: Booz, Allen & Hamilton. Inc.
Figure 3.1: Comparison of quoted prices for nine major hazardous
waste firms in 1981. (Source: US Office of Technology
Assessment, 1983:196)
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rates unachievable (Krag, 1982a:3).
Moreover, the Booz-Allen study does not examine the capacity of
onsite treatment. As we have seen, this capacity accounts for 80
percent of all treatment. Neither does the study take into account
the need to clean up many old waste sites. Perhaps most importantly,
the study does not specify the environmental adequacy of existing
treatment processes, many of which are expected to be closed down as
hazardous waste regulations become increasingly stringent. State and
industry officials have consequently argued that the report under-
estimates capacity shortfall (BNA, 1981:872). Finally, the Booz-Allen
report indicates that 75% of the nation's excess capacity is located
in the three states of Louisiana, Texas and Oklahoma (Booz-Allen,
1980:IX-3 and IX-20). Half the states, accounting for over 40 percent
of the demand for offsite capacity, are located in regions with net
capacity deficits. The New England region, for example, has a pro-
jected demand for 580,000 wet metric tons of offsite capacity with
only 218,000 tons available. The remainder must be transported to
places as far away as Alabama. The transportation not only greatly
increases costs, but also increases the potential for accidental
spills and illegal disposal.
Demand for the services of treatment facilities depends largely
on the generation of waste and hence on the market for primary prod-
ucts and the efficiency of production techniques. - Demand is also
critically linked to the requirements for safe waste managment, and
hence to regulation and potential liability. Demand will shift
towards more sophisticated techniques as regulations and liabilities
increase. But, EPA cannot enforce tougher regulations unless the
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capacity exists for legally disposing of wastes. In 1980, EPA esti-
mated that only 120 existing disposal sites would meet the require-
ments of the law (Epstein, 1982:246). A hazardous waste siting
committee established in EPA further estimated that 40 new offsite
storage and disposal facilities and 60 new treatment facilities would
be needed between 1980 and 1985 (BNA, 1980).
Increases in demand for offsite treatment have been slow in
coming (BNA, 1982:66), as have effective regulations. Congress gave
EPA 18 months to develop regulations for RCRA. Two and a half years
after that deadline, in November of 1980, the first of these regula-
tions went into effect. The regulations defined hazardous wastes,
created an accounting system for tracking these wastes from the
generator to ultimate disposal, established recordkeeping and financi-
al requirements for operators of hazardous waste treatment facilities
and set interim standards to be met by disposal facilities until
permanent standards could be set and a certification process estab-
lished. The interim regulations, however, were largely administrative
and did not set technical, design and operating standards needed to
protect health and environment. Moreover, the application process was
not designed to determine compliance with the regulations. Inspection
occurred in only 12 percent of the sites within the first 12 months,
and despite the fact that 97 percent of these facilities did not
comply with the regulations, compliance orders were issued to only 14
percent (US GAO, 1981b). Not until January 26, 1983 did permanent
land use regulations become effective and standards for treatment
facilities have still not been promulgated.
Given these circumstances, the onsite treatment processes of
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hazardous waste generators are only now coming under review and
regulation. Whatever effect the RCRA regulations will have on shift-
ing onsite treatment to offsite facilities has yet to be seen. The
industry is nonetheless growing rapidly. Total revenues for the
hazardous waste management business were estimated at $60 million in
1970, at $300 million in 1980, and to reach $1.5 billion by 1985
(Krag, 1982a:1).
In essence, the main service of the hazardous waste industry is
risk managment. The process of developing technical solutions for
individual hazardous waste streams is a time consuming task. Risk
management, however, goes beyond the design of technologies. The very
high capital costs of new technologies and the long lead time required
to site a facility means that technological sophistication alone will
be insufficient to ensure corporate success. The market for waste
management services is complicated by uncertainties surrounding
federal and state regulations and their enforcement; instability in
the demand for offsite services due to source reductions and onsite
management of waste streams; the emergence of new competitors; and
continued improvements in technology (Krag, 1982a:24). The United
States treatment facilities are neither as sophisticated nor as
plentiful as that of some Western European countries (Krag, 1982a:3).
We have capacity shortfalls in many sections of the country. The
capacity that exists causes considerably greater environmental and
public health damage than would new treatment facilities. Much will
need to be replaced. Existing capacity is also predominantly disposal
capacity. Over time, the effective management of hazardous waste
requires that waste be detoxified or destroyed to the maximum extent
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possible. The successful management of hazardous waste therefore
depends on the industries' ability to bring new technologies on line,
and that in turn is heavily dependent on siting a facility.
III. Opposition to Locally Sited Hazardous Waste Treatment Facilities
Krag, in his analysis of the hazardous waste management industry
conducted for the Harvard Business School, concluded with this remark:
The political rather than economic nature of the hazardous
waste problem becomes most evident when we consider what
should be a crucial focus of government regulation, namely
site permits. The most stringent enforcement of RCRA will be
ineffectual unless facilities can be created. Everyone
desires the good that could be produced by the industry, risk
avoidance; everyone is willing in a general sense to pay for
that good since the costs are not readily seen. No cost,
that is, until a particular community has its attention
brought to the most important costs by a proposal to locate a
facility in its midst -- that is, when it is suddenly real-
ized that society's risk aversion propensities might be
achieved by placing all (or what is seen as all) of the risk
in a particular locale. In the long run this strategically
critical problem may only be solved, or mitigate, by public
credibility achieved by particular operators at specific
facilities. Given adequate government regulation to deter-
mine the market and to enforce voluntary compliance with the
regulations, firms should evolve in the industry that can
demonstrate, through operation, the legitimacy of capable
hazardous waste disposal. But this will not be done over-
night nor simply. (Krag, 1982b:103).
Perceptions about the risks associated with siting a facility may well
be the limiting constraint facing a hazardous waste managment firm.
The strategy proposed by Krag is the careful management of risks such
that over time some firms are perceived to be reliable. For Krag,
risk management is the core service that the industry can provide as
well as the crux of its ability to survive the facility siting pro-
cess.
Krag is not alone in his assessment. EPA and state government
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officials concur with representatives of the National Solid Waste
Management Association that "the siting of hazardous waste facilities
is the biggest and most difficult obstacle to safe management of
hazardous wastes" (BNA, 1981:871). Opposition to hazardous waste
facilities has forced abandonment of proposed projects and restric-
tions or closure of existing facilities. Between 1978 and the end of
1981 (and to my knowledge since that time), no new offsite commercial
waste management facilities were approved (BNA, 1981:872).
Dynamics of a Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Dispute
Opposition to the siting of hazardous waste facilities is almost
unanimous in potential host communities. Centaur Associates conducted
a major study of local opposition to hazardous waste facilities for
the EPA. Of the ten cases selected as examples of successful siting,
only four were offsite facilities sited after 1974 and one of these
failed in the year following the study. All successful plants were
sited before the Love Canal controversy (US EPA, 1979c).
Based on the experience described in these reports, Centaur
concluded that local opposition is critical to both the siting of new
facilities and the continued operation of existing facilities. Public
opposition often arises as soon as a facility is announced. The
community, including "grandmothers and U.S. Congressmen, factory
workers and university scientists, those who never graduated from high
school and those with doctorates in ecology and physical sciences,"
(US EPA, 1979c:iii) are united in their opposition to hazardous waste
facilities in their community. Centaur notes that these controversies
have reached levels of stridency impossible to convey in
reports such as this one. In one case studied, an angry
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mob was prepared to blow up a facility... There were two
reports ... of threats of death or physical harm to key
individuals or their families (US EPA, 1979c:iii).
Facility sponsors are often surprised by the vehemence of this
opposition. While technical studies show that proposed facilities
will meet all regulations, opponents frequently acquire technical
expertise to refute the sponsors' claim. When state regulatory
agencies support claims made by sponsors, they are frequently viewed
with the same suspicion and hostility.
Underlying community opposition is usually a dispute over risks
and fairness. As Centaur notes:
Throughout this process the community talks in terms of
risks and fears, the facility sponsor in terms of regu-
lation and technology. The terms of one are often not
understood by the other...
The community envisions few benefits from the proposed
facility -- a few jobs and perhaps some tax revenues.
Risks are often seen as overwhelming -- a "Love Canal" in
their community, polluted water supplies threatening the
entire community, decades of uncertainty, hundreds of
trucks carrying thousands of drums of hazardous waste on
local roads. The industries that produce these wastes
may be hundreds of miles away... Opponents question the
fairness of having their town bear such a large share of
the environmental costs of modern industry. Facility
sponsors rarely, if ever, address this question of
equity (UA EPA, 1979c:iii).
Centaur concludes:
National publicity concerning abandoned sites has made
citizens and local officials increasingly aware of
hazardous waste problems. They are also likely to be
increasingly aware of actions taken by others to stop
sitings. Opposition will, in all likelihood, become more
widespread and sophisticated. Even if not ultimately
successful, opponents may increasingly turn to the courts
and delay siting for months or years with costly law
suits (US EPA, 1979c:iv).
In reaction to local opposition to private hazardous waste
facilities, some states have tried to preempt land control over the
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siting process. Minnesota is a striking example of the difficulties
associated with this strategy. In 1975 the state's Pollution Control
Agency, in conjunction with the Minneapolis - St. Paul Metropolitan
Waste Control Commission (MWCC), received $3.7 million from the US EPA
to site and demonstrate the safety of a state-of-the-art secure
landfill. Three attempts were made to select a site. Despite MWCC's
power to override local zoning, each attempt failed.
The agency had first selected 45 sites based on land use,
hydrologic, topographic and geologic data. These sites were narrowed
to four through further technical analysis. All four sites were on
rural agricultural land. Persistent public opposition forced a
reevaluation of the siting criteria (supposedly to accomodate regional
and local land use and development plans). All lands in Commercial.
Agricultural Regions (a metropolitan council designation for preserv-
ing agricultural land) were therefore excluded. Use of this criterion
eliminated the four preferred sites. Six more were selected that were
less geologically desirable. Extensive opposition within these
communities emerged, in part because the criteria for evaluating sites
were changed halfway through the process. The process was postponed
until 1978, when after a third attempt to find a site, the agencies
abandoned the project and returned the grant to EPA (US EPA, 1979c:
190-206).
Extent of Opposition to Locally Sited Facilities
A number of surveys have indicated just how extensive concern
about hazardous waste has become. In 1980, 64 percent of the respon-
dents to a Roper survey indicated that they were worried a great deal
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about the disposal of hazardous industrial chemical wastes. In
similar polls throughout the 1970s, concern about air and water
pollution had never reached this level (US CEQ, 1980b:26-27). A
Harris poll, released in the same year, suggests that 93 percent of
Americans want to see stricter hazardous waste regulations, 86 percent
give the problem a "very high priority," and 83 percent want disposal
sites cleaned even if it costs more than $10 billion in the process
(Harris, 1980).
While individuals are worried about hazardous waste and its
regulation, however, they are even more adament about resisting the
siting of improved waste treatment facilities. A Resources for the
Future survey asked 1,576 individuals to indicate how near to their
homes five facilities could be sited before they would either want to
move or to actively protest the siting. Four installations (a ten-
story office building, a large factory, a coal-fired power plant, and
a nuclear power plant) were mentioned with a general assurance that
they would be built and operated according to government environmental
and safety regulations. The fifth installation (a disposal site for
hazardous waste chemicals) was listed with an additional assurance
that "disposal could be done safely and that the site would be in-
spected regularly for possible problems." As shown in Figure 3.2,
only 17 percent accepted a disposal site within five miles of their
home, less than any other type of facility.* By comparison, 80
percent would accept a ten story office building, 50 percent a large
* In Massachusetts, where the average community is 24 square miles in
area, few sites exist in which a majority of a community's residents
would not live within 5 miles.
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative percentage of people willing to accept new
industrial installations at various distances from their
homes. (Source: U.S. Council on Environmental Quality,
1980b)
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factory, 45 percent a coal powered factory, and 20 percent a nuclear
power plant. Neither the hazardous waste facility nor the nuclear
power plant reached majority acceptance until the distance exceeded
100 miles (US CEQ, 1980b:29-32). The similarity between public
attitudes toward nuclear power and hazardous waste facilities is
striking for several reasons. Nuclear reactors have long been con-
sidered the facility that is hardest to site.* Moreover, the survey
took place less than a year after the Three Mile Island incident and
only shortly after the Kemeney Commission report on the causes of the
problem was released with considerable fanfare. Seventy-four percent
of the respondents were able to correctly associate Three Mile Island
with an accident at a nuclear power reactor. By contrast, only
twenty-two percent could associate Love Canal with hazardous waste.
National media attention on hazardous waste was relatively low. The
original Love Canal evacuation occurred two years before the survey
and the second evacuation had not yet taken place (US CEQ,
1980b:36-37). It would appear that opposition to hazardous waste
facility siting was extensive, even before the media focused on a
particular national disaster.
Sources of Opposition Within Communities
At the heart of community opposition are two immutable facts:
once sited, a facility is difficult to move, and within even the best
* National fascination with nuclear power led to 84 separate surveys
of attitudes toward nuclear power in the years 1974 through 1976
alone. All together, over 100,000 Americans were surveyed in these
studies (Melber, 1977:8-14). By comparison, national surveys of
hazardous waste were not conducted until the 1980s.
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facility lies the possiblity (albeit small) of tragedy. Construction
of a treatment plant is literally a concrete act. Construction is
visible and fixed in location. The plant, and its treatment-activi-
ties, becomes a permanent neighbor. The siting decision is the most
significant control a community has over this neighbor.
While support for better treatment processes and improved
hazardous waste management facilities is almost universal, local
opposition to specific sites is equally widespread. Hazardous waste
facilities, like prisons and power plants, are locally noxious but
regionally beneficial. However, because the location of the benefits
is isolated from the location of the risks, interjurisdictional
disputes are likely to emerge. A local constituency which will
benefit from a large facility seems a necessary precondition for local
support. In hazardous wastes facilities, however, only facilities
that treat wastes onsite for a local firm will be of strictly local
benefit.
This political reaction to hazardous waste plants has crippled
traditional regulatory approaches to the siting process. As the key
to facility siting, regulation is based on the notion that improve-
ments in the design and safety of facilities will reduce opposition to
their siting. Regulations are designed to promote regionally benefi-
cial facilities by weeding out those facilities that are undesirable.
Social optimality can best be ensured by establishing site selection,
design and operating standards, and promoting facilities that meet
these criteria. Based on this notion of social optimality, opposition
to facilities ought to continue only if proposals are inadequate (and
hence not socially optimal) or misperceived (and hence mistakenly
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thought to not be socially optimal). A strict standard and permitting
process will improve inadequate proposals, while a well-informed
public debate will correct misperceptions. In either case, an un-
biased and thorough technical research program coupled with a strict
permitting process is a necessary, and hopefully sufficient, step in
resolving such siting disputes. Once a technically competent and
impartial review of a facility has been conducted, the continual
inability to site the facility is generally believed to grow from
developer or resident attempts to bend the siting process to their own
ends for purposes inconsistent with the public interest. Based on
this assessment of the problem, reforms to enforce regulation or to
forestall delay in site permitting are generally attempted.
In my view, the impasse over the siting of locally noxious but
regionally beneficial projects will continue because siting policies
are redistributive. That is, benefits of a hazardous waste facility
are spread widely across a region -- no single beneficiary feels
especially well rewarded -- while at the same time, the risks and
costs are concentrated in a very small area of the host community
(O'Hare, 1977). Diffuse regional support is counteracted by concen-
trated local opposition. The resulting conflict in interests is
aggravated by traditional regulatory systems. The regulatory approach
presupposes common public values and an appropriate technical solution
to the problem of how to achieve those values. Neither exists in
hazardous waste disputes. While complete authority can be given to
central governing bodies to make decisions which are in the interest
of the region, these bodies will have insufficient power to prevent
opposition when disagreement over means and ends undermines the
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acceptability of the regulatory solution.
Over the last seven years, research on large scale facility
siting (O'Hare et al., 1983; Susskind et al., 1978, and 1984; O'Hare,
1977; and Morell et al., 1983) has led to the design of new siting
processes involving face-to-face negotiation and compensation. Those
who benefit can, on a project by project basis, share the gains with
those who stand to lose. In July of 1980, the Massachusetts Legis-
lature adopted a new siting process based in part on this research
(Bacow, 1982). Called the Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act, the
new law vested primary authority for siting hazardous waste facilities
with local communities; established a process of negotiation and
compensation involving the community, the developer and the state; and
mandated a broad public information program on hazardous waste manage-
ment practices. The National Governor's Association has endorsed a
similar approach to hazardous waste facility siting.
The Siting Act instituted a system of negotiation and compen-
sation for managing risks. On the surface, the system is quite
capable of coping with differing risk perceptions. However, the State
and the developers that have attempted to site facilities under the
Act have relied heavily on traditional approaches to regulatory
decision making. Massachusetts has used technical analysis and public
education as the primary means of improving the quality of the debate
and bringing about a convergence in perceptions of risk. In four
years since the law's enaction, no negotiation in Massachusetts has
reached the stage where local residents have openly negotiated over
compensatory benefits. In three cases (the SRS proposal for Andover,
the General Chemical proposal for Gardner, and the Liqwacon proposal
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for Freetown), potential host communities have successfully argued
that the risks involved are too great to even permit bargaining over
appropriate compensation and mitigation measures, and have forced the
developer to withdraw. In one case (the IT Corp proposal for Warren),
two years of negotiation have settled little about the risks of the
facility, and active negotiations over benefits has yet to begin.
This emphasis on risks early in the process suggests that risk per-
ceptions is of considerable import to a successful facility siting
process. Changes in benefits may have little power to alter percep-
tions about what risks are acceptable. It would seem that policies
for more creatively coping with risk perceptions are needed if im-
provements in the decision making process (such as negotiated dispute
resolution) are to be effective. The next chapter examines the
perceptions of and attitudes about risk revealed by the residents of
Worcesterville and Essexton.
Chapter 4
The Variety of Local Perceptions:
Sponsors, Guardians and Preservationists
Local opposition to the siting of the hazardous waste facilities
is widespread, but neither as universal nor as monolithic as would
first appear. In both Essexton and Worcesterville, participants in
the simulated hazardous waste facility siting dispute generally held
one of three distinct patterns of perception about and approaches for
siting hazardous waste facilities.
Participants within each of these three groups perceive risks
and value outcomes consistent with other members of the group. I call
these three groups sponsors, guardians, and preservationists. While
differences among sponsors, guardians and preservationists are most
clearly demonstrated using interview data, the general outline of
these differences are also revealed through the questionnaires.*
* The designations of sponsors, guardians and preservationists emerged
from analysis of the interview data. Participant attitudes and
perceptions were of three distinct types, and almost all individuals
fell clearly into one category or another. The study was explora-
tory, in that while I expected differences to exist within communi-
ties, I had little basis for predicting the characteristics and
strength of those differences.
(Footnote is continued on the next page.)
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Sponsors (to which 29 percent of the designatable participants
belong**) value the tax revenue or waste management benefits that such
a plant would bring, and at least tacitly promote facility proposals.
As shown in Figure 4.1, they perceive the risks of hazardous waste
treatment facilities to be relatively minor (question 2) and control-
lable (question 6). They are more trusting of expert knowledge,
private industry, and technology than are guardians and preservation-
ists (questions 5, 3, and 7), and generally resist community control
over those facilities (question 4).
Guardians (to which 38 percent of the designatable participants
belong) value orderly change that protects and promotes the public
interest and judge proposals by their potential impacts. They
perceive the risks of hazardous waste treatment facilities to be
significant (question 2) but potentially controllable (question 6).
Guardians emphasize the managerial aspects of safety (question 7), do
* (Footnote continued from previous page). The validity of these
designations is to some extent independently confimed by analysis
of the responses to the questionnaires. The questionnaires, shown
in Appendix B, were administered before the simulation began.
Answers to the questions were therefore in no way influenced by the
simulations. Moreover, all answers were scaled and quantitatively
analyzed, and hence served as a counterpoint to the more qualita-
tive analysis of interview data. While the small number of parti-
cipants (16 in Worcesterville and 18 in Essexton) do not allow for
a statistical test of the significance of these designations, the
attitudes and perceptions revealed are consistent with those
obtained from the interviews. A summary of findings is shown in
Figures 4.1 to 4.3.
** Seventeen percent of the participants in the Worcesterville and
Essexton simulations could not be classified as a sponsor, guardian
or preservationist, either because interviews could not be com-
pleted (11%) or no clear preference was revealed in the interview
that was held (6%). Excluding these individuals, Worcesterville
participants consisted of 23% sponsors, 46% guardians and 31%
preservationists. Essexton participants consisted of 35% sponsors,
30% guardians and 35% preservationists.
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not trust technical expertise, industry, or higher levels of govern-
ment to ensure proper waste management (questions 5, 3, and 8), and
hence promote consideration of community participation in the manage-
ment of hazardous waste treatment facilities (question 4).
Preservationists (to which 33 percent of the designatable
participants belong) value stability, a traditional life style, and
control over their own environment. They judge proposals by their
potential disruption and the uncertainty they engender, and perceive
the risks of hazardous waste treatment facilities to be significant
(question 2) and highly unpredictable (question 6).
Surprisingly, the position that an individual adopts is only
weakly related to traditional political and public interest demarca-
tions. As a group, sponsors are somewhat more conservative and
guardians somewhat more liberal than are preservationists, but the
differences are slight and exceptions common. Environmentalists exist
in all three groups, and the pro-environmental stand of guardians is
only slightly stronger than that of the other two groups. As shown in
Figure 4.2, small but consistent differences exist in attitudes about
industrial development, environmental protection, and governmental
activism.
Employment and income seem a somewhat more important determin-
ant, with self-employed businessmen tending to be sponsors, moderate-
income professionals to be guardians, and well-paid professionals to
be preservationists. Service workers, and surprisingly engineers, are
scattered somewhat equally through the groups. In addition, guardians
tend to be younger, to have resided in the town for fewer years, and
to be considerably more active in local politics than either sponsors
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Figure 4.2: General attitudes about industrial development, the
environment, and government activism, by type of
participant. Each scale is the amalgamation of data from
several questions. The questionnaire is presented in
Appendix B.
or preservationists. The specifics of these differences are shown in
Figure 4.3a to 4.3e.
These differences only begin to suggest the complex perceptions
and values used in evaluating the acceptability of a proposed. hazard-
ous waste treatment facility. In the next three sections, we will
examine the perspective of each of these three groups. For each
group, we will explore perceptions and values associated with the
character of the town, and the effectiveness of technical expertise,
monitoring and management as techniques for controlling risk.
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Figure 4.3a: Average income,
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Figure 4.3: Personal characteristics of participants in the simula-
tion, by type. Characteristics examined include (a) average income,
(b) average age, (c) average years of residency in Worcesterville or
Essexton, (d) percent of participants who have served in a major town
office (see Appendix C), and, on the next page, (e) degree of interest
in the problems of hazardous waste, as expressed on the questionnaire.
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I. The Perceptions of Sponsors
Meeting to interview a typical sponsor was an adventure in its
own right. Harold (not his real name) was rather special. He owned
and managed an industrial firm that produced hazardous waste. We
talked astride large vats of process chemicals. The noise and activ-
ity of the main floor drifted in and out of his office, while through
the office window I could watch two of his older children working
alongside several other employees. He was proud of his work, did a
first rate job. He was gruff and straight talking: "A community
without waste is nothing, a dry shell."
Like most sponsors, he generally trusted industry and supported
free enterprise but also believed in the need to protect the environ-
ment. He was ambivalent about citizen and local government involve-
ment in the siting process, generally thought that experts should take
Extreme
Moderate
Casual
Figure 4.3e: Degree of interest
in the problems of hazardous
waste.
- 124 -
care of the problem. But he was also wary about who would make sure
things were done right.* Unlike most sponsors, Harold is reasonably
familiar with the problems of hazardous waste. Another engineer and a
fireman also have professional experience with hazardous waste, but
most sponsors were only vaguely aware of the issues before the start
of the simulation. They work as realtors, builders, fire chiefs, or
are retired from business. They are entreprenurial and many are
self-employed.**
Perceptions of Risk
Not everyone believes hazardous waste treatment facilities are
inherently dangerous. While sponsors certainly are concerned with the
safety of treatment facilities, as a group they feel that perceptions
of risk are largely overblown. To some, the risks were simply incon-
sequential.
I think hazardous waste is less safe than nuclear
power, but the risk percentages on either are so low, I
don't particularly pay attention to them. (17) Once they
get that stuff inside the plant, it would affect little
else. No one will even know it's there. The company
won't want anyone interfering with their business, so
they're bound to use good neighborly practices. Keeps
people happy. (26) It's so overblown anyway. I lived
within two miles of the Woburn site (a contaminated
hazardous waste disposal site), drank the water that was
* As described above, these attitudes were determined from a ques-
tionnaire given to participants before start of the simulation.
** To preserve the anonymity of the participants, sources of the
quotes used in this text are referenced by number only. A general
description of the occupation and major offices held by each of
these individuals is provided in Appendix C.
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supposedly carcenogenic. Our family was tested and we
had no problems. The papers just blow everything out of
proportion. People read about a problem and start making
a fuss over something only vaguely related. I didn't
stop eating swordfish during the mercury scare or lob-
sters because of PCBs. We want everything to be so
sterile -- we could eat ten times the allowable levels of
most pollutants and there'd be no problem. (5)
Most sponsors take a more comparative view of the risks.
Relative to other risks they face, those of a hazardous waste treat-
ment facility are seen as managable. Under these circumstances,
sponsors are generally willing to accept these perceived risks, albeit
cautiously.
I don't care where they locate the plant, because
it's already everywhere. Why are people afraid of a
plant? It's on every road. What they really should be
worried about is the railroad cars and trucks that go
through here every day loaded with the skull and cross-
bones. Nobody wants it in their back yard, and yet
they've got it at their front door, without regulations
and safety precautions! I see chemical trucks on Main
Street: little Main Street that is so congested that you
can hardly get across. My God, if a car ever pulled out,
gonzo! The whole center of town would blow up. It's all
around us. Nobody in town lives more than a quarter of a
mile from either a railroad or a highway. Someday
there's going to be an accident, but a plant like this
certainly won't be the cause of it. (19)
The words "hazardous waste" scares so many people
because of a few past incidents. There needs to be more
public awareness. Those who voice concerns are worried
about their health, but they can't relate it to other
things that can be equally risky. Twenty-two cars of
vinyl chloride are shipped through here on train cars
every day. A nearby town has the second largest LNG
storage facility in the country: 3 million cubic feet of
LNG. People don't even know this. If one of these
tankers were to go, it would take half of Worcesterville
with it. Yet the plant has never had any problems. They
are really safety conscious. They trained the town fire
department, bought them special equipment, built extra
safety dikes. If you explain these safety features to
intelligent people and let them see that it can work, it
might change their minds. But people let emotions and
peer pressure affect their decisions, and nothing gets
done. (14)
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Its not that I don't think hazardous waste is
dangerous. The only thing I consider as dangerous is
genetic engineering, and I'm really scared of that. I
don't think we know enough about the long range effects
of hazardous waste -- cancer, groundwater contamination,
environmental pollution -- to really know how to manage
it. With this level of uncertainty, we need to be very
cautious. But I feel that a cautiously run treatment
facility would be a safe option. I wouldn't have a
problem living near such a treatment facility because
it's likely to have properly trained personnel and to be
effectively regulated. (14)
Preserving the Character of the Town
Sponsors give little attention to issues of town preservation.
When talking about the effects of a hazardous waste treatment facil-
ity, over half of the sponsors were silent about both the character of
the town and the aesthetics of the plant. To these people, the only
issue of great importance was the potential hazardousness of the
facility, and this hazardousness they thought largely managable.
Those that did mention a concern about the town character rated
development quite positively.
Nobody wants anything to come into Worcesterville.
Nothing! They don't want any development. They want to
lock the gates. You can't afford to live in a town if
there's not some development, some growth. (19) The way
I look at it, people make a big thing about the way a
plant like this looks. You know, once it was up and run-
ning smoothly, nobody'd know it was there. An operator
of a plant like this isn't dumb. They know enough to
keep a low profile. (26) As for me, I don't get emo-
tional about how these things look. The way I see it, a
community without waste is nothing, a dry shell. (17)
Technical Expertise
More than any other group, sponsors accept the general notion
that risks are managable through technology. The reasons for this
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acceptance, however, varies considerably. To some, the risk is not
part of their consciousness. The risks are insignificant, requiring
only standard management procedures. Technology is not so much
trusted as a solution to a problem as the reason the problem does not
exist. To these individuals, the issue of hazardous waste management
is less one of optimizing a control strategy than one of thinking the
problems have been blown out of proportion. Even among those sponsors
who believe hazardous waste treatment facilities pose important risks,
technology is viewed as well-tested and trustworthy. Problems will
not develop if the technology is properly designed.
As an engineer, I would have no qualms about a
hazardous waste plant. If I lived in a community that
had the right conditions to make it safe, I'd be a big
proponent. Given the scrubbers, monitoring and process
systems that IT is proposing for Warren (the Massachu-
setts town where IT Corporation has proposed siting a
hazardous waste treatment facility), I would not be
concerned if I live there. Unfortunately, someone hasn't
educated the residents of Warren. If the people of
Warren had taken the time to visit plants and become
educated, they wouldn't have as many doubts. They would
realize that there is a solution to all of these prob-
lems. (5) In fact, I'd rather put money into technology
than improved management. People who manage these plants
are human. They'll look out for their own personal point
of view. I'd trust technology because you can't bribe
it. If you put it in right from the beginning, it'll go
on protecting you through the years. (7)
Our town had a problem with odors from our sewage
treatment plant. The engineering firm who designed it
botched the job and the feds and the state didn't check
the plan for engineering defects. How were we to know?
We were led astray because we didn't have enough ex-
pertise to know better. Now we know that iron clad
guarantees are only as good as the technical knowledge on
which it is based. If we had more expertise ourselves,
we wouldn't have the problem. (17)
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Monitoring
Given the basic trust that sponsors have in technology, it is
not surprising that as a group they put little emphasis on the need
for local monitoring. Rather, they see the problem of regulating the
plant as rightfully a state and federal responsibility. Through
strict enforcement of standards, these higher levels of government can
ensure safety. Without such enforcement, there is little the local
community can do.
The most important risk factor is the lack of
enforcement. There's no one to enforce any of the
regulations. The federal agencies have neither the
manpower nor the time. We regulate driving and use
police to enforce the laws. NRC regulates the nuclear
industry. Without effective regulations, the risks are
likely to be significantly higher. (14, 26, 17) What
good are laws if you can't enforce them. Don't write
them. It's false security. This is a very serious
thing, more important than finding kids with marijuana.
We don't enforce the hazardous waste laws. We need a
real good enforcement team to do nothing else. The state
Department of Environmental Management has two people.
Two people in the whole state to enforce these regula-
tions, the manifest system, everything. (19)
Massachusetts had a manifest system, a hazardous
waste facility siting process, and an inspection system
even before RCRA. The only problem was that only four
people had to do all the work on hazardous waste, indus-
trial waste and oil pollution. It was impossible. But
resources weren't the only problem. The state Department
of Environmental Quality tried to close Silresim (a
hazardous waste treatment facility located in Lowell,
Massachusetts) for four years before they succeeded. If
the state tries to close down a functioning company, the
courts will give them every chance to correct the situa-
tion. By the time the state succeeds, the problem has
become enormous. (5)
Risk Management
To sponsors, the management of risk is not an issue of much
concern. Management is largely irrelevant to their considerations
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about safety. Moreover, sponsors believe that the town's role in
decision making for and management of the plant should be strictly
circumscribed. To sponsors, towns do not have the ability to effec-
tively participate. The problems of management are best left to
experts. At most, the town's role should be one of information
sharing and goal setting.
I would want a company that would be willing to work
with the community and allow some community input. But
sometimes too many cooks spoil the broth. Many people
let their emotions rule their mouth. They don't stop and
think and they don't have the expertise to make deci-
sions. Worcesterville should hire an independent engin-
eer to keep tabs on the plant, and leave it at that.
There has to be an assumption of "good faith" between the
operators and the town. Until the company screws up, we
need to assume that they will do what they agree to do.
(14)
Essexton would be ill fit to negotiate with such a
large company. The operating budget for this facility
would be is $30 million; the town's budget is only $6
million. We wouldn't know how to manage such a large
enterprise, we'd be lost. (26) Besides hazardous waste
is a national problem. EPA and the state should provide
the watchdogs. They should have the lion share of
responsibility for regulating this plant. The town
should not be burdened with a protection role. We don't
have the necessary skills. (17)
II. The Perceptions of Guardians
Diverse in background, guardians are strikingly similar in
attitudes and concerns. Two stand out in my mind, for at first glance
Tessa and Paul (not their real names) seem quite different. Tessa is
director of Essexton's art association and works in a wonderfully
sunlit office. She is optimistic, buoyant and at times exuberant.
Tessa has lived in Essexton most of her life. She works hard to
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promote its civic life: she has been a selectman for nine years,
served on the recycling and solid waste committees for fifteen years,
and on the conservation commission for one year. She belongs to the
League of Women Voters, the Sierra Club, the Appalachian Mountain
Club, and the Conservation Law Foundation.
Paul, by contrast, is chief of police in Worcesterville. His
office is lit with the glow of florescent light. The outside world is
completely cut off except for the squak of CB radios and telephones.
Paul arrived in Worceterville only a few short years ago. He belongs
to no political organizations, but when he talks politics he talks
straight and with considerable insight. As police chief, he has seen
the worst of small town life, yet he remains cool headed, even opti-
mistic.
Despite these differences in occupation and background, Tessa,
Paul, and other guardians share a very similar vision. Guardians
perceive the risks of hazardous waste treatment facilities to be
significant but potentially controllable. As a consequence, the
problem of hazardous waste attracts their attention more readily than
it does the attention of sponsors or preservationists. While sponsors
have little fear of hazardous waste and preservationists little hope
of designing acceptable solutions, guardians have both the fear and
the hope. They value orderly growth that protects and promotes the
public interest and are strongly aware of the need to site treatment
facilities. They therefore confront the problems of facility siting
in great detail, examining pros and cons to look for preferred solu-
tions.
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More so than sponsors or preservationists, guardians share a
common set of attitudes, beliefs and values. As expressed in the
questionnaires answered before the start of the simulation, guardians
are the strongest supporters of environmental protection, local
government management of development, and community control over
facility siting. They most stongly believe in the need for siting
hazardous waste treatment facilities. At the same time, they are the
most wary about the desirability of industrial development, the
trustworthiness of hazardous waste facility owners, and the reliabil-
ity of the state and federal governments.
Guardians are, on average, ten years younger than sponsors or
preservationists, and more likely to be women. Almost all guardians
had a general understanding of the problems and history of hazardous
waste management before the start of the simulation. For the most
part, this interest is not professional. Guardians are employed as
business managers, editors, engineers, museum directors, planners,
police, farmers, and assistants to selectmen. Rather, the interest
comes from a general concern with promoting the quality of life in
their community. Like the League of Women Voters to which several
guardians belong, they believe in responsive government coupled to an
informed and responsible citizenry.
Perceptions of Risk
When talking about the risks of hazardous waste, guardians do
not need much prompting. They give expression to what they think and
fear in great detail. To some, the reaction is visceral.
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I fear what we're doing to ourselves with these
chemicals. I fear the chemicals themselves. I remember
in particular a trip to New Jersey I took several years
ago. I was on the New Jersey Turnpike around sunset.
The sky was brilliantly colored with purples and oranges.
Only a few cars were on the road; the place seemed so
desolate. The air stank horribly and I began to have
trouble breathing. I was afraid that I would pass out
but felt I had to keep driving. On that day, my sense of
chemicals changed dramatically. They became dangerous to
me, personally. (23)
Central to their concern is the uncertainty of environmental
risks. Facilities bring with them the possiblity of accidents that
will greatly affect their security, as well as ongoing pollution that
has unknown effects.
My initial reaction was "Oh my God. I don't want
it. It's too big and noisy. Property values would
decrease." After thinking about it for a while, the
potential environmental problems became more important.
(12) I'm most concerned about making sure things don't
get any worse. We've got ocean dumping 15 miles south of
us and nuclear power 15 miles north. And now we're going
to create a hazardous waste treatment plant at ground
zero where we're living. It doesn't make sense unless we
can do something better than is being done now. We've
got to make sure we aren't creating a third potentially
explosive situation. Protecting the environment, our
water supplies, the ecology, these are essential. (18) I
worry about the emissions. They're small, but that's
when the plant is working properly. You're going to get
these bursts, and the operators aren't going to tell
anyone. Somebody will forget, or leave something open,
or a tank will leak. They could easily contaminate the
groundwater. You put a hazardous waste plant here, and
it leaks, the chemicals are going to travel. Nothing can
stop it. I'm scared. It's not knowing. A hazardous
waste plant might not be any more dangerous than many
seemingly benign activities, but then again you never
know. You'd find out five years later, and then it would
be too late. (23)
Statistically, a modern hazardous waste facility
might be safer than driving or working out in a thunder-
storm. The difference is that you never know when the
effects are going to show up. Twenty-five years down the
line everyone might get cancer. All these things we used
to think were safe are no longer considered safe.
- 133 -
Tomatoes aren't safe! (laughs) There's hardly anything
that doen't have a risk. (22) A little here and a little
there. It all adds up. You just don't know what will
make a difference. (30)
The sense of losing of control is a recurrent theme. Guardians
believe that inasmuch as possible, people ought not impose risks on
others. Risks that spill over onto non-participants, that reduce an
individual's autonomy to protect his or her health, are to be avoided.
I take all kinds of risks. I smoke, drive without a
seatbelt. I think these things are worse than living
near a hazardous waste plant. But they're also personal
choices that I make and they don't affect anyone else.
(29) It's my choice, my responsibility and I face the
consequences. I die or I don't die from cancer. But the
operator of a plant can live elsewhere and divorce him-
self from the effects. (32, 18) Moreover, when I drive,
I know what the risks are. I know if I'm driving safely
or not. With this you aren't given the information, or
you can't interpret what information you're given, or you
can't trust the people who've given you the information
to begin with. (16, 22) We already have so little
control over our bodies. Everything we eat has additives
which could lead to cancer. So if I can stop an addi-
tional hazard, I'll exercise it. (13)
You can't make guarantees about the future that all
people will believe. Things happen to change guarantees.
People would rather control the present as much as they
can, not take any chances, than to gamble on losing
control. This is true even if the gamble has lots of
advantages. (2)
But the concern with uncertainty and loss of control does. not
lead to blanket rejection of hazardous waste management facilities.
Guardians believe that unless handled cautiously, problems will
develop in hazardous waste plants. But they also believe that safe
managment is possible.
Hazardous waste has had a bad history and now people
have a lot of information as to what might go wrong.
Certainly hazardous waste plants are objectionable, but
they needn't be dangerous. (12) Safe plants can
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certainly be built, but it depends on how its approached.
The company needs to go out of its way to insure that the
community and the environment are protected. (18) If a
plant were handled to my satisfaction, I would expect the
risk to be reasonable, no greater or less than driving on
the Mass Pike every day. Not to treat the wastes is
certainly a greater risk, (22) because it leads to
illegal dumping which jeopordizes lives. But when a
facility is proposed, everyone opposes it. People don't
believe that they already are potential victims of
improper disposal. (2) So we don't really have the choice
of being risk free. We just get to choose your risks.
Like this old Vermont farmer a friend of mine visited.
My friend took one sip of his well water and nearly
gagged. Told the farmer to get it tested. The State
Board of Health came out to the farm as soon as they
looked at the water: the stuff was just awful. The
inspector found that the farmer had located his well
below his septic system and suggested he relocate one or
the other. He moved the septic system, and his well ran
dry. (29)
Because of this recognition that improper disposal of hazardous
waste is a problem of significant proportions, guardians believe that
treatment plants need to be sited. They see haphazard management as
irresponsible.
There has to be some treatment plants. Landfills
aren't working. Like the state-of-the-art landfill out
west. It leaked within a year, and that was with enor-
mous dikes, double lining and monitoring. It's clear
that we've got to treat these wastes because we have more
and more contaminants turning up each year. (23)
I know we have a problem with hazardous waste.
Right now they're dumping much of it in the ocean. We
have a dump 15 miles south of here. They've been dumping
55 gallon drums into the ocean for years. Just recently
the papers had a story about PCBs in bluefish. We go out
bluefishing. We had to give our fish away. Our business
went right down the tubes. I think it was a bum steer on
the bluefish. If the bluefish have this problem, so do
the flounder, the pogies and the lobster. They're all
taken from the same area. The pogies are taken to the
dehydrating plant and then fed to chickens. If the PCBs
are in the pogies, sure as heck they're going to be in
the chickens, in their eggs, in cattle feed... So what
are we doing with hazardous waste now? We're shipping it
to Alabama and dumping it in the ocean. I think we're
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going to have to face the problems instead of sweeping
them under the rug and I'm willing to do that. There's
thousands of drums out there. You catch one in your nets
and you just dump it back overboard. It's not a solu-
tion. (18)
Preserving the Character of the Town
Guardians think highly about their community. They wish to
preserve its small town and rural character. While recognizing the
potential problems of a hazardous waste treatment facility, guardians
believe the problems are solvable. To most, the facility need not
necessarily be detrimental to the character of the town, as long as
the siting is handled with care. This concession marks an uneasy
truce between the desire to keep the problems of hazardous waste at
arms length and the desire to be socially responsible.
Given our lack of industry, it's easy to say it
belongs some place other than this little rural town.
Most people would feel that they shouldn't get this kind
of plant. It would be seen as ruining its rural charac-
ter and its reputation. I have this too. I wouldn't
want to live in a town with a hazardous waste plant. (22)
If we had a plant, I think people's perception of Worces-
terville would change. If I were looking for a new home
and I had a choice, I'd stay away. (23) I wouldn't want
people to drive into the town and see an ugly plant with
a huge smokestack. Still, I do feel that we have a
responsibility to the state as a whole. This might be
part of that responsibility, but I'd want to know a lot
more before I accepted it. (22)
Guardians do not talk extensively about preserving character for
its own sake. They work hard to keep a perspective on what is most
important. Protection of health and safety that is their dominant
consideration.
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Sure, if it's an ugly eyesore, it would affect the
reputation of Essexton. We're a clean, little New
England town, and people know us for that. But if it
couldn't be seen, it wouldn't be a major consideration.
(13) So while the plant isn't beautiful, there are areas
where no one could see it, (18) and under these circum-
stances, the biggest problem is one of perceptions, not
reality. People are disgusted with the idea of hazardous
waste, whether or not it actually affects their lives.
Personnally, I could live with it, if its safety were
insured. (29) Placed alongside issues of safety, I think
the aesthetics of the plant are inconsequential. The
size, shape and color of the plant seems irrelevant. (32)
These issues of aesthetics and the town's character are
important to people because they lead such protected
lives. People can get caught up in their own little
dream world. They come home from work, have supper with
their family, watch a little TV and go to bed. Next
morning, they go into the town center to have a cup of
coffee with all the local good guys and off they go to
work again. It's a cycle that keeps them from having a
realistic perception of what the world is really like.
So any little disturbance becomes a major concern. They
worry about roosters crowing and a few trucks on their
streets. They have no idea about some of the problems
other people have right here in their own town. I don't
blame them. Maybe their better off. But for me, I count
my blessings, fully aware of how fortunate I am. I don't
spend too much time worrying about the small problems in
my life or trying to control things that aren't part of
my domain. Safety is part of my domain. What a plant
looks like and whether other people will like it aren't.
(2)
The tension between safety and town character shows itself
clearly when guardians discuss ideal locations for a hazardous waste
treatment facility.
It should be located in a place like Acton, which
already has a hazardous waste problem. The facility
developers should promise to clean up the W.R. Grace
problem. You wouldn't be starting with virgin land. You
could increase their safety as compensation for this new
hazard. (12)
If I lived in western Massachusetts, I would want to
locate the facility where the wastes are produced. Why
truck it all over the state and expose everyone to the
danger, especially since a truck accident is the most
likely accident. (23)
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Massachusetts is a vast state. We have lots of open
space, near major highways. It's land that isn't near
anyone's home, land enough to act as a buffer for air
pollution, explosions, spills and fires. If not in
Massachusetts, then in New Hampshire. Certainly some-
where in New England. Its got to be better to put it in
some wilderness somewhere. (30)
What good is a buffer zone? If the plant works
right, it shouldn't make a difference how far you live
from it, except for the effluent from the stacks. Your
offering a false security. A hundred yards of trees
won't protect you from a mismanaged facility. Putting it
in an industrial zoned area, even if it is located in an
urbanized area, would be better because it wouldn't
change the character of the area. The operators have
already assured us the plant is safe. You can't say both
that it's safe and that, just in case, we also want to
put it in the boonies. (32)
Technical Expertise
Guardians do not equivocate about expertise. They rally around
the belief that "technology is necessary but hardly sufficient."
So while the nuclear industry has been the most
tightly regulated industry we've ever had, it has still
had many problems. The best available technology is
necessary, but hardly sufficient without cooperation with
the town. I've worked with solid waste for years. A
regional facility was being developed in this area. The
most advanced technologies were being employed to convert
waste to energy. All the components had been employed
elsewhere: the shredders, the grinders, all the equip-
ment had been tested in other plants. In this plant,
they were putting components together in a new way to
achieve a new goal. They thought it would work, but it
hasn't always. In Conneticut, a plant blew up. They
used to spray their garbage with an embrittling agent and
this seems to have caused the explosion. On paper,
everything was the best available, and yes it should have
worked, but it didn't. You need more than good technical
equipment. (13)
I was working for a nuclear engineering firm on the
day of the Three Mile Island accident. They hadn't
designed TMI, but they did similar work. They were
absolutely crestfallen. They had done everything as
perfectly as they could; they didn't know any better way
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to do it. They didn't want people to get hurt. They
were human beings and felt badly. I feel like I could
trust them as people, even if something went wrong. The
problem was that nothing caught the problem earlier. You
can't design a foolproof system. I really think you have
to have faith in the people running the plant, or you're
lost. Ways to improve credibility are essential, and
must be designed into management. (22)
Technology is viewed as a tool which is malleable. Whether the
tool works well or poorly depends most strongly on the management of
design, construction, and operating procedures. It is these processes
that determine the variability in physical systems. Guardians believe
that by focusing exclusive attention on the physical component, risk
managers miss opportunities for improving hazard control through
better management.
Reliance on technology alone has proven a failure.
Three Mile Island showed that everyone tries to cover
themselves until something gives. Then its too late. In
Browns Ferry, a fire wiped out an entire control sector.
In some plants, valves have been put in backwards. These
failures are a real concern. Closed technocratic systems
create problems for the community because they don't know
the local community concerns and they aren't looking out
for the community's interests. (29)
Objectively, I think a plant could be designed and
managed to run safely. The problem is simple enough.
You need a container to burn things at a higher than
usual temperature. However, in design, safety margins
are cut for reasons of economy and management is compro-
mised because of the need for a profit. The technology
is not big deal, but (as in the nuclear industry) the
steel is not choosen right, the welds aren't applied
carefully, the plant is mismanaged. (32)
Through all this is a skepticism of expert opinion, a "show me"
attitude. Guardians want to be able to make up their own minds, to
retain their own ability to choose.
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The way I look at it, the developers would have to
prove to us that the technology was capable of doing what
they said. There's a fish dehydrating plant in a neigh-
boring town that just smells awful. The town's been
after the owners for 20 years. If you couldn't get
better assurances that this plant wasn't going to be
obnoxious, you'd get a lot of objections. We have one of
these problems already. What do we want two for? The
dehydrating plant problem would probably have to be
solved first, to prove the technology is there. We
certainly ought to be able to get rid of fish odors more
easily than we can handle the problems of hazardous
waste. Show us first. Get that problem squared away,
and if you can do that to our satisfaction, come back and
talk to us. (18)
Monitoring
To guardians, systems for monitoring the plant are essential.
While they generally believe that a well designed plant need not have
any problems, they are very concerned about fluctuations from the
ideal. Guardians believe that the potential for hazards evolve with
changes in the facility and its management. Risks cannot be adequate-
ly predicted because the conditions that facilitate hazards are in
flux. Under these conditions, the information that is of greatest use
is not predictive data, but detective data. By noting changes in the
flux, guardians feel confident that hazardous conditions can be
detected and ameliorated before mishaps occur.
The best of today's technology can have problems.
You need monitoring because if the technology you put in
today is not as good as you think, you can find out.
(12)
The technology of monitoring is of little concern to guardians.
The value of monitoring comes not from the collection of data, but
from its use. Monitoring that is done by the company is subject to
the same vagaries as prevention set up by the company. Such moni-
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toring does little to reduce the perceived risk because the monitoring
is not an independent check. It is just as likely to go awry as the
technology itself if the same management controls both. Independent
monitoring, on the other hand, encourages management to operate the
technology in such a way as to reduce hazardous conditions. What was
once a standard operating system becomes a feedback loop, with oppor-
tunity for learning and change.
Any activity that is opened to scrutiny is less
likely to be managed irresponsibly. (32) If monitoring
is effective, spills will be minor. You can stop prob-
lems before they go too far. But someone needs to be
scrutinizing the results of this monitoring. We don't
need joint management of the day to day operations.
After all, the company knows how to manage these pro-
cesses best. But a company owes it to the people who
live in the area to level with them, to shoot straight
with them. This doesn't seem to be the practice of many
companies. If they can't correct a problem, they hide
it. (18)
I like the monitoring being done by Pollution
Control. But that's great. The company collects reams
of data and as far as we know they sit on it. Is anyone
going to analyze this data and make changes? (23) And
figures can be manipulated so easily. What one person
holds to be safe, another person reinterprets as a
hazard. I have a friend who is very high up in Grace
Chemical. I'm sure if I lived in Acton, I would have
been one of those citizens protesting against Grace's
chemical storage policy. But I listen to him, and he
doesn't think Grace has done anything wrong. He's very
upset with the citizens of Acton. (30)
The problem is that you never know what's going on.
I used to live within a half mile of the Vermont Yankee
nuclear power plant. The managers of the plant sent us
all kinds of material, but I didn't know what it all
meant. We were disappointed with a lot of things we
found out through other avenues, though. They weren't
doing a lot of studies they said they would. (16) A
company like this can monitor everything, but if they sit
on the results themselves and there is no link to the
public, then that doesn't do us any good. When those
pollution levels start rising, they'll still be sitting
there monitoring away. Without citizen input, they may
not set about to correct the situation. (22)
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The problem, therefore, is to design a system to allow for
scrutiny on an ongoing basis. Guardians consistently promote a
program of independent monitoring to be done by a locally hired
engineer and coupled with agreements on acceptable levels of emis-
sions.
The planning of this type of facility requires a
high level of expertise. The town needs an advocate with
an appropriate background. (32) He should provide
outside monitoring, a voice who can say "close down" or
"do this" without fear of losing his job. (23) We also
need a locally based system for monitoring safety data,
how the plant is operating, groundwater quality, and air
quality. We'd need to set standards before the plant is
even built. If they went over the limit, that would be
that. (18)
We can't rely on federal standards. The EPA comes
out with standards, and then changes them. The Clean Air
Act may not make it again. All of a sudden, the plant
you thought was clean has more emissions. Standards have
to be set beforehand so that there is no way emissions
can increase, but rather can only decrease as technology
gets better. This would be part of the negotiations.
(23) And if the plant exceeds the standards to which it
has agreed, it should be shut down to correct the prob-
lem. Every few years, a review process could examine
what's going on and how the state of the art has changed.
In this way, we ought to be able to anticipate almost all
problem scenarios. (32)
Risk Management
To guardians, the essential problem of hazardous waste facili-
ties is the trustworthiness of its operators. While physical systems
of technology form the essential underpinnings of risk management,
they are generally not the source of greatest variability. Differ-
ences between good management and bad management are seen as producing
much more variability than differences between technologies. Two
reasons exist for this emphasis. The current system for regulating
- 142 -
technologies is seen as preventing truly bad technologies from being
used, and good management is seen as the basis for selecting good
technology. To guardians, trust of management is based at least as
much on its perceived motivation and intentions as on its perceived
expertise and ability.
Why give advanced technology to an idiot or someone
who would misuse it? It won't be used appropriately.
I'd rather give average equipment to a good competent
manager. You can't get away from the problem of human
interests and human abilities. All technology must be
managed by people who either act competently or not. (2)
I really think that all you have to do is read the
newspaper, and you know that you have to be skeptical.
We just have to be if we're not totally naive. We've
gotten to the point that no matter who tells us something
is safe, we ask for proof. This is getting worse and
worse. The League of Women Voters' studies show that
it's become much more difficult to convince people. Why
should we believe anyone? In the midwest, a new hazard-
ous waste landfill, complete with double lining, leaked
within years of start-up. I'm sure that it was presented
as safe to the town in which it was built. I'm afraid
that American business doesn't have that good a reputa-
tion. They're too concerned with stockholders' profits.
If I really trusted that they would be forthright, then I
would also feel that the plant would be run safely.
(30)
I've seen engineering consultants we've hired come
to town meeting and just be run out of town. They're
perfectly competent, but people just didn't trust them.
They had no real connection to the town. (22) It's even
worse when you talk about outside corporations. We're
really skeptical of big companies coming in and saying
this is the best thing. I'm a supervisor at an indus-
trial plant that uses large quantities of sulfur, mer-
cury, asbestos and similar substances. They don't always
deal with a full deck. Big companies don't always tell
you everything. I wouldn't trust a plan I didn't help
create. (18) The credibility of the plant being built
the way it should be without corners being cut is ques-
tionable. The company that builds this isn't in it for
the crusade of safe waste management. They set it up as
a way of applying their knowledge and capital to turn a
profit. Their priorities will never be those of the
community. (32) Because of this basic difference in what
the company and the town each consider important, there
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would have to be a lot of trust established. The people
running it would have to really sell themselves as
competent and responsible. If that could happen, then
the rest becomes possible. (22)
Guardians believe that a risk management policy that does not
share decision making powers is not reliable. The sentiment is nearly
universal in this group.
People are afraid of hazardous waste because of past
experience. Love Canal, Woburn, gasoline being dumped
into deep wells. Unless you can develop reassurances
that this can't happen, people won't accept the chance.
And the only assurances people trust are the ones they
help create. They need to be right in on the ground
floor. A company can come in with a superb plan using
the best technologies and the most advanced methods of
disposal and everyone will walk away from it. The people
who are going to be living with the thing from day to day
haven't had an opportunity to give input. People are gun
shy. If they don't help create the solution, they see it
as someone else's problem. (18)
These national companies and state government tend
to be less personal. They look at us as numbers, towns,
groups. We're not individuals. But here in our own
town, we're concerned with our families and their lives.
We're more diligent. And while we have a freer and
hotter exchange over issues, our politics are less easily
manipulated. That's why I'd rely on strong citizen
involvement. We're not experts, but we care. If we
tried to keep the plant safe, even if an accident did
happen, I'd feel better. I wouldn't feel so much like I
was being indiscriminantly dumped upon. (13)
Not only do guardians see incompetent and poorly motivated
management as promoting the risk problem, but they also believe that
with good management, risks can be greatly minimized. Guardians
believe that it is possible to cope with the risks of hazardous waste
treatment plants, and that the most effective avenue towards this end
is through effective management.
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I prefer to rely on people who believe in coopera-
tion with the community more than on technical systems if
I must make a choice. (22) If management is open and
above board, they can handle the problem. The technology
is there. Even if you can't predict exactly what would
happen, a good company can adapt technology when needed.
But if they're going to hide their problems, if they
aren't going to tell the truth, no way do I wan't to have
anything to do with them. If you can't have confidence
in a company, if you have to put a lot of constraints on
them, it's not worth the risk. (18)
The plant could be extremely risky if not properly
managed. Even if carefully managed, I would expect some
mishaps. I look at the East Bridgewater resource recov-
ery plant, which was supposed to be very well engineered.
That blew up. There are going to be accidents in a plant
like this, not necessarily disasterous ones that will
affect people outside the plant, but accidents nonethe-
less. I think there needs to be fairly heavy bonding or
insurance that can be easily reached so that problems
could be dealt with forthwith without years of litigation
while the problems spread. A small hot area is much
easier to clean up. With the right action, problems can
be contained. The problem is to make sure that the
"right actions" can be taken quickly. (29)
The problem is not so much "what should we control?" but rather
"how can we design a sharing that accounts for our mutual strengths
and weaknesses, and properly balances responsibilities?" Guardians
are very aware of their limited abilities and powers.
What really worries us is that we've all been on
town boards and seen situations where we were powerless.
When the Conservation Commission tried to impose stricter
standards for development on soils that were inadequate
for good septic system operation, the state reversed our
decision. Within two years of occupancy on such a site,
the septic systems of the homes were leaking. We find
something that needs to be done, we work hard to do it
right, and we're overruled. I would hesitate on taking
on any responsibility for the plant unless we could both
obtain the expert assistance necessary for intelligent
decision making and we were assured of having a meaning-
ful voice. It's scary to have responsibility without a
real ability to effect safety. If you don't know what
your doing, if you miss something important... (23) To
site a hazardous waste plant, you need a lot of people
who are unbiased and really concerned with humanity.
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That's hard to find. (30) But even with these diffi-
culties, I would want to retain sufficient authority to
protect the community. While it means also increasing
our liability, it seems the only responsible path to
follow. (2)
For the company to really build up a relationship
with the town, it would have to offer some real control
over choices. That takes a lot of faith on the part of
the company, a very positive attitude on their part. The
usual game, where the company offers as little as pos-
sible and the town wants as much as possible, doesn't
work. But the alternative will not be easy, for either
the town or the company. (22)
The difficulties. of effective power sharing, however, do not all
lie in the availablility of expertise nor in the balancing of power
between the company and the town. Deep concern exists over the
capacity of the town to handle anything this complex. Both the
structure of town governance, and to some extent the trustworthiness
of elected officials, are questioned.
Small insignificant nonsense consumes a community
like this. People worry about crowing roosters and
banning truck traffic. They and their government would
have a great deal of trouble in handling anything this
complex. It would be virtually impossible to do anything
constructive in a town meeting on a topic as big and as
controversial as this one is. I'm not prepared to
suggest an alternative, but the problem is there. (2)
Even our elected officials have little power to act
independently. People suspect your intentions as soon as
you get elected. We tried to sell the old fire station
for years. Everyone was so afraid that if they gave the.
selectmen permission to sell it they'd do something
horrendous. Unless you could find negotiators from the
town that would be absolutely trusted, you could never
manage anything this complex. (22)
To facilitate better management, guardians rely almost exclu-
sively on systems of joint policy making and clear lines of responsi-
bility in which the facility operator is given free reign within the
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general policies established jointly. The objective is to provide
incentives to both the operator and the town to act responsibly, while
recognizing the expertise and interests of both.
We can do without them, but they can't do without
us. And so we have the upper hand. Until there's some
competition among towns wanting hazardous waste plants
(laughs), I think we could take advantage of our posi-
tion. The advantage I would want is to have authority,
to have a say over things. My responsibility is to
protect this town, and it is the plant operators duty to
make the changes necessary for this to happen. (22) It
is important for the town to retain this authority for
controlling the safety of a plant, but the responsibility
of running the plant should be left to the plant managers
who do this for a business. A citizen safety committee
should focus on safety policy, the company on fulfilling
their responsibility in meeting these standards. (2)
I don't like government involved in business any
more than necessary. We needn't be involved in the day
to day operations, but we do need to know what is going
on at all times, have the capacity to respond rapidly in
a crisis and have the power to close the plant if they
don't follow the guidelines or meet the standards.
(29)
Within these systems of management, guardians look for a way of
holding the operator accountable. This concern for accountability
leads them to couple detection systems with promises contingent on
particular problems being detected. Given that not all problems can
possibly be predicted before operations begin, guardians also look for
ways of resolving future disputes between the town and the operator.
The exact conditions under which the citizen board
could close the plant down need to be spelled out before
hand. If problems are thought out and response scenarios
are written, then there should be few problems determin-
ing who is responsible for what in a crisis situation.
(13) To hold them accountable, we would need to hire an
engineer who would have full access to the plant and its
operations. (16) If there's a problem that hadn't been
foreseen and we disagreed with the facility manager, then
we'd need to call in some experts and hanker this thing
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out. Periodic reviews could be used to figure out if
problems are developing. (29) If something new comes up
that has to be dealt with quickly, the plant manager
should take care of it. But after that first time, a
community group would need to meet with the managers to
decide how to correct it in the future. If they dis-
agree, a board of arbitration would have to be created to
settle the problem. (13) It probably wouldn't be good
for the town to have the final say in these situations of
disagreement, since we may make decisions that are
neither in our interest nor that of the company. The
accountability needs to be balanced with the competence
of trained personnel. (16) And one good way to promote
caution on the part of the company is to require that all
employees and managers of the plant to live within one
mile downwind of the plant. It would then be in their
best interest to keep the plant clean. They'd have
families at home to worry about. (23)
I would also like to see very stiff penalties for
violating agreed upon guidelines. I'd like to give them
leeway to run the plant, but if something goes wrong
because of poor management, they'd have to pay out. If
an accident occurs because of honest mistakes -- mistakes
which they should not necessarily have known about ahead
of time -- that's one thing. But if they take short cuts
or bring in materials the plant is not equipped to
handle, they should be heavily penalized. In the same
light, the town should take responsibility for its own
actions. If it does something that impinges on the
plant, it should be equally liable. (29)
In general, guardians see monitoring of management and tech-
nology as needing to exist at the 'local level. The state is seen as
an unreliable partner in the process of regulating hazardous waste
treatment facilities. While holding power, the state is slow to act
and frequently has its own agenda, an agenda that is not consistent
with the interests of the town. Guardians see the present system as
politically motivated. Only with political pressure can the state be
forced to act responsibly.
The state should have an agency to check the func-
tioning of these plants, but I frankly haven't much faith
in the state government. I've seen departments riddled
with appointees that do not serve the towns. This
- 148 -
bothers me very much. But if your local watchdog commit-
tee knows these regulations and is monitoring the plant,
to me the state regulations could be made to work. With
enough kicking and screaming and with citizen actions to
bring these things to light, problems are usually solv-
able. It's always a hassle. But if we stand up and take
responsibility for our own lives and do not accept
something which we feel is irresponsible and dangerous,
the state eventually backs down. (13)
The state isn't always reliable. Sometimes they're
in cahoots with the developer and sometimes they just
don't care. But if the community was monitoring and could
show that the facility was spewing pollution outside the
tolerances set up, the state would have to respond. (18)
If you make enough noise, and ring the bell loud enough,
I think the state would act. (22)
III. The Perceptions of Preservationists
By valuing stability, a traditional life style, and control
over their own environment, preservationists make conditions that
almost no hazardous waste treatment facility could fulfill. It is not
so much the absolute level of risk that concerns them, but the uncer-
tainty of effect and loss of control. They perceive the risks of
hazardous waste treatment facilities to be unpredictable and focus on
the potential for disaster.
Jeffery expresses this idea quite clearly. As an architect, he
works in downtown Boston. Daily he fights traffic along overly
crowded highways in his long commute. From his twentieth floor
office, he overlooks all of central Boston. At night, he returns home
to clean air and open space. He loves the nearby ocean and the small
town amenities. He has lived in Essexton for 20 years, and expects to
die there. When we talked, he was clear and direct:
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There's no real benefit from this; it's just a
question of degree of nuisance. But we don't really know
very much except what we read in the paper. It's like
the atomic bomb in Japan: we know its horrible and a
potentially disastrous thing for a community, but we
haven't been directly confronted with it. We haven't had
to raise our children with this thing festering in our
community. Unless I was absolutely convinced that
nothing could go wrong, I wouldn't even consider it. (21)
In their attitudes, preservationists almost invariably stand
between the extremes of guardians and sponsors. This middle ground is
achieved not so much by agreement among preservationists but rather by
averaging a wide range of opinions. There is little that binds
preservationists together except their strong sense that a hazardous
waste plant would not be worth the risks. Some would not accept a
facility because the risks are so significant. Others are more
concerned with preserving the rural and pastoral qualities of their
communities.
There is, however, one set of attitudes which set preservation-
ists apart. All sponsors and guardians believe that if detected
quickly, hazardous waste mishaps could be contained and health and
safety protected. In stark contrast, no preservationist trusts these
detection and mitigation systems to be effective. (see Figure 4.1)
This general pessimism over being able to control future problems
pervades much of preservationist thinking.
Perceptions of Risk
To preservationists, small town life is a healthy life. It is
life without the risks of larger technological centers, life that is
safe and comfortable. To some preservationists, the risks of hazard-
ous waste treatment are enormous. They speak of holding back the
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chemical world which threatens to pour out into their community.
We're not so dumb as to allow hazardous and dele-
terious chemicals to enter our community. We are on the
edge of ruining our towns ith wastes that we've largely
ignored in the past. We're about to lose our environ-
ment. If a company can't get rid of its wastes at the
source, we shouln't allow them to just pass the problem
on to others. It's not fair. We should design tech-
nologies that won't make other people take care of
industry's problems. We are in danger and it's very
serious (31, 28)
Most preservationists do not have this zeal. To them, the risks
of hazardous waste treatment are uncertain and unwanted. These risks
disturb the security of the home, threaten what is perceived to be a
safe haven. In the absence of any critical reason to take these
risks, preservationists react by holding to their ideal of a rural,
healthy community.
People who live here are concerned with health and
safety. The air is good, clean. (4) The risks we have
now, they're like day compared to the night of hazardous
waste risks. Our way of life is slower, more relaxed.
Our risks are relatively low level and minor, this
treatment facility could be catastrophic. (1)
Like 95% of Worcesterville, I say "Who needs it?"
It's not critical to my life style. It's not critical to
the economy of the town. Why take the risk? I think of
myself as intelligent. I do my risk taking when I have
to. I must drive to be gainfully employed. But I don't
have to live near a hazardous waste plant. (6, 20)
Preserving the Character of the Town
When confronted with the possiblity of a hazardous waste treat-
ment facility locating in their town, preservationists react emotion-
ally. The question "what would a plant like this do to the character
of our town?" raises as much concern in some individuals as do ques-
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tions about potential health hazards. Concern over the character of
the town is paramount to preservationists. Hazardous waste raises
concerns about loss of control over local and personal decision
making. The outside impinges in on a familiar and well loved home. To
preservationists, a hazardous waste plant would be a great loss, one
to be grieved.
Our community would never tolerate a plant like
this. (28, 24) The most important consideration is the
sheer size of the facility. Essexton has almost no
industry; this facility would change the community
completely by converting a large area into industrial
use. (1) If I lived in an area that produced hazardous
waste, I'd feel different. I'd have the benefit of the
producing industry and of proper disposal. I don't think
any rural area that doesn't have these industries would
want the disposal plant. It wouldn't fit in. It's a
four story structure with an even higher smokestack.
This is much larger than what now exists in Essexton.
(4) Once this facility was built, you'd never get rid of
it. If one incinerator goes down, they'd build another
one on top of it, perpetually. We can't accept such
changes. (31) And we've resisted them before. There's
been a lot of proposals for the undeveloped area of
Essexton -- bomber bases and missile silos. Nobody can
leave a great wilderness tract alone. The idea of
hazardous waste going there would be absolutely heart-
breaking and fought tooth and nail. It's an asset that
is irreplaceable. (21, 1)
It would detract from the beauty of this town, which
is why people live here. I'd gladly pay whatever it
costs to keep what I enjoy. By myself, I can't buy all
that I enjoy from what Worcesterville collectively
offers, and I find the suggestion of such a plant to be
absolutely distasteful. My neighborhood would be
trashed. (20) You know what would happen if you sited
this here. People would leave. Worcesterville would
become an extension of its more industrial neighbors.
You'd have a community that would want to cater to this
facility. You'd lose Worcesterville as it is now. (24)
Technical Expertise
Preservationists are of two minds: those who think the risks of
hazardous waste are just so unpredictable as to be unacceptably risky,
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and those who wish to preserve the town from hazardous waste for
reasons other than health risks. This latter group has some of the
same ambivalent acceptance of technological solutions as do sponsors:
I would have confidence in the engineers and consul-
tants to decide when the plant is safe enough. (4) I'd
want them to use the very best equipment; human beings
would have less opportunity to mess it up. How could
Mario Andretti win races without the very best car? (20)
But after you have the best equipment, you don't just
start it up and ignore it. The piece will eventually
fail, it has to fail. So you need monitoring to tell you
when the piece will fail. (6)
I believe a strong body of scientists, engineers and
experts should develop and promote a solution. The state
should then just go in and build it. No questions asked.
This is one of those times when an authority figure
stands up and says, "I know what's best for you." (6)
But most preservationists find the technical aspects of risk
management to be frustrating, exactly the kind of problem they guard
against having to confront in their town. The technical problems of
hazardous waste treatment requires continual vigilance and poses
potentially unresolvable questions. As such, they are to be avoided.
Accidents aren't suppose to happen, but they do. We
bought the recommendations of an engineering firm hired
to design for us a sewage treatment plant. It doesn't
work. This is the applied arts. They are not precise,
and they don't always work. It's like a dog chasing its
tail. It's an imponderable. We need the technology to
do the job, but this won't happen until new systems are
designed and tested, and regulations are in place.
Government relies on industry to figure out a solution.
Industry waits until it has to act. Now it may be too
late. Nothing's been solved, and you can't trust either
government or industry anymore. I might have been a
little more trustful if the EPA had been allowed to exist
as a beneficial overseer of environmental quality.
Everyone in Washington should be run out of town based on
this issue alone. Nobody's looking out for us. We're
being dumped on. (31)
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I think I could live with the threat of a hazardous
waste plant, but I worry about my children. I don't
think there is any substance in the world that can keep
wastes from permeating into the ground. Water is a
universal solvent. I'd like to think that technologists
know what they're doing. Maybe they could contain it for
20 years, but eventually the stuff would leak out.
Incinerators are worse than landfills. They're terrible.
Air pollution is immediate. You breath it, and you just
don't know what it's doing to you. (24)
Monitoring
Like guardians, about a third of preservationists value monitor-
ing as a tool of risk managment. Under the circumstance that the
company could not be prevented from building in their community,
monitoring at least provides a means for knowing what the company is
doing.
Anything that humans handle has the possiblity of
error. We have so many unknowns. So many things are not
a science; they're an art. You're dealing with the
judgements of humans. You need to protect yourself with
safety factors, but you also need to monitor and watch
what is happening even more. But constant monitoring
locked in a back room is useless. You need exchange of
information and input into what mitigation measures are
being taken. (1) The town engineer ought to have the
right to shut down the plant if very clear and precise
guidelines, specified prior to the opening of the plant,
are not being met. (24) By anticipating problems in this
way and cutting them off through surveillance, we do a
service to our community. (1)
I was the only one in my group that wanted the high
technology option. But it's more than just good equip-
ment. I was looking for checks and balances. Everyone
knows that companies can come in with sophisticated
equipment, but they don't give a damn once its there and
the thing falls to pieces and there is no way of knowing
what they're doing and no way of controlling the conse-
quences. Monitoring is fine, but if it's all in-house it
won't do me any good. We would need access to it. I
would look for the best equipment, some transfer of
information to the town on an ongoing basis, and a way of
controlling the plant if something goes wrong. If they
exceed certain limits, the town should have the right to
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close it down. Also, some method of arbitration would be
needed, since the town might have no way of knowing now
what might be objectionable later. (21)
But most preservationists want as little to do with the facility
as possible. Monitoring, they believe, is a sham. They perceive that
the town is powerless to alter the actions of a developer in any
meaningful way once he has siting approval. Monitoring is of little
use under these circumstances.
Promises are easily made. I spent eight years on
the planning board watching developers come in and say
whatever they thought would most aid their cause. The
mechanisms to hold them accountable are just not very
satisfactory. Eventually they all end up in court. It's
such a long drawn out approach. So developers feel free
to take short cuts, knowing that there is little we can
do. (20)
Small communities can't stand the pressure of a
company if its in concert with state government. Once
something like this was sited, what could we do? We'd
withdraw and become distrustful. (1)
Moreover, even those preservationists who support the use of monitor-
ing do not believe that it will provide effective control. While all
sponsors and guardians have neutral to strongly positive attitudes
about the effectiveness of monitoring, the attitudes of all preserva-
tionists are neutral to strongly negative.
Risk Management
Like guardians, preservationists are deeply concerned with the
trustworthiness of management. But unlike them, there is widespread
pessimism that any system would improve the situation. By emphasizing
the virtue of preserving the existing quality of life, preservation-
ists are naturally pitted against people who seek to alter that way of
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life. There is little common ground on which trust might be built.
A developer is an outside guy who comes in to cheat
you. We need a situation in which no one stands to gain
by cutting corners, one in which the efficient manager
types were in control. I don't see that this is possible
if a private corporation is the owner. (28)
I like the idea of private enterprise. It's the
American way. It has its own checks and balances due to
competition. But things like this, certain corporations
will have monopolies. Big corporations will own little
corporations so that everything will be run by really
large corporations. That's not my idea of capitalism.
If they're going to do that it may as well be publicly
owned. But the government has a track record of notori-
ously screwing up, be it by excess paper work, lack of
committment, mismangement or what have you. So its six
of one, half a dozen of the other. (24)
Moreover, preservationists feel at a disadvantage relative to
the perceived power of outsiders. They feel their town is small and
inexperienced in the ways of large industry. They feel vulnerable.
There is no way that Essexton could participate
effectively in this process. Residents here can't sit
down, discuss problems and come to agreemnt about things
which are essential to the town. They're too fragmented
to work together. This issue is peripheral to the town.
You would have non-professionals dealing with profes-
sionals, and a community which wouldn't be able to agree.
No middle road could develop. Part time government can't
handle this because its too complex. County, state and
to some extent the federal governments can't make it work
because they're too political. I have no faith in them
to do what is good for my community. (1)
I don't know that there is anyone in this community
with enough expertise. I don't trust anyone anyway,
so... (24) The more I thought about it, the more I
realized that what control Essexton would have over a
facility like this would be relatively minor. Co-manage-
ment is more of a smokescreen than real power. Local
control is great, but if there is a problem that exists
and we can't get the problem corrected, then the com-
munity is also at fault. If I had to take this plant, I
would rather limit the community's liability. Give the
experts in the field the responsibility. Let them run
the plant, knowing that if they make a mistake, they
would be liable. (4)
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Preservationists have little basis for hoping that management
could minimize change in the community or limit what appears to be an
impossibly compex risk. For most preservationists, there is therefore
little advantage in improving management. Instead, preservationists
talk generally about the virtue of openness. They avoid connection
and cooperation with the facility operators, feeling better about
maintaining an arms distance from a company they recognize largely as
an adversary.
Credibility of management is a third of the problem.
If they play games, they'll lose it. They need to play
straight, tell us the facts, and let us work together.
(1) The developer needs to present their case with its
deficiencies, in a straightforward way. Seventy-five
percent of a developer's problems come from their holding
back on problems that other people later ask them about.
People get to wondering what else they are holding back.
(6)
Trust isn't built by a company telling us not to
worry. The company has to lay it all out on the table.
They've got to recognize us as a community that likes
what it's got and would like to keep it that way. (21)
The industry needs an insurance system or a pooling
of resources to make sure there is enough money to cover
corrective action. It's not the responsibility of
government to bail out industry if they have a problem.
The industry should stand on its own two feet. If you
make it expensive for them to make a mistake, they aren't
as likely to make one. (4)
This attitude is not quite universal. A quarter of preserva-
tionists concede that if forced to accept a plant like this, they
would want some control over the plant.
Local participation seems important as a check
against the excesses of the company, to make sure they're
not cutting corners. At the level of policy, we can
develop checks and balances. But we needn't get involved
in the day to day affairs of the plant. Open covenants
openly arrived at and enforced is what I'd look for. (28)
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IV. The Variety of Experience
In Essexton and Worcesterville, we have uncovered three distinct
patterns by which residents perceive risk and evaluate the acceptabil-
ity of those risks. Sponsors perceive the risks of hazardous waste
treatment facilities to be relatively minor, generally support econ-
omic development, and believe that expertise can effectively employ
technical analysis and preventative technology to control what risks
remain. Guardians perceive the risks to be significant but potential-
ly controllable, wish to protect the quality of life in the community
without foreclosing change, and believe that technical expertise is
necessary but hardly sufficient for effectively controlling risks.
They strongly promote systems for detecting and mitigating hazards
coupled to systems for holding management accountable and responsive
to community concerns. Preservationists believe the risks to be
unpredictable, generally oppose any development that changes the
character of the town, and are frustrated by the ambiguity inherent in
the use of technical analysis and prevention technology. They are
skeptical about the value of systems for monitoring or for holding
management accountable. They feel powerless to control the future
should they allow a treatment facility to be sited. In the face of
this uncertainty, they prefer to exercise control over the present by
denying permission to site the facility.
These three groups each included approximately a third of the
participants in both Essexton and Worcesterville. While this rough
equivalency cannot be said to exist throughtout the community, it does
suggest that each of these groups will be a significant force in the
local politics of facility siting. At this point, we can speculate
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that unless sponsors are motivated to actively promote the proposal,
the concerns of guardians for risk and safety are ameliorated, and the
opposition of preservationists is minimized, a proposed facility will
face stiff opposition from local residents. In a strategy for siting
a facility which seeks to engage each of these groups, the nuances in
their perceived risk must be carefully considered. In the next
chapter, the dynamics of their risk perceptions are explored, followed
by a chapter on the design of risk management strategies that account
for these dynamics.
Chapter 5
The Dynamics of Risk Perception
The hazardous waste management industry and public regulators
have argued that much of the opposition directed against hazardous
waste treatment facilities is a consequence of misperceptiono Evi-
dence that individuals perceive risks differently from experts is seen
as evidence that lay perceptions are inaccurate. By this logic,
public risk management policy ought to be based on technical assess-
ments and solutions, and lay perceptions should be heavily discounted
when they diverge from expert perceptions.
Policies promoting technical solutions and attempts to alter lay
perceptions through education have consistently failed to reduce local
opposition. Each of the patterns of perceptions demonstrated by
sponsors, guardians and preservationists differ from technical percep-
tions in significant ways. Moreover, while sponsors are willing to
entrust decisionmaking to experts, most guardians and preservationsts
are not. They acknowledge expert opinion, but consistently frame the
problem of risk in social and political dimensions as well. They do
not think probabilistically, but rely on broad classifications and
generalizations.
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This chapter examines the dynamics of these differences in risk
perception. Two aspects of perception are given particular attention:
(1) the intellectual and cultural frames used to define risk; and (2)
the cognitive and social processes used to evaluate risk. This
chapter argues that laypeople, particularly guardians and preserva-
tionists, evaluate risk using characteristics generally not included
in the analysis of technical experts. Risk perceptions are very
sensitive to the characteristics used by both lay and technical
publics to frame which hazards are to be considered most significant.
Moreover, the process for inferring the probability of future events
is systematically simplified, most noticeably by laypeople but also by
experts when they assess highly uncertain futures. Together, these
differences in assumptions about what characterizes a significant risk
and in processes for inferring the levels of those risks lead to
differing perceptions of risk. This chapter compares these differ-
ences, and suggests that (1) attempts to use public education to alter
lay perceptions typically ignore these fundamental differences and
hence lead to stalemated policymaking, and (2) acknowledgements of lay
perceptions as valid reflections of deeply held values provides a
basis for dialogue that could lead to more effective risk management
policy.
I. Frames for Defining Risk
Risk analysis, as currently practiced, is designed to evaluate
the potential hazardousness of an object or technology. Technologies
are emphasized because the predominant cause of hazards is believed to
be physical processes that go awry. By predicting the probability of
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system failure, and engineering ways to reduce those probabilities in
particularly vulnerable subsystems, the analyst uses specialized
skills to manage risks. At the same time, the analyst has framed the
problem of risk in the language and interests of his or her special-
ization.
Risks are widely presumed to be objectively determinable and
causally related to physical systems. In Essexton and Worcesterville,
many sponsors hold this view. A number of corollary conclusions are
implicit in this framework for understanding risk. When perceptions
held by the lay public are inconsistent with specialists, it follows
that they must be less accurate. When laypeople make distinctions
that cannot be sustained in analysis, it follows that their assess-
ments must be biased.
An alternative view is possible. Guardians and preservationists
are not simply lay statisticians using faulty analysis. Rather, they
offer a coherent framework for understanding risk and its management,
one that supplements the frame used by technical specialists. The
frame is a useful supplement to the one used by risk analysts.
In light of the high degree of uncertainty that exists in our
understanding of the potential consequences of hazardous waste (as
discussed extensively in Chapter 2), the risk analyst's assessments
are themselves at least somewhat subjective. More importantly, most
analysts employ physical indicators of risk that define and limit what
is considered important and worthy of attention. The definitions
chosen are physical: the expected number of deaths or expected
increases in the number of tumors, for example. These definitions of
risk are not generally shared by laypeople. Laypeople place greater
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emphasis on extreme outcomes, potential catastrophes, and uncertainty,
and less on actual numbers of people killed. They are concerned more
with maintaining normality and control over their futures, of avoiding
"unnecessary" death, than they are with avoiding what they consider to
be natural processes of living and dying. They therefore attend to
some dangers that technically trained specialists ignore, while hardly
considering other hazards with high levels of technical risks.
Similarly, they design risk management systems that control sources of
variability which technical specialists fail to consider. In this
section, we examine the ways that technical and lay publics frame
their understanding of risk.
The Subjectivity of Risk Assessment
Predicting future events has never been a reliable profession.
The unknown future is a central feature of most consequential deci-
sions. But not all futures are equally unknown. The behavior of
certain random variables and many causally determined variables are
well understood. While the consequence of a particular event remains
unknown, the distribution of possible consequences does not. The ex-
pected distribution of possible outcomes is generally shared by most
observers and is predictable. People gamble, buy insurance, build
bridges and drive automobiles with some assurance that the potential
outcomes are predictable and part of the human experiential base of
knowledge.
On the other hand, the probability distributions of many events
are themselves unknown and subject to significant disagreement. Under
such conditions of uncertainty, decision strategies which depend on
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discovery of a reliable probability distribution of events may prove
futile. This distinction between levels of uncertainty is based on
the types of information available about the potential consequences.
Highly certain estimates are based on reliable probability distri-
butions, while highly uncertain estimates exist in the absence of
reliable distributions.
An original distinction between objective and measurable "risk"
and subjective and non-measurable "uncertainty" pioneered by Knight in
the early 1900s (Knight, 1921:233) has become less clear since the
inception of Baysian probability. The two insecurity concepts are
sometimes used interchangeably. Arrow (1974:3) defines risk as the
subjective uncertainty of consequences, thereby removing all distinc-
tion. This definition presumes that all probabilities are subjective
and that some knowledge is applicable in even the most "uncertain"
situation. The boundary between subjective and objective uncertainty
therefore cannot be strictly delineated.
Like many other phenomena, some consequences of hazardous waste
treatment facilities are too unique to be estimated by observation.
Risk analysts have consequently developed theories to structure and
give form to their estimates of these rare events. The validity of
these theories are largely untested. Under these conditions, new
information is likely to have important implications for estimates of
risk. Choices for political action must therefore be based not only
on valuations of consequences but also on relative beliefs in the
occurrence of different states of the world. We have what Rowe
(1977a:17) calls descriptive and measurement uncertainty. New infor-
mation could have a significant effect on the estimates of risk when
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these levels of uncertainty are high. These estimates are not objec-
tive descriptions of reality, but subjective interpretations of
experience.
Annual Mortality as a Technical Measure of Perceived Risk
Consider a survey in which individuals are asked to judge the
relative "riskiness" of activities (such as skiing or driving) and
technologies (such as nuclearpower plants and liquified natural gas
facilities) without specifying any particular measure of risk.
Technical experts almost invariably order risks by the best available
estimates of annual fatalities. Based on the strength of this cor-
relation, Slovic and colleagues (1982a) concluded that technical
specialists viewed risk as synonymous with annual fatalities. This is
in keeping with prescriptive models of engineering risk assessment.
To analysts, risks ought to be a measure of an unwanted consequence
(in this case: death) over a given period of time (annual frequency).
Implicit in these measures of riskiness is the presumption that all
risks are equivalent in as much as their expected outcome is the same
and that risks can be ordered by these measures of expected outcome
(Rowe, 1977a; Lowrence, 1976).
When laypeople are similarly asked to judge the "riskiness" of
an activity, their orderings vary considerably from that of experts.
This inconsistency is frequently seen as evidence that lay perceptions
are inaccurate. If risks are viewed as a straightforward consequence
of hazards inherent in physical systems, then the inability of the lay
public to discern these risks stems from their lack of proper training
or their unfamiliarity with the facts. Under this assumption, how-
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ever, we would expect that the poor performance of laypeople at esti-
mating risks is caused by their unfamiliarity with death statistics.
This, however, does not appear to be the case. While laypeople
typically overestimate the absolute frequency of rare causes of death
such as botulism and underestimate common causes such as stroke
(Lichtenstein et al., 1978), they correctly rank order these causes of
mortality by frequency. In light of the respondents' unfamiliarity
with death statistics, this itself suggests a general sensitivity to
causes of death. Given that laypeople have the skills to estimate
risk in the way of experts, why do their estimates differ so radically
under some conditions?
Variability as a Measure of Risk Percetions
Studies of business investments, gambling, and insurance sug-
gests that laypeople make unique estimates of risk because they are as
concerned with variability (what is the range of potential outcomes?)
as with expected value (what is the most likely outcome?). A number
of psychologists have developed models of risk that explicitly incor-
porate these concerns with variability. The "variance/expected value"
theory of Pollatsek and Tversky (1970) and Coombs and Bowen (1971)
incorporate measures of expected value and the variance in a model
that accounts for the relative importance of these two factors to
individuals. The "portfolio theory" of Coombs (1975) and associates
(Coombs et al, 1960, 1970b, 1970c; Pruitt, 1962) postulates that
individuals change their preferences for variability with different
levels of expected value. Risk is subjectively estimated as a-func-
tion of the range of outcomes, probability of extreme outcomes,
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variance, and expected value. Likewise, risk preferences are based on
subjective valuations of these variables. According to this portfolio
theory, for any given expected value, preferences for risk are single-
peaked. As the risk of lotteries either increases or decreases, the
individual likes them less. A little risk is preferred to a dull
certainty or a frightening gamble.
These, and parallel theories developed by Huang and Krelle (see
Schaefer, 1978), describes the behavior of individuals in betting
games more closely than engineering analysis. People have been shown
to exhibit preferences for certain probabilities (e.g., Edwards, 1953,
1954a, b, c), for certain levels of variance (e.g., Coombs and Pruitt,
1960; Lichtenstein, 1965; Slovic, et al, 1968b), and for certain
degrees of skewness (e.g., Coombs and Pruitt, 1960; Lichtenstein,
1965). Variance preferences are particularly strong; individuals are
willing to give up a considerable amount of expected value to achieve
a preferred level of variance. Probability preferences may be equally
important (Edwards, 1954c).
All these studies are based on betting games with monetary pay-
offs. The models are based on single person games in which the risks
are small. These characteristics, and the absence of empirical data
to differentiate among the various theories (Schaefer, 1978:22-24),
makes the generalization of quantitative results difficult. Qualita-
tively, however, perceived risk is systematically linked to dispersion
of outcomes and variability, not just to measures of expected outcome.
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Variability and Extreme Outcomes in Large-Scaled Risks
When risks are capable of affecting large-scale social networks,
the importance of variability is accentuated. The sources of vari-
ability are many. We have what Vlek and Stallen (1980) call "ambigu-
ity of seriousness" and "ambiguity of probability." Both the range of
consequences and the predictability of their likelihood are highly
variable.
The attempt to uncover the determinants of risk perceptions in
real life situations was sparked by the work of Starr. Starr (1969)
held that historical data on fatalities and benefits could be used to
reveal existing social preferences for risks. By his analysis, the
public is willing to accept voluntary risks roughly 1000 times greater
than involuntary risks and that the acceptability of risk (as measured
in fatalities per person hour of exposure) appears to be crudely
proportional to benefits (as measured in dollars per person involved).
Applying these figures to nuclear power, Starr calculated that the
cost of repairing a damaged nuclear power plant is a more demanding
safety constraint than that of social acceptability. By his estimate,
economic considerations for protecting capital yielded a safety factor
40 times more stringent than those applied to coal burning electric
generating plants, the risks of which society clearly accepted. What
this said about public opposition to the risks of nuclear power is
hard to fathom, but the technical community generally received the
paper with interest. By reducing complex, esoteric phenomenon to a
simple index of preference, Starr had opened the way to applying
engineering analysis to national risk management decisions.
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Starr's work had several difficulties. Risks that are "involun-
tary" tend also to be ones that could potentially produce catastrophic
consequences, are inequitable, and have a number of other features
which might affect both the structure of perception and the range of
acceptance. Since Starr's model did so little to explain the opposi-
tion to nuclear power (except to show how irrational it was), other
explanations were proposed by Rowe (1977a), Otway and Fishbein (1977),
Fischhoff et al. (1978b), and Slovic et al. (1977). The apparent
relationship between voluntariness of risk and its acceptability could
also be accounted for by the immediacy, controllability, newness, and
other features of risk. Moreover, Otway and Cohen's (1975a) attempts
to replicate Starr's work indicated that the results were excessively
sensitive to assumptions and manipulation of data. A simple explana-
tion of risk acceptance did not exist.
From research, it is becoming increasingly apparent that differ-
ences between technical and lay perceptions are consistent and identi-
fiable. In studies of individual perceptions of risk conducted by
Fischhoff et al. (1978b) and Slovic et al. (1980) factor analysis was
used to help understand lay perceptions of risk. Are risks which are
perceived to be fatal different from risks perceived to be uncontrol-
lable? In what way do either of these traits help frame what hazards
are considered most risky? The Fischhoff study clustered nine of
these risk characteristics into two underlying factors* (a techno-
logical risk factor and a severity factor), while the Slovic study
clustered eighteen traits into three factors** (an uncertainty factor,
a dread factor, and an exposure factor). The structure of these
factors is somewhat sensitive to the characteristics included,*** but
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once characteristics are selected, the factors remained relatively
stable across laypersons and experts judging large and diverse sets of
hazards (Slovic et al., 1982b).
In what ways are these factors indicative of perceived risk? To
answer this question, Slovic asked his subjects to characterize a
large number of hazards as to their perception of each hazard's
riskiness and the degree to which each of the eighteen traits applied.
Slovic found that perceptions of risk correlate most strongly with
what Slovic called the "dread" factor, moderately with "exposure," and
not very well with "uncertainty." Knowledge, when abstracted from
consequences, are not an important determinant of risk perceptions.
People are not afraid of potential consequences simply because little
is known about them. Rather, they are afraid of (i.e., they "dread")
* (from the previous page) Fischhoff identified a "technological
risk" factor that included the degree to which the risk is
involuntary, delayed, unknown to the exposed, unknown to science,
uncontrollable, and new. He also identified a "severity" factor
that included the degree to which the risk is certain to be fatal.
Both included the degree to which the risk is dreadful and
catastrophic.
** (from the previous page) Slovic identified a "degree to which a
risk is understood" factor consisting of risks that can be
characterized as being unobservable, unknown to the exposed,
delayed in effect, new, and unknown to science; a "degree to which
it evokes a feeling of dread" factor consisting of risks that are
uncontrollable, dreadful, globally catastrophic, fatal, not
equitable, locally catastrophic, intergenerational, not easily
reduced, increasingly risky, involuntary and personally risky; and
a third factor of number of people exposed and the degree of
personal exposure.
*** (from the previous page) The structure of the factors in the
Slovic study (which included several characteristics not used by
Fischhoff) differed from the structure found in the Fischhoff
study. Characteristics that were once grouped together were now
grouped apart with characteristics from which they were once
separated.
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consequences about which enough is known to consider them hazardous,
and which appear to be uncontrollable, potentially catastrophic,
intergenerational, not easily reduced, and not equitable. In a
related study, Slovic (1982b:87-88) concluded that neither the annual
number of lives lost nor the total number of lives lost in one mishap
were indicative of the seriousness of a risk. Rather
Accidents serve as signals regarding the probability and
magnitude of further mishaps. An accident that takes
many lives may produce relatively little social dis-
turbance if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-
understood system (e.g., a train wreck). A small acci-
dent in an unfamiliar or poorly understood system may
have immense consequences if it is perceived as a har-
binger of further and possibly catastrophic mishaps.
It is this variability in consequences, the possiblity of extreme
consequences, that most strongly augments the perceived riskiness of
large-scale technological systems.
Technical and Lay Perceptions of Risk Compared
Based on these studies by Slovic, Fischoff, and others, Vlek and
Stallen (1980) argue that differences in perceived risk are more a
function of what is valued than of how data is analyzed. Distinctions
between risk preference and risk evaluation become blurred when
preference measures (such as preferences for voluntary exposures,
controllable consequences, and time and spatial limits on consequen-
ces) dominates analytic measures (such as cause-effect relationships,
systems for safety, and the historical accident frequency). Otway and
Fishbein (1976b and 1977) have used an attitude scale to develop an
even more finely grained analysis of the beliefs about and evaluations
of the risks and benefits associated with nuclear power. In both
studies, individuals are presumed to perceive risks through processes
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that are more personal and social than rational. Perception of risks
are not seen as independent of the perceiver.
Hohenemser and colleagues (1983), on the other hand, have had
initial successes in generating a rational, cause-effect model that
incorporates many of these "dread" risk characteristics, explains lay
risk perceptions, and yet is still quantifiable through scientific and
engineering methods. Hohenemser developed a "hazardousness" scale
based on causally explainable events which could be measured and
predicted. By choosing events that threaten what people value,
Hohenemser was able to define an engineering function of risk that
closely approximated lay perceptions. Based on this scale, the scores
made by experts using scientific and quantitative estimates closely
correlated with the scores of laypeople using intuitive and qualita-
tive estimates for 93 hazards. Interestingly, of the factors used,
nine are measures of consequence variability and extreme effects,
while only two are measures of expected outcome.* Measures of human
mortality are insignificant explainers of perceived risk. Once again,
the factor most frequently chosen by scientists to represent risk does
not appear to be a strong factor in estimates made by laypeople. The
three factors that correlated most strongly with perceived risk are
each factors of extreme consequences and variability: maximum
credible human mortality, maximum credible nonhuman mortality, and
potential for widespread exposure.
* Variability of effect is associated with the factors of potential
for widespread exposure, concentration of release, persistence of
release, recurrence of release, population at risk, delay of effect,
maximum credible deaths, potential for transgenerational effects and
maximum credible nonhuman mortality. Expected outcome is associated
with average annual deaths and nonhuman mortality.
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The Hohenemser model defines hazardousness by describing a
sequence of causally connected events. The events are selected based
on a model that begins with human needs and wants, and proceeds to the
selection of technology, release of potentially harmful energy or
material, and eventually to the development of harmful consequences.
The model tries to rationalize lay perceptions within an engineering
frame of cause and effect, showing that perceptions of riskiness are a
function of this "hazardousness" scale and not just a function of the
annual rate of mortality. Thus, the authors suggest that laypeople
frame the problem of risk within a causally coherent structure,
different from the way engineers and scientists normally frame risk.
Whether the structure of lay perceptions can be structured on a
rational cause-effect model or more loosely on a decision situational
model, it seems clear that the structure is widely shared, fairly
consistent, and substantially more complex than current engineering
models of decision making. The application of different models
clearly leads to different conclusions as to what is risky and what is
not.
II. Processes for Evaluating Risk
Whatever dangers we conceive to be important, perceptions of
risk must invoke some process of prediction. Risks are about events
whose consequences have not yet been felt, about fears of future
losses and hopes of future gains. If the inferences we make about the
possibility of these events becomes systematically biased, we may well
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make decisions which we would otherwise not make.
Because of the importance of probabilistic reasoning to risk
decision making, decision analysts have devoted considerable attention
to these problems of inference. They have found that both laypeople
and experts tend to apply simplifying assumptions to probabilistic
reasoning. These assumptions ease the process of inference but
sometimes introduce considerable bias to the decision making process.
Experts have argued that "intuitive" processes of inference are
considerably less reliable than disciplined processes, and that
laypeople are more prone to these biases than are experts.
Boundedly Rational Decision Processes
That these biases exist has been extensively documented (see
Kahneman et al., 1982c; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Beginning with the
work on bounded rationality, studies have shown that intendedly
rational behavior is constrained by limitations on cognitive and per-
ceptual capacity. Classical optimization, which searches for a full
and consistent ordering of outcomes, requires information processing
that is beyond human abilities. Instead, aspiration levels are used
to determine a subset of acceptable solutions. The theories of Simon
(1956), Cyert and March (1963), Lindblom (1964), and Etzioni (1967)
depict decision makers as coping with complexity by managing problems
as they become important, by partially ordering outcomes by how well
they satisfy needs, and by simplifying procedures for generating
solutions.
These mental shortcuts, called heuristics by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974), are important features of risk perception. Subjec-
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tive estimation of probabilities and consequences are constrained by
these simplifying procedures. Three heuristics for assessing prob-
abilities are particularly common. Representativeness (similarity to
other objects or events along some dimension) is used to group an
unfamiliar object into existing subjectively held classes of familiar
objects. Availability (ease with which instances of an event can be
brought to mind) is used to assess the frequency or plausibility of a
particular event occuring. Adjustments to an anchor (re-evaluation of
an initial estimate) is used to make predictions when a prior opinion
is already held (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
The hazardous waste debate provides ample opportunity for
systematic bias to enter through each of these heuristics. By way of
illustration, an individual's estimate of the likelihood of a hazard-
ous waste catastrophe is likely to depend on whether hazardous waste
is perceived to be more similar to nuclear waste, to recycling, or to
city dumps (representativeness), on whether the individual can easily
visualize the potential effects or can recall other instances of
catastrophe because of news coverage (availability), or on whether the
individual's initial estimate is colored by the estimates of propo-
nents or opponents to the project (anchoring).
The theories of bounded rationality also suggest that informa-
tion is processed sequentially. Options are eliminated by tightening
criteria around an acceptance set until only a few alternatives
remain. In a similar vein, events may be deemed risky (unacceptable)
by comparisons against a critical value standard or by comparisons
across or within attributes (Shoemaker, 1980).
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Comparisons against a standard is a common form of searching
behavior. Coombs (1964) initially described the use of satisficing
criteria to simplify cognitive and decision making work. Criteria
used to evaluate alternatives are tightened until one "optimal" option
remains or until the subset of acceptable alternatives is managable.
The rejection rule is usually disjunctive (i.e., divides alternatives
into mutually exclusive sets). Criteria are used to eliminate options
below thresholds of acceptability. Thresholds can be established for
probabilities (e.g., the chance of failure exceeds a critical value)
or consequences (e.g., an option has the possibility of exceeding a
specified maximum cost).
Rejection rules are more frequently based on the probability and
amount of losses than of gains because losses more strongly alter
minimum aspiration levels than do gains (Slovic, 1967; Slovic and
Lichtenstein, 1968; Andreissen, 1971). Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
suggest that losses become increasingly important while gains become
decreasingly important the further removed they are from an indi-
vidual's point of psychological neutrality.
The Cultural Basis of Risk Evaluation
In the risk assessment literature, much has been made of these
heuristics and biases in information processing. As Slovic and
associates note in their analysis of the structures of perceptions:
"People respond to the hazards they perceive. If their perceptions
are faulty, efforts at public and environmental protection efforts are
likely to be misdirected" (Slovic et al., 1982a:14 1). Thus, when the
lay public opposes the siting of hazardous waste facilities against
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the advice of experts because of news accounts about disasters, their
opposition to facilities is seen as misdirected.
Strategies to alter the way laypeople process information
appears to offer little promise for improving the siting of poten-
tially hazardous facilities, however. While the lay public clearly
has problems in their role as "lay statisticians," the role itself has
been created by expert statisticians. In interviews, local policy-
makers rarely conceive of risk as probabilistic consequences. Events
are risky when they promote the potential for an unwanted consequence
which the policymaker has subjectively defined as important. Prob-
ability is not explicitly considered both because laypeople recognize
their unfamiliarity with statistical reasoning and because charac-
teristics of the potential outcomes are more important.
These basic differences between how experts and laypeople
evaluate what is significant and what is not make transference of
knowledge between the two groups difficult. Frequently, these differ-
ences pose few problems. When experts are trusted and a dominant
theory exists for explaining phenomena, controversy is muted. Until
dams started to fail, for example, the lay public largely entrusted
dam building to engineers. On issues of hazardous waste treatment
facilities, sponsors have retained this basic trust of experts.
Sponsors do not think more analytically than do guardians or preser-
vationists, but they are more accepting of the apparent insignificance
of risks that experts estimate to be comparatively insignificant.
When controversy becomes widespread and competing theories can
be used to support partisan positions, guardians and preservationists
challenge the adequacy of expert opinion. Guardians and preserva-
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tionists will not simply define a problem as "technical" and assign it
to experts to await solutions. They insist that these problems be
negotiated amongst a larger pool of interested parties.
In the hazardous waste facility siting debate, technical experts
have responded to lay resistance with education and public relation
programs. The lay public is to be taught to rethink their perceptions
based on decisionmaking techniques and the facts (as developed by
experts). However, little evidence exists in the literature on atti-
tude change or the history of public information campaigns to suggest
that the education of one group (of laypeople) by another (of experts)
works in any way except slowly and unpredictably when the basis for
understanding reality differs substantially (see Nowotny, 1980, and
Nelkin et al., 1977, for examples associated with the risks of nuclear
power). Estimates which require some subjective judgement are dif-
ficult to change because they are based on inherently subjective
processes of classifying objects, correlating events, and imagining
consequences. No simple procedure exists for assessing the compati-
bility of subjective probability judgements with a total system of
beliefs, and no compelling argument for changing a subjective estimate
ca-n be made unless some incompatibility can be shown.
As a consequence of this information processing pattern, people
tend to persevere in their beliefs despite contradictory evidence.
Nisbett and Ross (1982:192) note that people tend to seek out and
interpret evidence in a way that sustains beliefs and to place too
much confidence in evidence on which they first build their theories
of causality. Evidence that gives support to each of two opposing
views does not reduce confidence and moderate opinions, but rather re-
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inforces confidence for holders of both views.
As demonstrated in a number of studies, experts are also prone
to these biases. When forced to go beyond well understood phenomena
or to convert incomplete knowledge into judgements for use in public
policy, experts frequently rely on the same intuitive process as do
laypeople (Fischhoff et al., 1982:252). Moreover, experts are typi-
cally over-confident about the accuracy of their judgements (Slovic et
al., 1980). Engineering judgements are built upon experience and
familiarity with risks. Just as the poor driver can feel safe because
he has had extensive experience of driving badly with no mishaps, so
too can the personal experience of an expert create unwarranted
confidence.
A few conclusions are possible. Experts clearly know more than
others about their specialized domain. However, the domain is built
on models, a language of probabilistic events and judgements that
confirm a particular view of reality. That view extends beyond what
can be measured into areas of considerable uncertainty. This conjec-
ture is not open to reliable testing and is limited by the bounds of
the expert's knowledge and concepts. Truly interdisciplinarly prob-
lems of risk management may not give way neatly to any particular
expert opinion.
In what sense can experts "educate" laypeople? As Otway and
Thomas (1982:75) note, we have two sets of people who by different
processes have each constructed a distinct view of reality. For each,
meaning and beliefs are intimately linked to culture. Each group has
learned to function more or less successfully, testing and correcting
for error within their specified domain.
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As Douglas and Wildavsky (2982:50-51) have emphasized,
The choice of risks to worry about depends on the
social forms selected. The choice of risks and the
choice of how we live are taken together. Each form of
social life has its own typical risk portfolio. Common
values lead to common fears (and, by implication, to a
common agreement not to fear other things). There is no
gap between perception and reality and no correct des-
cription of the right behavior, at least not in advance.
The real dangers are not known until afterward (there
always being alternative hypotheses). In the meantime,
acting in the present to ward off future dangers, each
social arrangement elevates some risks to a high peak and
depresses others below sight. This cultural bias is
integral to social organization. Risk-taking and risk-
aversion, shared confidence and shared fears, are part of
the dialogue on how best to organize social relations.
Questions about acceptable levels of risk can never
be answered just by explaining how nature and technology
interact. What needs to be explained is how people agree
to ignore most of the potential dangers that surround
them and interact so as to concentrate only on selected
aspects... Once the idea that people select their aware-
ness of certain dangers to conform with a specific way of
life is accepted, it follows that people who adhere to
different forms of social organization are disposed to
take (and avoid) different kinds of risk. To alter risk
selection and risk perception, then, would depend on
changing the social organization... In addressing ques-
tions of acceptable risk without considering their social
aspects, we are speaking to the wrong problems.
Education, then, may well be limited to cultural exchange, in which
each learns from the other and neither view is deemed correct and
hence superior to the other.
This is not meant to suggest that all perceptions are equally
valid. Perceptions can be powerful even if completely devoid of
reality. In the Frayser neighborhood of Memphis, Tennessee, a resi-
dent named Evonda Pounds was convinced that her rashes and other minor
illnesses were caused by poisoning through toxic chemicals. An
investigation in 1976 of her home found only trace concentrations of
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pesticides commonly used throughout Memphis to control termites and
mosquitoes. She was not convinced and continued with her complaints.
Over the next three years, other residents started reporting an
increased incidence of rashes, headaches, urinary problems, heart
disease and cancer. By 1979, the neighborhood was in an uproar
"virtually identical to that of Love Canal" (Maugh, 1982b:645). EPA's
analysis of air, water and soil samples revealed only background
levels of pesticides. Historic records and old aerial photographs
showed no evidence of chemical dumping. The Center for Disease
Control conducted an epidemiological study of 300 families and found
no evidence of toxic illness or severe health effects. After a year
of emotional confrontation, the uproar slowly subsided (Maugh, 1982b).
Within Frayser, we should note, the change of perceptions was
brought on by a process of interaction between the scientific and
community cultures. While communities can and do panic because of
misperceived realities, the solution is less one of education than one
of engagement. In the siting of hazardous waste facilities, such
engagement may well require opening risk management policy to new
processes of give and take suggested by guardians and preservation-
ists. Only when the perceptions of the various lay and expert publics
are each given credance is the process of interaction likely to lead
to new, potentially useful solutions. The next chapter examines what
these solutions might entail.
Chapter 6
The Mitigation and Management of Risk
Risk perceptions are central to the process of siting a hazard-
ous waste facility. Substantial disagreement exists over the signi-
ficance of risks and the appropriateness of control strategies.
Unlike many risk management issues, however, agreement does exist on
the most fundamental question. In the abstract, lay people as well as
experts believe that treatment facilities are a necessary element of
any hazardous waste risk management strategy. Local residents,
however, perceive that a regionally safer environment is achieved at
the price of a more dangerous local environment. Abstract support
does not therefore generate local consent.
To many professional risk managers, lay fears are becoming
increasingly irrational as the public responds to problems of older,
less effective facilities. Risk managers believe the risks of hazard-
ous waste treatment facilities to be. measurable, predictable, and
comparable to other risks. Their careful analysis demonstrates that
the siting of treatment facilities is the most efficient path to
regional safe waste management. Moreover, local risks are also
estimated to be within levels already accepted for other risks. State
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of the art treatment facilities, according to these analysts, makes
everyone's environment safer. The analysis, however, is not compel-
ling to those who hold a different view.
The resulting uncertainty frequently cripples public decision
making. These uncertain risks lead to predictable behaviors. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the uncertainty is systematically excluded or
treated as a predictable effect, an inadequate theory is claimed as
most appropriate in light of no clearly adequate alternative, and
action becomes impossible in the absence of greater certainty. As was
seen in the Love Canal example, hazardous waste management debates
have all these characteristics.
Improved risk management, therefore, depends on improved treat-
ment of risk perceptions. Public systems function to provide ser-
vices, and perceptions influence the demand for, opposition to, and
satisfaction with those services. As a basis for knowledge, percep-
tions are most important when public policy has no firm factual
foundation upon which to rest. Perceptions of risk can overpower any
analysis that is attempted if the analysis and its supporting theory
are subject to dispute. As a basis for behavior, perceptions con-
strain the range of feasible risk management strategies. Perceptions
can generate substantial opposition to proposed facilities. As a
basis for experience, the fears generated have demonstrable psycho-
logical and social costs. (Kasper, 1980; Weinstein and Quinn, 1983).
Perceived risks, even when not substantiated by analytic estimates,
can cause considerable distress. If we are to break out of the cycle
of denial, claiming, and inaction associated with uncertain and risky
public policies, we must learn to cope with risk perceptions in the
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face of uncertainty.
Because of the seeming intractability of perceptions held by
both the lay public and technical experts, the dynamics of risk
perception have attracted considerable research interest. Most of
this literature focuses on issues of perceived predictability within a
general model of technically preventable risks. Control strategies
based on this model focus on two aspects of risk management:
- Prediction: Do we know enough to forecast the likely
effects of a hazardous waste treatment facility? Is
this knowledge being impartially examined and present-
ed?
- Prevention: Can we design systems for effectively
reducing the potential risk? Will these systems be
reliably managed?
As revealed by the simulations and interviews employed in this re-
search, however, many individuals who are concerned about the siting
of hazardous treatment facilities are concerned with two additional
aspects of risk:
- Detection: If hazardous conditions develop, do we have
the means to detect these changes? If so, will that
data be collected and scrutinized so as to detect
changes quickly?
- Mitigation: If serious hazards are detected, do we know
how to reverse the dangers and the negative impacts?
will these mitigation measures be applied with suf-
ficient speed and skill to be effective?
When hazards are rare but potentially catastrophic, almost all lay-
people prefer strategies of risk detection and mitigation to strat-
egies of risk prediction and prevention. Likewise, guardians in
particular prefer strategies that strengthen social control mechanisms
to those that strengthen technological control mechanisms. In this
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chapter, we explore the rationale for these preferences, and examine
the strengths and weaknesses of each as a basis for managing risks.
I. Predicting and Preventing Risks
The process of siting hazardous waste treatment facilities has
ceased to function. According to several studies conducted for EPA
(BNA, 1981:872; US EPA 1979c:12-13), opposition is motivated by
several factors: fear of facility accidents and chemical exposure
(with the conviction that a different facility located on a site
"somewhere else" is better); distrust of industry and government (with
fears of losing control over the community's future); and adverse
beliefs about impacts on property values, the quality of life, and the
aesthetics of the community (with concerns about equity and "being the
dumping ground for other people's waste"). This fear and mistrust is
based on experience. Though the safety of new facilities may be
considerably improved, serious risks are clearly associated with many
existing facilities. Analysis of problems does not provide a clear,
unambiguous estimate of these risks.
In some cases, even modern secure facilities have failed. In
1977, studies by both the US EPA and the Illinois State Geological
Survey found an SCA-run disposal site to be "a well designed, secure
landfill which provides disposal by environmentally acceptable meth-
ods" (US EPA, 1979c:309). Public opposition from the township of
Wilsonville continued despite these determinations, and the State
Supreme Court eventually ordered the site closed and all material
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exhumed. Although the site had accepted wastes for only eighteen
months, toxic organic solvents had already leaked from the disposal
site (US OTA, 1983:255). In Sheffield, also located in Illinois, a
barrier wall that state regulators claimed would prevent migration for
500 years was breached by organic solvents in just a few years (US
OTA, 1983:255). A study of four secure landfills in New Jersey
uncovered similar problems (Morell, 1982:82).
Arguments by proponents of hazardous waste treatment facilities
must be judged in light of this difficulty in predicting and prevent-
ing hazards at even modern sites. While treatment facilities have
generally proven more environmentally benign than disposal sites, the
claims by industry spokespersons that these facilities are "like any
other industrial or manufacturing facility" and "yield no adverse
environmental impact" (Morell, 1982:66) have yet to be proven in
practice.
Prediction as a Basis for Decision Making
While analysts may agree that the fundamental uncertainties in
our current knowledge and ambiguities in defining risk may make truly
objective analysis impossible, they disagree considerably on the
implications of this finding. To those who espouse a view that the
world is explainable, predictable, and controllable, subjectivity is a
transitory phenomenon that continually gives way to objectively
advancing science. Subjective data approximates the truth that is
being discovered by research. Systematic biases can be remedied, and
remaining error can be treated as random. Statistical and experimen-
tal tools remain our most valid and reliable methods for understanding
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risk. Thus, while Rowe (1977a:38-41) points out that risk parameters
can be subjective, he nonetheless describes risk as that condition in
which possible unwanted consequences exist, the occurrence of which
can be expressed in the form of a probability distribution (Rowe,
1977a: 24). To Rowe and other analysts, subjective data requires more
careful attention, but the probability of their occurence can still be
estimated and analytically compared (Starr, 1969; Lowrence, 1976;
Rowe, 1977a; Rasmussen, 1975).
In its purest form, the subjectivists' position differs radical-
ly. To subjectivists, hierarchy of truth does not exist. Knowledge
is modeled on experience and mediated among people with similar
experience. Knowledge is socially constructed and not inherent in the
structure of the natural world (see Kuhn, 1970; Lindblom et al., 1979;
Feiveson et al., 1976). Useful knowledge is built on paradigms of the
world that are powerful explainers and predictors of the natural and
social world. The paradigm constrains the way people frame concepts,
pose questions and set research goals. It thereby ensures continuity
in inquiry. When no paradigm is dominant, people see the world
differently and base their inquiry on their most salient experiences
and needs.
This is not to say that subjectivists believe that all percep-
tions are therefore equally valid. While we cannot know objective
truth, in conditions where uncertainty is greatest most subjectivists
hold that some patterns of perceiving remain more reliable than others
(i.e., the scientific method, statistical empiricism, Baysian analy-
sis, or religious revelation, depending on who is claiming reliabil-
ity). Unreliable or inconsistent patterns of observation and analysis
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lead to biased choices.
The Search for Precision: The Technological Imperative
As discussed in Chapter 5, cognitive psychologists and decision
analysts have identified important differences between individuals who
base their perceptions of risk on scientific reasoning and those who
base it on impressionistic reasoning. To these analysts, risk is a
probabilistic function of potential, unwanted effects. Their focus on
probabilities and scientific reasoning has a number of implications.
They have identified heuristics used to assess probabilities subjec-
tively (i.e., representativeness, availability and adjustments to an
anchor), have demonstrated a number of satisficing criteria used to
simplify cognitive work, and have prescribed theories about how we
ought to measure risk and make decisions when uncertainty exists. By
prescribing theories that require quantitative analysis, however,
these analysts tend to limit their attention to that which is measur-
able. Probability functions are not precise (and hence useful) unless
factors of analysis are either measurable or estimatable. To achieve
measurability, analysts tend to emphasize technical engineering
solutions and prediction-prevention strategies for managing risks.
Technology is emphasized because the search for truth, as
defined by decision analysts, is a search for solutions that can be
accurately predicted and reliably implemented. In their model,
estimates of risk (based on aggregate, generalizable data analysis)
requires fixed, measurable, and predictable functions. The model
systematically ignores the sources of greatest variability (namely
operational procedures, individual behavior and managerial structures)
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because there are no reliable methods for systematically generating
numerical estimates of their probable future behavior.
In the absence of scientific consensus, attempts by facility
sponsors to alter risk perceptions of guardians and preservationists
have proven futile. Advertisements, public education and persuasion
seem to have little effect on the perceived riskiness of hazardous
waste facilities. Moreover, when given the opportunity to design risk
management systems that most effectively minimize perceived risk (from
their perspective), neither guardians nor preservationists stress
investments in technological safety devices. Even sponsors, who
generally rely on the advice of technical experts, did little to
promote the use of technical prevention systems.
A look at how participants in the simulations acted and made
decisions is illuminating. In the Essexton and Worcesterville simula-
tions, individual participants had an opportunity to select a company
(based on its safety proposals) that best satisfied each participant.
The choice was between Waste Technology Incorporated (which stressed
improvements in technologies for preventing risks), Pollution Control
Corporation (which stressed improvements in detection and mitigation
of risk), and Environmental Management, Incorporated (which stressed
improvements in management systems for controlling risks). In the
individual selections, only 15 percent of participants most preferred
the technological options offered by Waste Technology Incorporated,
and 61 percent saw it as the least preferred option (see Figure 6.1).
In addition, trade-offs among the proposals of these three companies
were made within small groups of about six people each. On average,
17 percent of resources were used to upgrade technical hazard
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Figure 6.1:
Least Preferred Options
Preferences for safety options proposed by three compan-
ies, by type of participant. During the simulation,
participants ranked the proposals of the three companies
by order of preference. Figure 6.la shows the percent of
participants who ranked a company as most preferred of
the three. Figure 6.lb shows the percent of participants
who ranked a company as least preferred of the three.
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prevention systems. This is compared in Figure 6.2 to 25 percent used
to upgrade managerial structures, 28 percent taken in various forms of
compensation, and 30 percent used to upgrade detection and mitigation
systems.
Perceptions about the inability of technology to solve safety
problems persist not because local residents are anti-technology.
Most are not. Rather, individuals frequently believe that experts
ought to be in the best position to estimate risks, but they are
dissatisfied when expert knowledge is ambiguous (aggregate data cannot
Restricted
Compensati¢
talUnrestrict
Compensatic
Figure 6.2: Average allocation of resources among five possible
options, in percent of total budget. In the simulations,
an annual budget of $3 million was given to each team.
On average, the six teams allocated these resources as
indicated in the figure.
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be applied to any particular individual), contradictory (experts do
not agree), and counter intuitive (expert-opinion dictates against
common sense). Experts frequently write off previous hazardous waste
disasters as failures of incompetent management using inadequate
technology. Individuals are left with a sense that the problem is
larger than the expertise of those who claim to know.
Moreover, behind every probability estimate is an implicit model
of causation. For the most part guardians and preservationists
believe that good equipment backed by technical expertise is essential
to the effective management of hazardous waste. Technology is the
backbone of waste management for almost all participants in Essexton
and Worcesterville. But for guardians and preservationists, the
technology offered in the basic package (standard equipment and
management good enough to meet state and federal standards) forms that
backbone. Given additional resources, only a third of sponsors, a
tenth of preservationists and no guardians choose primarily to streng-
then this aspect of risk management. As shown in Figure 6.1, for 30
percent of sponsors, 90 percent of guardians, and 56 percent of
preservationists, the proposals offered by Waste Technology are less
desirable than those offered by either Pollution Control or Environ-
mental Management.
Sources of Variability Beyond Prevention Technologies
By opting for detection, mitigation, and management systems over
prediction and prevention measures, these residents are acknowledging
the already superior development of technical systems for managing
risks. Scientific study of risks associated with large scale
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facilities has focused primarily on these technological and engineer-
ing contributors to risk. The state of the art is already advanced.
The risks associated with hazardrous waste treatment, however, cannot
be managed simply through the application of better science and the
construction of better facilities. Perfectly designed technologies
are no insurance against inept use of those technologies. Only when
technologies are integrated with systems for detecting and mitigating
problems, and organizations to manage these systems, can prevention
strategies work effectively. Thus, in the management of hazardous
waste, release of chemicals can occur if the container or treatment
systems malfunction (i.e., a holding tank leaks at an improperly set
weld), if detection and maintenance procedures are inadequate (i.e., a
holding tank leaks at a point of corrosion that was never detected),
or if decisions are made erroneously or negligent (i.e., a holding
tank leaks due to an explosion that occurs because two chemicals are
improperly mixed). Only when the various parts of a risk control
system are well integrated and functioning optimally can the facility
operator most effectively manage risks. Thus, a well rounded manage-
ment system is likely to yield a better record of safety than the
disjointed use of more advanced techniques.
In practice, this integration is only weakly acknowledged.
Specialists in the dominant field tend to assume a unique signifi-
cance. In hazardous waste treatment facilities, the technological
component dominates. Effective management is equated with containment
or elimination: physical processes for treating the wastes. Alterna-
tives consist of variations on the technological theme. Too little
attention too late in the facility siting process is paid to the other
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aspects.
The Uses of Technologies for Prediction and Prevention
The use of methods for predicting and preventing risk is there-
fore two edged. While these technologies are perceived to provide the
essential backbone on which a waste management system must be based,
they are also seen as focusing the risk debate along too narrow a
line.
Within a particular political risk management debate, the choice
of an analytic method will powerfully influence the alternatives that
can be considered and the analysis that is possible. Fischhoff and
colleagues demonstrate this point in their comprehensive study of
methods for estimating the acceptability of risks. As they point out,
no approach is comprehensive or infallible, each gives special atten-
tion to some aspects of the problems while ignoring others, and hence
"choosing an approach is a political act that carries a distinct
message about who should rule and what should matter" (Fischhoff et
al., 1981:xii). To those who stand to win or lose, tools for assess-
ing intricate and politically explosive hazards are as controversial
as the conclusions to which they lead.
The risks that the firm seeks to minimize, however, are not the
same risks that a potential host community might want it to minimize.
By restricting the debate to issues of technology, the firm can seek
to isolate a whole range of risk related issues from public scrutiny.
The incentives for the sponsoring firm to limit its own uncertainty
help explain why discussion is restricted to technological alterna-
tives. Compared to detection, mitigation, and managerial systems,
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preventive technologies are more precisely delineated and difficult to
change once construction is complete. Future costs and organizational
constraints are predicatible. The firm retains control over its
future and precludes the town from shifting uncertainty back onto the
firm. Moreover, the operating, financial, and managerial systems
needed to construct these technologies can be easily integrated into
the normal operations of the sponsoring corporation.
Changes in detection, mitigation and managerial systems are not
so easily integrated into organizations. They require greater flexi-
bility and openness to change in the environment. The firm can less
perfectly measure and predict the effect of these more social forms of
risk management. Finally, the firm's advantage in expertise is less
consequential. Claims made by a facility developer about management
and mitigation measures have less authority and are subject to greater
challenge from citizen groups.
By preventing discussion of detection, mitigation and managerial
alternatives, the firm can hope to limit its own uncertainity.
However, this tendency for disputants to focus on facility construc-
tion and technologies rather than on the whole risk managment system
can only aggravate disagreements based on divergent perceptions of
risk. When the facility siting debate is couched analytically in the
language of engineering probabilities, but concerns are more fundamen-
tally about causes of risks and the equitable sharing of risks and
benefits, then disputants talk about risk in ways which do not commun-
icate real concerns.
When values are shared or power clearly delineated within an
organization, these problems may have few consequences. Controversy
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is muted and decision making remains possible. In business organiza-
tions and other closed networks, decision rules and analytic conven-
tions can be used to give form to uncertainty. In the political
arena, the decision rules themselves are open to debate and charges of
bias. Inquiry becomes a mixed blessing. As hazards are studied, new
problems (with unknown solutions) are uncovered where before all
seemed safe. While potential hazards are easily discovered, the
safety of risk managment strategies are difficult to delineate. In
the short run, assessments create a seemingly unsafe world, a world of
wide ranging consequences, vague probabilities, and unanswered prob-
lems.
We become stuck in the assessment phase of public policy making.
In the absence of a theory or process for reducing the newly discover-
ed risk, each discovery increases the perception of risk while at the
same time encouraging further investigations that discover yet more
subtle risks. Our knowledge-seeking work engenders fear of the risk
situation without a corresponding increase in our capacity to adapt
and cope (Clark, 1980:11). Under such circumstances, the public
system ceases to provide essential functions for people in the system
(Schon, 1971).
II. Stabilizing Risks Through Detection and Mitigation
When knowledge is incomplete and the future uncertain, mistakes
and surprises are inevitable. Effective policy must rely on a stra-
tegy of recognizing mistakes, learning from them, and modifying future
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actions accordingly (Clark, 1980). Our problem is not just of know-
ledge, but also of learning; not just of consequences, but also of
coping. To effect changes in perception, efforts to manage risk must
extend beyond a focus on prediction and prevention strategies. The
design of detection and mitigation strategies to promote learning and
adaptive control of hazards seems essential.
Detection and mitigation strategies are designed to be resil-
ient. Problems are sought out and corrected as they are detected.
These strategies have the potential for more effectively managing
risks because consequences associated with hazardous waste facilities
emerge for the most part gradually, not catastrophically. As conse-
quences evolve, they become increasingly predictable. Detection and
mitigation systems can reduce feelings of uncertainty by effecting
control of hazards over time. If errors can be detected and corrected
as they evolve, the possibility of error become less frightening.
Repair and recovery are possible. By increasing the reliability and
trustworthiness of these learning and control systems, the management
of risk becomes more effective.
Detection Technology
Strategies for mitigating hazards while their potential conse-
quences remain minor depend on effective compliance monitoring. For
the residents of a community, the most significant hazards are likely
to be caused by release of chemical waste from the facility. By
comparing measurements of chemicals in the environment with measure-
ments taken before the facility was constructed, the effectiveness of
prevention strategies can be continually assessed. If effectively
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designed, detection can occur shortly after accidental spills or
releases. In the absence of monitoring, the success of containment
and treatment processes must remain a conjecture.
Wastes released from a hazardous waste treatment facility can be
transported through several media in the environment. A rotary kiln
incinerator (similar to the one proposed in the Essexton and Worces-
terville simulations) is designed to burn solid and semi-solid organic
wastes. Incompletely burned organic substances or vaporized non-
organic waste constituents (i.e., sulfur, nitrogen, organic solvents,
and metals) can be released via smoke emissions or through cracks in
containment vessels. Organic compounds with sufficiently high vapor
pressures can evaporate and escape from storage. Liquids can escape
containment and leach into the soil and groundwater. All of these
substances can, in turn, be taken up by plants and animals. As shown
in Figure 6.3, the fate of chemical wastes accidentally released into
the environment is likely to be distributed through all media to which
it can bind.
Five types of monitoring can be applied to waste management
practices (USOTA, 1983:246-247). Four of these (visual, process,
emission and ambient monitoring) focus on identifying the occurrence
and extent of wastes released into the environment. These data can be
used as part of an information feedback system to improve facility
operations. The fifth (monitoring of effects on biota resulting from
exposure to wastes) is primarily useful in research settings.
Visual monitoring consists of routine inspections for container
leaks, improper storage and handling practices, and equipment malfunc-
tion. Its primary purpose is to identify fugitive emissions, spills,
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and unsafe conditions. Process monitoring consists of checking for
unexpected variations in process parameters (e.g., the temperature and
flow rate in an incinerator). Because chemical, physical, and bio-
logical reactions can be controlled through careful management of
material and energy flows, variations in these flows are indicative of
potential probelms. Emission monitoring consists of examining condi-
tions (e.g., pH, temperature, specific metals, and total organic
content) to verify that the flow of material from the facility to the
environment does not contain unexpected pollutants. If significant
variations are measured, more comprehensive analytic tests can be
conducted to further specify the problem. Finally, ambient monitoring
consists of carefully controlled sampling and analysis of waste
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
Figure 6.3: Hypothetical environmental profile of a compound that
binds strongly with organic material, showing transport
and persistence in different environmental media.
(Source: US Office of Technology Assessment, 1983: 245)
i
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constituents in air, water, soil, plants and animals. If waste
constituents are discovered, an attempt can be made to trace their
source. Ambient monitoring can provide baseline data for comparison
with changes in environmental conditions over time.
Conclusions that can be drawn from monitoring depend on a number
of technical and institutional factors. As discussed in reference to
the technical uncertainties surrounding Love Canal, monitoring is not
an exact science. Particularly in attempting ambient monitoring,
protocols for sampling and comparing data over time are not standard-
ized, the environment itself is variable and can interact with waste
constituents, and precise data can be collected only through complex
and costly analytic techniques (USOTA, 1983:247-251). The conse-
quences of imprecision and the conclusions drawn from such data are
subject to the same differences in perceived risks as are predictive
data.
Unlike predictive data, however, detective data is generated
after the siting decision is made and the plant begins operation. The
impacts of detective data on the facility are not known before the
facility is sited. The facility operator and the community need not
agree on the consequences of accidental releases of waste which cannot
be measured and remain highly uncertain for years. Rather they can
focus on standards of release (acceptable to the community and the
operator) which can be measured, albeit with some uncertainty.
Protocols for collecting, evaluating and sharing the data can be
agreed upon beforehand. The facility operator, who has predicted low
levels of release, need only believe his own analysis to feel secure.
The community, which fears potentially greater releases, may be able
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to better trust the resilience of detection systems coupled to mitiga-
tion measures without believing in predictive analysis.
Integrating Detection and Mitigation with Management
Of the three companies simulated, Pollution Control Corporation
stressed systems for detecting and mitigating hazards. Four systems
of monitoring were offered: combustion monitoring (with automatic
shutdown should air pollution standards be exceeded), ambient air
monitoring to detect air pollution in the neighborhood, preconstruc-
tion monitoring and modeling of baseline environmental conditions, and
groundwater monitoring. Systems for inspecting vehicles and to track
wastes from the generating source to the treatment facility were
developed. Spill containment measures were coupled to contingency and
emergency response plans and a highly trained emergency response
corps. Finally, the company offered to enter into negotiations with
the community over additional mitigation promises.
If the participants of the simulation are any indication,
systems for detecting and mitigating hazards have almost universal
appeal. Out of 34 participants, only two preferred both the predic-
tion and prevention strategies of Waste Technology and the management
strategies of Environmental Management to the detection and mitigation
strategies of Pollution Control. In Worcesterville, participants
selected this company as the one they would most want to have managing
a facility in their community. While allocating available funds among
the three companies, each of the three teams in Worcesterville and one
of the three teams in Essexton allocated more funds to the proposals
of Pollution Control than to either of the other two firms. Figure
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6.4 shows the average allocation of resources of these four teams.
Support for the proposal of Pollution Control Corporation,
however, appears to interact with support for proposals of the other
two companies, as part of a total package. As is shown in Figure 6.1,
less than a third of participants chose Pollution Control as their
first choice. For the two-thirds of the participants who selected
either Waste Technology or Environmental Management, Pollution Control
was the near universal second choice. Participants who preferred the
prevention options of Waste Technology perceived monitoring to be an
extension of the technological solution, while participants who
preferred the management options of Environment Management perceived
it to be an extension of management systems.
Restricted
Compensation-
Unrestricted
Compensation
Waste
-- Technology
Environmental
- Management
Pollution
- Control
Figure 6.4: Average allocation of resources among possible options,
in percent of total budget, for four teams that most
preferred the risk management strategies of Pollution
Control Corporation. In the simulations, an annual budget
of $3 million was given to each of six teams.
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In this light, monitoring (even with extensive mitigation
promises) can only be a partial solution. It straddles the techno-
logical and the managerial emphases and is not sufficient unto itself.
For those that trust technology, detection by itself is too little too
late. For those that trust the control of management systems, moni-
toring without some form of power sharing is impotent in the face of
conflicting interests.
This pattern of choosing detection and mitigation systems to
support a more fundamental preference is particularly striking in
guardians. Eighty percent of guardians selected the managerial
strategies of Environmental Management for first consideration. All
of these chose Pollution Control for second consideration. This
overwhelming pattern of preference is indicative of a shared belief in
the importance of social control over technological risks. In this
context, detection and mitigation systems provide information for
evaluating the effectiveness of social control and contingency prom-
ises for holding the facility operator accountable.
III. Management Side of Risk Management
To seventy percent of guardians (and a third of sponsors and
preservationists), the most effective path to safe waste management is
through improved management. Moreover, while four teams most prefer-
red the detection-mitigation strategies of Pollution Control Corpora-
tion, the remaining two teams allocated over half of the $3 million
budget to the risk management strategies emphasized by Environmental
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Management Incorporated (see Figure 6.5). To these individuals, risks
are socially constructed realities. Effective management of risk
depends on social controls and incentives, as well as physical proper-
ties. A priori estimates of risk are fundamentally unstable because
conditions that inhibit or promote risks are continually evolving.
The purpose, reliability, and capability of this evolving management
has major implications for the riskiness of hazardous waste treatment
facilities. Management is a source of variability and uncertainty.
Improper management can greatly increase the danger of a spill, slow
leak, or other danger potentially associated with hazardous waste
facilities.
Restricted
Compensation
Unrestricted
Compensation >
Pollution
-Control
Waste
Technology
Environmental
Management
Figure 6.5: Average allocation of resources among five possible
options, in percent of total budget. In the simulations,
an annual budget of $3 million was given to each team.
On average, the six teams allocated these resources as
indicated in the figure.
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Moreover, perceptions of risk depend not only on the strategy
choosen to manage risk, but also on the reliability of its implementa-
tion. Excellently planned but poorly implemented strategies can
generate great risks because they provide false security. Trust in
the motivation, intentions, and power of risk managers is an essential
aspect of reliability. In the absence of trustworthy systems of
management, worst case scenarios can and will be conjured up by those
who fear the worst (and stand to lose the most).
The Example of Three Mile Island
These points are underscored by the Presidential Commission's
Study of Three Mile Island (Kemeney, 1980). What started out to be an
investigation of equipment problems steadily shifted to a study of
people problems. The equipment was well built and the technical
support staff competent, but the managers of nuclear power (both
private and public) were overconfident. They fundamentally believed
the equipment was foolproof. They consequently ignored clear signals
of problems and failed to train operators to handle crisis situations.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, while paying close attention to
technical problems, overlooked problems in training, inspection and
enforcement. Moreover, they had developed no systematic way of
learning from experience. Both the operators of the nuclear power
plant and the NRC were "convinced that the equipment was so foolproof
that nothing bad could possibly happen; they therefore honestly
believed that whatever they were doing was sufficient to assure
nuclear safety" (Kemeney, 1980:69).
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Problems of management go beyond experts who are overconfident
of prevention technologies. We have seen that risk perceptions are
strongly influenced by perspective and culture. Differences in
perspective on risks are particularly striking between corporate
executives and elected officials. Corporate executives believe that
the most significant risks the United States currently faces include
the energy crisis, economic troubles, refusal by society to accept
risks associated with technology, and overregulation by big" govern-
ment. Executives believe that society would be better off if the
public allowed more leeway for corporate risk taking. In stark
contrast, members of Congress (the group surveyed that is most like
our local decisionmakers) are most concerned with the threat of
nuclear war, economic troubles, and proliferation of chemicals. Out
of a list of 20 possible risks, the only one that no executive consid-
ered particularly important was the profileration of chemicals (Marsh
and McLennon, 1980:8). When coupled to the obvious differences
between the interest of the firm and those of the residents, it is not
surprising that half of the participants in the simulation preferred
the power sharing and management systems of Environmental Management
to more technological systems.
The Boundary Between the Firm and the Community
Community residents who support power sharing do not generally
wish to participate in the day to day operations of a facility.
Rather, they envision a system with boundaries that are clear but
permeable to influence and control by the community. This task is
difficult because as Katz and Kahn note (1966:91-93):
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The dominant tendency in ... powerful organization(s)
will be to seek control over the environment rather than
to modify internal structures to accord with external
changes. The organization thus will proceed on the
principle that it is easier to make the world adjust than
it is to adjust the organization, and the latter altern-
ative will be adopted only if the first offers small hope
of success.... A change of internal structure is a
threat to the organization. To resolve an organizational
problem by changing the environment constitutes no such
threat. Indeed, if it can be brought off successfully,
it affirms the power and rightness of existing organiza-
tional structure. The limiting variable is the relative
openness of the system to external influence.
Given these tendencies, Essexton and Worcesterville residents
see three conditions as essential to effect sufficient community
control over management. First, clearly defined responsibilities and
obligations must be made contingent on hazards developing (control and
constraint function). While management systems need to be adaptive
and flexible, this flexibility must be constrained as to the limits of
acceptable outcomes. Contingency planning allows for a clearer
definition of expected behavior under various conditions. Ownership
of waste delivery vehicles by the facility operator assigns clear
lines of liability should an accident occur. The consequences of
exceeding standards (e.g., shutdown of facility operations or payments
of fines) would be established before the facility was sited to pro-
vide incentives to plant operators to manage the hazards cautiously.
Second, a system is needed to facilitate transference and
analysis of information about facility operations (surveillance and
feedback function). If the managers are to be held accountable,
reliable information must be available against which their performance
can be judged. Monitoring systems, and a shared understanding of what
constitutes good monitoring and analysis, are clearly essential.
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Transference of information in a form useful to the community is
equally important. Moreover, surveillance should include visual
examination as well as analytic measurements. The town is usually
thought to need expert assistance to conduct inspections and properly
analyze the resulting data. In the simulations, all six teams set
aside funds to hire such an expert.
Third, a structure must exist for jointly solving problems and
resolving disputes as conditions and concerns evolve (interdependence
and interaction function). In the simulations, every team but one
allocated money to create a joint community/company safety board to
help set risk management policy and to oversee general compliance with
standards. A third of the teams also set aside a fifth of their
annual budget (i.e., approximately $600,000 annually) to provide a
budget to the safety board for making improvements in the plant safety
and to establish an emergency action trust fund to cover costs of
emergencies. Most, however, saw these functions as the clear respon-
sibility of the firm, not the town. In general, the powers of the
safety board would need to be clearly delineated.
These limits are partly a consequence of an awareness that firms
have the right to control their internal workings as long as they do
not affect the safety of the community. Equally important, however,
community control implies at least some level of community responsi-
bility, and many individuals are ambivalent about accepting such
responsibility. Liability issues are important, but concerns for
potential regret and blame are even more important. Individuals
active in decision making are subject to potentially greater feelings
of regret should something go wrong. Every decision that a community
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representative will make (which could potentially affect the health of
his or her neighbors) will cause stress because it may eventually
bring on blame as well. While individuals, especially guardians, feel
obliged to take on this responsibility (because they perceive the
plant as being safer as a consequence), they do so hesitantly.
This pattern of quasi-integrated risk management, in which both
the facility operator and the town have clearly defined rights as well
as powers and must work together to arrive at a mutual accomodation,
is fraught with the difficulties of all attempts at coproduction
(Susskind and Elliott, 1983). Residents will try to avoid potential
cooptation and to remain vigilant without creating a situation in
which they must be hypervigilant and anxious. Facility operators will
try to balance their willingness to negotiate (in light of their
inability to obtain a site by conventional means) against their need
to retain internal control over their corporation and flexibility over
goal setting. For this coproduction of safety to be effective, risk
management functions must be clearly delineated from other functions
of the firm, differences in perceptions about appropriate risk manage-
ment policy must be resolved, and a basis for mutual trust must be
established.
While most participants in Essexton and Worcesterville recognize
the difficulties, they perceive it as the only viable path to ensuring
effective risk management. Guardians in particular perceive community
participation in the safety of the facility as part of their responsi-
bility to protect the town. To give up this authority is to abdicate
too much control over the town's future.
Chapter 7
Beyond Mitigation:
Risk Perceptions in Processes of Preemption and Compensation
The preceding chapters have focused on risk management strate-
gies and their impact on risk perceptions. The preeminent importance
of perceptions in generating opposition has been stressed. Some
individuals (particularly guardians) may well support proposals that
incorporate effective risk management systems. Most would not.
Neither the possibility of rare catastrophes nor the costs of common
impacts can be completely eliminated. Hazardous waste treatment
facilities remain a bad bargain.
Most residents who oppose the siting of hazardous waste treat-
ment facilities almost assuredly have more to lose than to gain.
Hazardous waste facilities are strongly redistributive. Benefits of a
hazardous waste facility are spread widely across a region, but no
single beneficiary feels especially well rewarded. At the same time,
the risks and costs are concentrated in the host community. Diffuse
support is countered by concentrated opposition.
In aggregate, local opposition to facilities leads to shortages
in their availability. Opponents who help generate local failures
generally do not support this cumulative result. In 1979, three
Massachusetts communities successfully obtained state legislation
barring construction of hazardous waste treatment facilities in their
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towns. Even in these communities, virtually every citizen surveyed by
the State Executive Office of Environmental Affairs believed that
"appropriate" hazardous waste treatment facilities should be used to
process wastes (O'Hare et al., 1983:2).
The question of how to site locally noxious but regionally
beneficial facilities is the topic of an emerging literature on
facility siting (see, in particular, O'Hare et al., 1983; Susskind et
al., 1984; Morrell and Magorian, 1982; and O'Hare, 1977). This
literature has generated two findings of interest to this discussion:
(1) the conflict of interests between diffuse regional support and
concentrated local opposition is aggravated by traditional regulatory
systems, especially when these systems are coupled to state preemption
of local governing authority and (2) the conflict can be diffused by
new siting processes involving face-to-face negotiations and compen-
sations. In this way, those who benefit can, on a project by project
basis, share the gains with those who stand to lose.
These two approaches to facility siting are based on funda-
mentally different theories about political legitimacy and fairness.
State preemption is coercive. Facility siting is generally thought to
be a valid exercise of state police powers. For the persons whose
property is taken, compensation is constitutionally mandated. For
abutting neighbors and the community, no such compensation is re-
quired. Rather, individuals must accept personal loss for the greater
social good. The state, in turn, has an obligation to ensure that
facility siting is a technically competent and politically fair
process. The state is obligated to protect the common good and to
proceed impartially. In a democracy, the role of stewardship and
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protection are the basis on which political legitimacy is assured.
While individuals or local communities may not like the outcome of a
particular decision, they give implicit consent to the decision making
process because overall it leads to good outcomes.
Negotiation and compensation processes of facility siting are
built on different assumptions. Large-scale facilities, especially
facilities with impacts as important as those of hazardous waste
treatment facilities, cause unique nuisances. They impose local costs
that are sufficiently imbalanced with benefits as to generate wide-
spread local opposition and undermine the legitimacy of state pre-
emption. Consequently, no facilities can be sited. To regenerate the
siting process requires a new process for generating local consent.
Consent cannot be achieved by simply mitigating risks and impacts.
Even with the best means of mitigation, some impacts will remain. To
leave the affected community at least as well-off after siting as
before, compensation and rewards are needed. By altering incentives,
compensation and rewards can lead to local consent and hence to a
legitimate and fair siting process.
The debate between proponents of preemption (with its variants
of centralized decision making) and negotiation (with its variants of
local autonomy) is largely argued in the language of economics and
politics. It is a debate over "efficient resource allocations" in
which "highly threatened groups have much more effective power in the
decision-making process than their total risk warrants" (O'Hare,
1977:417). In this chapter, I wish to extend this debate into the
arena of risk perceptions.
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Considerable attention has been given to the difficulties of
risk assessment in this thesis. I have argued that no matter how
carefully applied, technical analysis cannot answer the concerns
raised by local opponents because lay people structure their percep-
tions of risk along distinctly different dimensions than do technical
experts. I have further argued that effective siting of hazardous
waste treatment facilities depends on mechanisms for coping with risk
and uncertainty. These coping mechanisms must acknowledge and build
on the risk perceptions of both technical and lay publics. As a
consequence, risk perceptions and uncertainties fundamentally alter
how we think about effective risk mitigation.
In a similar way, I will argue in this chapter that risk percep-
tions powerfully influence how individuals conceive of a "legitimate
and fair" siting process. Preemption does not work because central-
ized decision makers are unable adequately to fulfill their steward-
ship and protector roles when perceptions of risk diverge widely. The
use of negotiation and compensation processes are also complicated by
apparent tradeoffs between mitigation and compensation, for in expend-
ing resources to improve safety, fewer resources are available to
compensate individuals for the remaining risk.
I. Perceptions and the Legitimacy of Preemption
As a strategy for siting hazardous waste facilities, preemption
of local siting authority is strongly rooted in options for predicting
and preventing risks. As discussed in the previous section, preemp-
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tion strategies rely on centralized decision making. Invariably,
legitimization for this centralization is based on the potential
impartiality and technical competence of the siting board. Technical
criteria are used to select sites on which potential hazards would
have the least deleterious impacts. These technical criteria, how-
ever, are themselves open to the uncertainties discussed throughout
this thesis.
Moreover, as a system for state government to coerce local
government into accepting unwanted land uses, preemption runs counter
to the traditions of home rule and local zoning laws. While the
federal constititution vests control of non-federal land in the
states, the states have delegated much authority to local communities
(Healy and Rosenberg, 1979). For over a century, local zoning ordin-
ances were virtually the sole means of land use control in the United
States.
These values of home rule are particularly strong among preser-
vationists. While preservationists are most concerned with protecting
the quality of life and physical amenities of the community, they also
seek to maintain a high degree of political autonomy for their town.
Many preservationists sharply delineate the boundaries of their
autonomy, claiming the right to control whatever is in those bounda-
ries and acknowledging little control over whatever is outside those
boundaries. Thus, when confronted with the fact that he lives adja-
cent to an industrial park in a neighboring town and quite far from
the one in his own town, one preservationist claimed he would do
nothing to stop a hazardous waste plant from going into the adjacent
town and everything to stop one in his own.
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I believe in home rule and accept the right of other
towns to make a different decision. Once I cross the
town line, I lose a great dimension of control. Their
desires are their own perogative. I had a farm family
upbringing, one that emphasized quality of life, self-
reliance, and acceptance of the limits of our control. I
call my own shots in my own sphere of influence. The
rest I leave alone. (20)
Spheres of influence are an important political concept which
preservationists guard jealously. To guard these spheres against
encroachment sometimes requires considerable subtlety, as when a
preservationist prefers a less desirable facility which maintains the
integrity of the home rule concept to a more desirable one that
threatens the concept. To some preservationists, the political
traditions of local autonomy are more important than the particular
issue of facility siting.
I don't think the state should ever tell a town what
to do. If private industry couldn't site a facility on
their own, then the state should site a public facility
on state-owned land. It's a real problem. I'd prefer
private enterprise to run a plant like this, but if push
came to shove, I'd rather the state not try to override
home rule by telling us that we have to let one private
industry do what we forbid of other industries. If the
state owned the property, they wouldn't be overriding
town laws because town laws don't apply. (4)
The goal of many facility siting reforms is to bypass local
control. State siting boards are established to overcome opposition
by denying local governments their power to zone land or regulate
hazardous waste facilities. Out of 28 states who have enacted hazard-
ous waste facility siting legislation, 19 have some form of state
preeemption to bypass local ordinances (Nat. Con. of State Leg.,
1982:II-3). Each of these laws went into effect between 1978 and
1981. Consequently, evaluation of their impact is largely specula-
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tive. The use of preemptive power has to date failed to obtain a
site, but no other process has been more successful.
Several problems, however, suggest that preemption policies may
increase opposition in ways which decrease the likelihood of site
selection. First, while state intervention into local zoning has
increased dramatically over the last twenty years, most interventions
have been designed to preserve resources, not promote facilities.
Vermont's Environmental Control Act, California's Coastal Zone,
Florida's Environmental Land and Water Management Act, and similar
laws in Colorado, Maine, Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii (Healy, 1976;
Mandelker, 1976; Andrews, 1979) are all aimed at managing areas of
critical statewide concern to ensure their protection. As such, they
act as a double veto to unwanted development, not as an override of
local opposition.
In some cases, states have experimented with the override of
local opposition. Most common has been anti-snob zoning laws designed
to open communities to low and moderate income housing developments.
These laws have met with limited success in Massachusetts and else-
where, but the results have not been exceptionally encouraging.
Perhaps even more importantly, the justification on which these laws
are built cannot be applied to large scale facilities such as treat-
ment facilities. Anti-snob zoning laws are anti-discriminatory, built
on principles of constitutional rights and equality. Inasmuch as all
communities are treated equally under the law, consent for the local
override is justified by appeal to principles for which individuals in
the town have at least implied some consent.
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As such, they fit into the framework of almost all other state
land use innovations. As Bosselman and Callies (1972:3.4) note, these
innovations are not "the result of battles between local governments
and states from which the states emerge victorious." Rather, they
emerge from "an awareness on the part of both local and statewide
interests" that some problems are best solved by the state. Moreover,
"these innovations have never involved a total usurpation of local
control, and have rarely constituted an attack on the integrity of the
local zoning process."
The siting of hazardous waste facilities, on the other hand, is
highly discriminatory and no- process for selecting the site can be
shown to be implicitly acceptable to the potential host community.
The process is discriminatory because a particular community must be
chosen while others are relieved of responsibility. At the same time,
the high degree of uncertainty and differences of opinion over site
selection criteria implies that no technical process of site selection
will be acceptable to all communities. Chosen communities do not see
the selection of their community as just, equitable, or efficient.
While some criteria (such as avoidance of the particularly hazardous
conditions of flood plains or wet lands ) are clearly important, most
criteria are controversial because they favor one community over
another. Rural residents promote use of land use compatibility
criteria that preserves the character of communities (and insures that
hazardous waste remains in urban industrial areas). Urban residents
promote safety criteria that locates hazardous waste treatment sites
far from population centers (and right in the middle of rural commun-
ities). In Essexton and Worcesterville, which are low density but
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still urbanized communities, residents made arguments in both direc-
tions: facilities should be located either in a more urban or a more
rural area, but definitely not in their town.
When states have tried to develop siting criteria, the process
has quickly become politicized. In Massachusetts, for example, the
nationally renowned consulting firm of Camp, Dresser & McKee conducted
an analysis of potential hazardous waste facility sites for the
Department of Environmental Quality Engineering. When the report
became public and before further analysis could be conducted, state
legislators from the selected communites secured enactment of bills
specifically excluding their communities from further consideration.
In the case of Minnesota, described in Chapter 3, a coercive siting
process, based on technical analysis, was not considered legitimate by
the majority of the potentially affected communities. The facilities
proposed in each of these states were not built.
Not surprisingly, the residents of Essexton and Worcesterville
who support consideration of state preemption are people comfortable
with technical expertise. Seven of thirty-four participants promote
consideration of a state or federal siting board. Of these, five are
professional engineers or scientists. Strikingly, this group includes
all but one of the participants who works in these professions.
Equally strikingly, these technical experts support preemption whether
they are sponsors, guardians or preservationists. Their support,
however, has two distinct characters.
To the few sponsors and preservationists who advocate state
override of local authority, the problem is simply one of applying
technical expertise. By applying expert knowledge, the state would
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simply "take care of the problem."
I believe a strong body of scientists, engineers and
experts should develop and promote a solution. The state
should then just go in and build it. No questions asked.
This is one of those times when an authority figure
stands up and says, "I know what's best for you."
(6: a preservationist)
We've got to face up to this problem. The state
should take land by emminent domain and site the facili-
ty. No questions asked. Let's just move on with this.
You do the best you can and if that's not enough, tough.
What else can you do? (5: a sponsor)
Interestingly, the few sponsors and preservationists who do
support state preemption invariably believe that the state would
impose these facilities on some community other than their own. In
particular, they believe that hazardous waste treatment facilities
should be sited in an even more rural community than their own.
When I drove through western Massachusetts, through
all those small towns in which hardly anyone lives, I
kept thinking, Jesus, there's no reason for us to have
these problems. We could site a facility in any number
of places. No one would even see it. So why do we have
a problem? (5: a sponsor)
This preference for a more rural location is consistent with the
ideology of sponsors (who want to site a facility and therefore might
choose the path of least resistence). It is, however, highly incon-
sistent with the ideology of preservationists. To preserve their own
environment (which they wish to remain unaltered) through the use of
technical safety criteria (which insures that a more rural community
would be changed even more) is a political act and is recognized as
such.
Guardians remain centrally concerned with locating these
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facilities where risks are most controllable. 'While a quarter of
guardians believe that siting criteria is necessary to accomplish this
task, they recognize the inherently political problem of developing
criteria. As the physician, industrial process engineer, and police
chief who support the idea of using criteria each noted:
Once you assume you need it, which indeed we do, the
state should set up geologic, hydrologic and transporta-
tion siting criteria. Once they've found a good site,
the state should muster all the resources at its disposal
to make sure its safe. Unfortunately, the state has been
unable to conduct truly objective analysis nor to take
the heat needed to effect the best decision. Expediancy
doesn't lead to objectivity in issues which are this
visceral. (32, 2, 12)
Despite this conditional support by a few residents, the vast
majority of sponsors, guardians and preservationists are adamant in
their belief that the state' could never be both impartial and fair,
and that state preemption is doomed to fail. As two preservationists
describe their concerns:
I would never trust the state. I have a chronic and
habitual distrust of people who plug into politics.
Those who impose themselves on our lives through politi-
cal office get quickly buried with their own concerns.
Politicians can be bought, bribed, wooed. There's so
much mediocrity: Vietnam, Abscam, Watergate. I would
just as soon keep the public sector as far away from
these problems as possible. (20)
The problem with the Department of Environmental
Quality is that it's a state agency. It means well,
tries to be professional, but is underfunded and under-
staffed. They try their best, but they can't do the job
without the state being committed. I have no reason to
believe that if the state were to take over the problem
of siting a hazardous waste facility and maintaining its
quality, that they'd have any more commitment to this new
problem than they have had to all the other important
things they've ignored in the past. (26)
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In a similar vein, three guardians note:
The thought of having the state override local
decisions, people would go crazy at the idea. If they
don't trust their own selectmen, you can imagine what
they think of these other characters they don't even
know. (22) The decision would be so political. Nobody's
going to come in and say we've found the perfect site,
it's impervious to leakage, it's not near anyone. No,
they'll put it on somebody's brother's farm because he
wants to retire. Or they'll put it where the fewest
people will object, even if the land has poor soil
conditions. (23) If you try to force a solution like
this on someone, no matter how good the idea, they'll
resist it. Even if you're bigger, there's always a few
tricks a community has up its sleeve. (18)
Despite continued opposition to the override of local zoning and
preeemption of local decision making powers, 19 states have enacted
these laws. Without the implicit consent of local communities to this
process, however, such powers may prove ineffective at best, and
counterproductive at worst. In the Wisonville, Illinois story discus-
sed in chapter 3 (US EPA, 1979c:303-317), local officials wanted to
close down a hazardous waste treatment facility that was initially
suppported by both the state and the federal governments. They had no
local permit to issue and virtually no direct control over the SCA/
Earthline hazardous waste facility. By the creative use of the
township's power to repair culverts, the city closed the facility's
access road. Permanent closure was successfully achieved through
legal proceedings. The town was able to use various environmental and
regulatory requirements to bolster its claim that the site was envir-
onmentally unsuitable. In light of various legal, quasi-legal and
extra-legal powers that remain available to opponents, states remain
unable to guarantee unhindered access to sites. Vehement local
opposition to major facilities provide a veto even in the absence of
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apparent legal control. When perceptions of risk differ in signifi-
cant details, the development of acceptable siting criteria using
technical criteria itself becomes politicized. By accentuating the
adversarial character of siting disputes, preemption aggravates
problems of mistrust and divergent perceptions of risk, and hence lead
to greater opposition (Morell and Magorian, 1982; O'Hare, Bacow and
Sanderson, 1983).
II. Perceptions and the Acceptability of Compensation
The impasse over siting hazardous waste treatment facilities has
led to widespread interest in compensation mechanisms for reducing
local opposition. By mitigating some of the local impacts of these
facilities and offsetting others with compensation, facility propo-
nents hope to restructure the interests of local opponents. While
eight states have enacted compensation plans coupled to state pre-
emption, four states (Colorado, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and
Wisconsin) have coupled compensation to extensive local autonomy (Nat.
Con. of State Leg., 1982: II-5). The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste
Facility Siting Act, for example, vests primary authority for siting
hazardous waste facilities with local communities and mandates a
process of negotiation over mitigation and compensation involving the
community, the developers and the state (Bacow, 1982). The law
thereby explicitly acknowledges the primacy of local control over
local land use, and the necessity of compensation to minimize impact.
At the same time, the law specifically refrains local communities from
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denying applications on industrially zoned land if the facility meets
all permits and licenses that were required before enaction of the
siting law and it does not pose a significantly greater danger to
public health and safety than do comparable enterprises. While these
conditions might eventually be used to preempt local authority, the
law is clearly designed to reach a negotiated settlement that pre-
cludes such a confrontation.
The possibility of preemption is, however, not lost on residents
of potential host communities. In their ambivalence toward the state,
residents are somewhat leary of state intentions in establishing a
siting process that requires final arbitration over siting disputes.
The Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act created a
bad process in that the community really doesn't have a
say on whether the plant can be sited or not. We go
through the niceties of negotiation, but in reality the
state and the company are already assuming that the plant
is technically safe since it will meet state standards.
The community therefore has no valid reason to oppose it.
If the town goes along with this game of negotiation, and
does not get so emotional that they force the state and
the developers to back down, then it won't be able to
stop the plant. We have a say in the size, the shape,
the landscaping, how much money we're going to get, other
inconsequentials. But in the end, the choice is made in
arbitration and will be based on technical arguments that
may have little to do with our concerns, and the plant
will go in. Under these circumstances, where is the
basic for trusting the state? (32: a guardian)
The use of compensation in Massachusetts and other states is
specifically intended to promote local support of hazardous waste
treatment facilities by altering incentives. Compensation can take
several forms: monetary payments to enhance town revenues; monetary
payments to provide specified services; in-kind replacement of
natural resources, physical amenities or services; and provision of
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contingency funds. Each of these forms of compensation will promote
the interests of different constituencies. Hence, negotiation must
include not only the total amount of compensation, but also its
distribution within the town.
The most important tradeoff is not among types of compensation,
but between compensation and mitigation measures. Research to date
has largely ignored potential interactions between mitigation and
compensation. Several are of particular importance:
-- divergent perceptions of risk can create significant
differences in what is considered fair compensation;
-- increase in compensation will almost assuredly reduce
resources available to mitigate risks;
-- compensation can divert attention away from adverse
impacts by focusing it onto financial concerns; and
-- if perceived risks are above some threshold of
acceptability, any discussion of compensation can be
construed as an attempt at bribery to accept an
"unsafe" facility and hence contrary to the public
interest.
Sponsors focus on the first consideration of "fair" compensation,
guardians on the middle two considerations of resource allocation, and
preservationists on the last two considerations of "bribery." To
each, compensation has both desirable and undesirable effects.
Sponsors
Most sponsors strongly approve of the use of compensation to
promote the siting of hazardous waste treatment facilities. For the
most part, however, compensation is not the reason they support the
proposal. As discussed earlier, general acceptance comes more basi-
cally from a willingness to give industry a free hand or from a sense
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that hazardous waste plants are needed. Sponsors couple these atti-
tudes to a belief that these facilities are relatively safe.
Compensation, while marginal to their implicit acceptance,
remains an important consideration in their explicit support. Compen-
sation increases the motivation of sponsors to promote the plant. It
turns passive acceptance into active sponsorship. Without compen-
sation, only those few individuals who really believe in the need for
the facility have any incentive to voice their beliefs.
Essexton isn't producing this waste. If we're going
to do a service for the state, we ought to be able to
receive economic advantages. With this compensation, I
could accept a plant being built here. I see $$$ bills
in my eyes. The best schools, the safest roads, the best
of everything. (17) We could reduce our taxes to almost
nothing. Plymouth has the lowest tax rate in Massachu-
setts because of the Pilgram nuclear power plant.
Nuclear power certainly is more risky than hazardous
waste. (5) It'd be great for the community. Getting the
town to agree on what to do with the money would be the
only real problem. Like pulling teeth. Each person has
a different idea about what they'd want. (26)
While the majority of sponsors hold the above view, a fifth are
more ambivalent about compensation. These individuals make a distinc-
tion between justifiable compensation and unjustifiable rewards.
Inasmuch as the facility generates problems or costs for the town, it
should compensate the town accordingly. Pure rewards, in which the
town is compensated for more than its real costs, is considered
suspect, however.
I was perturbed at several individuals who wanted
more compensation. I didn't want the tipping fee because
the company will already be paying big bucks in taxes. I
don't think extra compensation is necessary or relevent.
If the town wants to build a swimming pool or increase
its services, they should do it themselves. It's not the
town's place to put these monetary restrictions on the
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company. The company ought to do what it is responsible
for, and should not be required to do more. The biggest
problem in making a decision lies in determining who is
responsible. I feel that hazard mitigation is the
responsiblity of the plant, and the plant operators need
to take every necessary precaution in that direction. I
also feel that road improvements, water supply guaran-
tees, and co-generation are appropriate responsibilities
for a hazardous waste company. Tipping fees are not. We
shouldn't financially overburden a company with unneces-
sary restrictions. (14)
To avoid excessive local demands for compensation, sponsors feel
the state should provide guarantees of safe operation to the town, and
be willing to provide compensation directly to the town if damages
should occur.
The state should provide the support we need.
They've got to provide relief and insurance immediately
in case of an accident. They should act as an inter-
mediary between the town and the courts in these cases.
The state provides the relief and then goes after the
company in court. (17)
Guardians
To guardians, compensation is clearly justified, though to some
it is an irrelevent consideration. The distinction between compen-
sation and rewards has little meaning. Since they believe the plant
is undesirable, payments over-and-above the costs to the town are
simply a means of compensating for the non-monetary costs of the
plant.
The operators of a hazardous waste treatment facil-
ity should perform some form of compensation. At the
very least, they need to cover the real costs of the
facility, the extra pressure it puts on the community.
And over and above this, they need to compensate for the
shear nastiness of it all. (13) Otherwise, why should a
town take a $10 million hazardous waste plant when it can
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get a clean $10 million computer plant? Without a carrot
in addition to taxes, it won't be palatable to the town.
(30) After all, the plant would affect the desirability
of the town, thereby reducing our ability to raise taxes
in the future. (23)
Compensation, while justifiable, is not necessarily seen as
beneficial. Guardians are most strongly attentive to the safety of
the facility. In this light, guardians consistently raise the issue
of whether increased compensation is offered at the expense of neces-
sary mitigation measures. In making this comparison, guardians are
directly confronted with the reasonableness of risk taking. Since
additional safety can always be bought at a higher price, at what
point can a line be drawn?
I wouldn't want a plant with a lot of negatives
attached to it. If you could take care of all the
problems, then I'd feel great about compensation. But I
wouldn't trade increased safety for compensation. If the
town accepted a proposal in which a company offered
compensation and fell short on extra safety features, it
would be accepting a bribe. The company would be buying
out of its responsibilities to be as safe as possible.
But I think you can go to extremes in buying safety. I
think at some point you don't gain much by these fea-
tures. (12) If we started with a budget for mitigation
and compensation, and there was money left over after
meeting basic needs for safety, with margins for error,
then there is no need to pile one safety system over
another. You do what is reasonable, and then take
whatever is left over as compensation. (18) At this
point, I'd feel great about compensation. (12)
So while compensation is less important than safety,
it is still essential. I don't rightly know how you
figure what level of compensation is fair or when safe is
safe enough, but you've got to try. I think people who
equate compensation with bribery are doing this to
protect themselves from having to change their mind. The
compensation may be just too good. People who lived in
the town where Vermont Yankee was located didn't mind the
plant. It paid almost all their property taxes. People
outside the town were the ones who cared. (16, 2)
- 227 -
While a third of guardians have a generally optimistic sense
about being able to balance mitigation with compensation, the remain-
ing two-thirds finds this tradeoff considerably more problematic. To
a few, the problem lies not so much in making tradeoffs, but rather a
concern that the town would make the wrong tradeoffs or should not be
demanding compensation at all.
Some people in the town would want to put compensa-
tion directly into the town's general revenues. I
disagree with this approach. These funds will get
funneled off into particular projects, like building a
new school or improving services. We've cut out services
in half because of Proposition 2 1/2. In the rush to
reinstate them, important things like better safety
equipment for the fire department and buffer zones around
the plant might get lost. These safety features need to
be considered first. (29)
There's a certain amount of risk we take every day
in getting up, going to work, or playing at home. As
long as it's reasonable, that's all you can be expected
to do. You can't make your life risk free. If there
wasn't very much left over for compensation, but I felt
that the risks had been handled reasonable, I'd accept
the plant. I wouldn't demand a lot of money. It borders
on blackmail. If you hold up somebody just for the sake
of some extra dollars, that's a bit unfair. If the plant
could be run safely, that's all you can really expect.
I'd be happy with a plant that met the basic needs of the
town, even if there wasn't much left over for compensa-
tion. (18)
Others are ambivalent about the offer of compensation itself.
To a fifth of guardians,
The offer of compensation feels like a bribe. It
doen't seem immoral or unethical, but it's being offered
only because we have the upper hand. It's good business
sense for the firm to offer the compensation, but for
most of us the money is the least of it. That's partly
because we don't want to feel like we're being paid off.
(22)
If the firm offers physical amenities like a swim-
ming pool or a cultural center, it's even worse. That
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really feels like I'm being bought, that if they think of
enough things to give me I will overcome any reserva-
tions. I really have a strong reaction against being
offered unrelated things. We'd be a company town, they'd
own the recreation center and we'd owe them something for
its continued use. They'd have something to hang over
us. Compensation that is related to what's going on
seems more like a benefit of the project. Straight
compensation in the form of tipping fees seems cleaner.
If the tipping fees were large enough to make a differ-
ence in my finances, and all the safety features were
already in place, I might accept the plant. (22)
But for half the guardians, the problem lies squarely in trying
to make tradeoffs between mitigation and compensation. To these
individuals, safety cannot be separated from compensation because
there is simply insufficient funds available to both mitigate hazards
and provide any meaninful compensation. In light of this economic
reality, these guardians see no choice but to expend the available
resources on safety.
This tradeoff between compensation and additional
safety features bothers me. Well, the company is not
going to build a plant unless it is profitable and they
can't make it profitable by offering the best safety
features and adequate compenstion, but who's setting the
profitability of these companies? The company shouldn't
be allowed to put us at risk because it increases the
company's profit. (30)
In Worcesterville, not enough people are that close
to the edge that we would worry about just how much the
plant could offer us. The big push in compensation would
be to plow it back into safety and protection for the
environment. Monetary compensation is nice, but it has
nothing to do with our concerns. There's got to be
provisions to help if something goes wrong. Somebody's
car, or home or family gets damaged, you've got to have a
way to compensate them. (33) It is these issues of
liability and safety that are important. They shouldn't
be so uncertain. The money needs to be set aside in
trust. (13)
Compensation has a negative effect for me. I think
a person will go along with a treatment facility because
they perceive a need to straighten out the problems of
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hazardous waste now rather than have 55 gallon drums
dumped all over the area. So while the facility would
change our world, if designed and managed safely it might
improve our overall environment. On the other hand, even
if you give a million dollars to the community each year,
that amounts to a couple of hundred dollars per person.
That's a joke, an extra. The decision should be based on
safety. What you do with the spare change seems totally
unimportant. If the compensation distracts from this
fundamental concern, it becomes a bribe. (32)
Preservationists
Preservationists rarely talk about the benefits of compensation.
To them, there are few. The guardian's occasional and considered
references to compensation as "bribery" become quite prevalent when
talking to preservationists. Some individuals focus on the incompata-
bility between a hazardous waste treatment facility and the character
of the town. Others focus on the impossibility of making a hazardous
waste plant safe. Having defined the issues so sharply, however,
there is little room for compensation. The only acceptable solution
is to ameliorate the perceived problem, but this is believed to be
impossible.
The developer is trying to ameliorate the opposition
against a facility that shouldn't be there by diverting
the issue from the real concerns of public health and
safety. (31) He's using compensation as a form of
bribery. That's what you do with a child. I don't like
being treated like a child, being rewarded for acting
like somebody else wants me to act. (6) Through compen-
sation, the developer is trying to structure a christmas
tree of goodies to spread before the town. The developer
wants the town to gravitate toward a proposal which the
town would not accept otherwise. For the town to do so
is morally inconsistent. It's accepting bribery. If the
plant has characteristics which the town doesn't like,
the town should reject it whether it comes with a christ-
mas tree or not. (20)
The only reason you're offering compensation is
because there's something wrong with the initial pro-
posal. You're paying me to take a risk. There's just no
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way you can make it worth my while to take that risk.
(6) If somehow the state forced us to take the plant,
and threw in some compensation, I would take all the
money and make the plant safer. Extra sweetners don't
mean much to me. (28) The plant should have every
possible safeguard. Costs shouldn't be a consideration
for something this dangerous. I would not tradeoff
safety for compensation. What good will all this compen-
sation be if something goes wrong? It won't cure things
after an accident. (4)
They'd be playing games with us. A few individuals
will cut a deal. The administrators of the town may see
it as a great opportunity to set their own priorities.
In the future, new deals will be cut. Anything that can
be fixed can be unfixed. (7)
If the town were to decide to enrich itself with the
amenities of the compensation package, it's their choice.
But if it were located near me, I'd get up and move. (20)
Compensation is seen as having a potentially insidious effect on
the host community. By expanding the resources available to the town,
the compensation could undermine the independence and self-reliance of
the town. To some preservationists, this change itself should be
resisted.
Even if revenues from the plant equalled all our
current tax revenues, we wouldn't want it. We're a well
managed little town. Our taxes are moderate, we're
frugal in our spending. No fat cats sit in our town
hall. We have a lot of volunteer labor who work as a
form of public service. Maybe a town that was financi-
ally strapped, because they've mismanaged their funds,
would look to this as a way to bale out. But the funds
would have less leverage in a town that is well managed,
with a tax rate that's already acceptable to the resi-
dents. (4)
People find the status quo acceptable. It's a small
town way of life. People volunteer here because it's the
way we do things. We like the quality of our life. If
you had all this money, I'm not sure it would be an
improvement. The people who would want to live here, who
would want to volunteer to work for the town... I'm just
not sure. (4)
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In a similar vein, the legitimacy of using compensation to
ameliorate community opposition was also questioned. In particular,
the issue of equity was raised by a fifth of the individuals.
If the plant doesn't offer compensation, they just
won't be located there. Good, bad, it's a moot point.
They have to do it. It's bribery. Its not an illegal
bribe because it's greasing the community's pockets and
is above board. It's up to the community to decide if
it'll accept the bribe. But I worry about a town being
poor enough to say "we don't care about the risks, we
need the money." Like New Bedford, which is highly
populated. These people are being bought. They're
weighing the risks against how poor they are. If
communities accept these facilities based on compenstion,
a town like Worcesterville would never take it. People
here are not hungry enough. Unless people are jobless
and hungry, they are not going to want that kind of a
risk. We're not talking morality here, we're talking
practicality. I think it stinks. It's just another way
of descriminating against the poor. Even if you somehow
got a treatment facility into Worcesterville, say by
paying enough money to cover property values, people
would sell off and move. People who were hungry enough
to want that kind of revenue would move in. Worcester-
ville would die. (24)
And, turning the bribery argument on its head, a tenth of
preservationists (like several of the sponsors) felt that compensation
was an improper demand on the facility operator.
I certainly wouldn't reject the compensation, but I
wouldn't want to go after it. I feel like I'm black-
mailing the company in exchange for my approval. It's a
tax that is not equitable. It's selective. On the other
hand, if all large industrial facilities are treated the
same, I call it "bearing the cost." (1)
The reaction of preservationists against compensation is not
based on an unwillingness to be compensated, but rather on an unwil-
lingness to take compensation into consideration as part of the site
decision making process. About one-third of preservationists consider
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compensation to be potentially desirable. Even these individuals,
however, mistrust its use to help convince towns to accept a locally
undesirable facility. While compensation may be desirable, a decision
to accept a facility should not be based on this criteria.
Everybody wants to reject these facilities because
of the mistrust. We don't trust the state or the devel-
oper. The lack of benefits doesn't make a community
close up; the lack of trust does. There's no question
that we will be swayed by the dollar, but without trust
there's nothing. In this light, I see compensation as
potentially exercising improper leverage. Either you fit
our guidelines or you don't, and either you will change
the character of the community or you won't. Why should
we trust anyone who wants to change us. The way I look
at it, any town which seeks to attract industry should
accept a treatment plant as a consequence of accepting
waste generators. I lived six years in two industrial
towns. They could use the compensation, and the treat-
ment facility wouldn't change the character of the town.
They already have industrial parks. That's where it
should go. (1)
We can all find good uses for compensation. After
all the safety considerations were complete, compensation
becomes an icing of sorts. But I don't think a proposal
would ever get far enough along to consider compensation.
There are too many questions about the hazards, not
enough trust in either the company or the state. (21)
Preservationists also generally support the desirability of compen-
satory trust funds to protect the community against damage, should the
plant be located in their community.
We're all gun shy of the court solution. The court
system is near a breaking point. It can be manipulated
and takes decades to make a decision. Meanwhile there
are real health costs as the conditions continue. We
need a more direct way of insuring that the facility is
well handled. If we have a problem, we don't want to
trust our future with the courts. We need something
closer to home. That's why trust funds and insurance
schemes are necessary. Money would become available when
needed. (28, 1)
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The Use of Compensation and Incentives
The risk perceptions of sponsors, guardians and preservationists
generally correspond to their perceptions of benefits. Sponsors
perceive the least risk and the greatest benefit, and preservationists
are at the opposite extreme. A close look at the individuals in these
groups, however, suggests that actual benefits (as measured in econ-
omic worth or increased service provisions) do not vary much between
these groups of individuals. Neither does utility for benefits appear
to differ significantly. What stands out more sharply are differences
in perceived risks and ideological beliefs. Sponsors support business
and free enterprise, and generally view risks as managable by those
institutions. Guardians support governmental and social responsi-
bility, and are generally cautiously optimistic about the potential
for safe waste management. Preservationists support home rule and
self-determination, and are generally pessimistic about the ability of
industry and government to mitigate aesthetic, environmental, and
health impacts. Perceptions of benefits, while consistent with this
pattern, appear to be a secondary consideration.
The gaming simulation allowed the residents of Essexton and
Worcesterville to allocate up to $3 million annually to mitigation and
compensation. Thus, each commmunity could choose any amount of
compensation up to that approaching the limit a private firm (opera-
ting a rotary kiln incinerator with annual gross revenues of $30
million) could pay while remaining competitive. Given the choice as
to how to allocate these funds, participants almost invariably opted
to purchase greater safety (and hence receive lower compensation). On
average, of the $1.1 million in compensation (that was initially
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designated as fees to be paid to the town's general revenues), 30
percent was reallocated to safety features. In the simulation, no
individuals switched from opposing to supporting the proposed facility
based on this amount of compensation. Even when compensation was
increased considerably (to the equivalent of the town's entire tax
burden through state subsidies), only one in ten people changed their
preference to accept a previously rejected facility.
Equally striking, participants in the simulations redistributed
funds away from direct monetary payments to enhance town revenues
towards payments to establish contingency funds for guaranteeing
compensation for injuries, decreases in land values, and problems with
water supply. In Worcesterville, these shifts were particularly
striking. Averaging the three team results, the $1.1 million in
annual community revenues was reduced to about $100,000. In its
place, over $400,000 annually was allocated to contingency funds,
$200,000 annually to improvements in community services that would be
used by the facility (i.e., roads and technical help for the town),
and $600,000 annually to the purchase of safety features. In Essex-
ton, annual revenues of $500,000 were left in the community treasury,
with $300,000 shifted to contingency funds and $500,000 shifted to
safety features.
Why does this emphasis on safety exist? Clearly, perceptions of
both compensation and risk are heavily influenced by perceptions of
the status quo. People do not balance risks and benefits using a
baseline of zero, accepting risks if the net benefits are positive.
For the comfortable, potential benefits are greatly outweighed by
potential challanges to comfort. Uncertainty is a strong challange to
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comfort. Compensation is heavily discounted relative to stability of
safety. Those who perceive the risks of a hazardous waste treatment
facility as being relatively controllable (i.e., sponsors) are freer
to consider benefits than those who do not (i.e., guardians and
preservationists).
In addition, emphasis on compensation introduces new tensions
into the siting dispute. Ideologically, tension exists between
individuals who believe that industry should be left to manage their
own resources, should not be taxed, and has certain rights, and
individuals who believe the opposite. Practically, people have
enormous difficulty making tradeoffs between increased compensation
and increased safety. Individuals and communities will expend almost
all available resources on safety, leaving little for compensation,
but will also reject the plant if it offers few benefits to their
community. Given the choice, they prefer arrangements that mitigate
risks, retain community control, cover the cost of impacts that are
measurable, and compensate for damages that actually occur rather than
arrangements that compensate for intangible impacts of the plant.
Most are uncomfortable with offers of incentives for taking risks when
the offer appears designed to alter their choice to accept a facility
or to reject it.
Nonetheless, the generally positive attitude of sponsors toward
compensation and the sense among most guardians and preservationists
that a facility with compensation is better than a facility without
compensation (as long as compensation is not used to influence the
choice of site or the levels of safety) suggests that compensation
does have an important role in increasing support for facilities.
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This conclusion is consistent with a survey of Wisconsin residents
conducted in 1980 (Carnes et al., 1982). Substantial payments to the
community had little affect on the willingness of the individuals
surveyed to accept a nuclear waste repository (acceptance increased
from 22 percent to 26 percent). When these payments were coupled to
various forms of community control over the facility (i.e., access to
information, independent monitoring, representation on a governing
board of the facility, and the power to shut the facility down),
support increased to 42 percent.* No one incentive led people to
change their minds; rather it is the total package that seems to make
the difference. Compensation induces sponsors to actively promote
facilities, while decreasing opposition among some guardians and
preservationists. However, great care must be taken to separate
considerations of safety from those of compensation and to recognize
possible interactions between the two.
* We should note that men were significantly more likely than women to
become more favorable to siting a waste facility in their community
when offered incentives, and that although not statistically signi-
ficant, higher income families also responded more favorably than
lower income families (Carnes et al., 1982:71). Since the partici-
pants in the simulations were predominantly male with above average
incomes, we might expect these individuals to respond most positive-
ly to incentives.
Chapter 8
Coping with Perceptions in the Management of Risks
Perceptions of risk are rooted in the selection, from a wide
range of uncertain possible futures, of alternatives that might be
most devastating. Risk perceptions are inevitably tied to definitions
of significance, for it is in such definitions that individuals chose
some possiblities for special review, treat others in standard ways,
and ignore most as inconsequential. I have argued that differences
between technical and lay perceptions of risk emerge as much because
of differences in their models of significance as because of differ-
ences in their information processing capabilities. What is believed
to be a risk is derived from cultural values, not simply from physical
properties measurable through technical analysis. As such, risk
perceptions are subject to the vagaries of social judgements.
For problems that are amenable to scientific or engineering
analysis, technical perceptions have historically been given greatest
credence. Broadly speaking, risk management strategies traditionally
preferred by technical experts focus on risks deemed most significant
by those experts. The bitter debates that engulf risk management
disputes, such as those associated with the siting of hazardous waste
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treatment facilities, reveal widespread political rejection of this
technically dominated model of decision making. If we are to develop
effective policies for coping with risk, policies that can be enacted
and implemented, a new direction is needed.
This dissertation suggests an alternative approach. Technical
perceptions need not necessarily compete with perceptions held by
laypeople. Risk management policies, currently held hostage to the
difficulties of reeducating the lay public or overpowering their
political voice, can be redirected. Since lay and technical percep-
tions are based on different conceptions of what constitutes a signi-
ficant risk, management strategies based on one set of perceptions can
be imbedded into strategies based on the other. The resulting ap-
proach is one in which professionals do not alone make the critical
judgements about what is significant and how risks should be managed.
The approach focuses analysis and discussion on a wider range of
concerns than those traditionally envisioned by technical experts.
Three questions immediately arise: What are the essential
characteristics of an approach to risk management which accepts as
legitimate the perceptions of both lay and technical publics? Would
the resulting strategies actually mitigate the hazards that both lay
and expert publics seek to manage? And would such an approach promote
acceptance of currently stalemated risk management strategies?
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I. Technical and Lay Perceptions in Risk Management
Differences in perceptions aggravate disputes over risk manage-
ment proposals. These differences are not ephemeral. The disputes
they generate are unlikely to be resolved in the absence of a better
system for coping with perceived risks. In the siting of hazardous
waste treatment facilities, in the setting of standards for chemical
substances, and in a host of other facility siting and regulatory
settings, these disputes have rendered our decision making processes
inoperative.
Risk management in the public sector is an inherently social
act. As a society, we must render our risks manageable. Our percep-
tions of risks must be coupled to a willingness to act, to make
decisive choices. Within these context, it is strikingly clear that
risk management is more than risk analysis (whether purveyed by
technical or lay publics). Perceptions of consequences, and the
analysis on which they are based, mean little in the absence of an
ability to effect change in those consequences.
The central paradox of contemporary American risk policy is that
the more we learn about risk, the less confident we are of our risk
management abilities. We are a society that is longer living and more
prosperous, and apparently also more fearful for our health and
welfare, than ever before. Risk analysts are prone to conclude that
we have lost our grip on rationality, for we must surely know that we
are better off. But this assessment of the problem cannot explain the
central question of why, if we are better off, are we incapable of
moving forward with continued vigor. What are the essential charac-
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teristics of our indecisiveness?
This thesis has argued that this indecisiveness, at least in the
context of hazardous waste facility siting disputes, springs most
fundamentally from differing conceptions about what consequences are
significant (particularly in light of the growing concern with poten-
tially catastrophic risks) and differing perspectives on the chains of
events that are most likely to cause these consequences. Analytic
techniques can be employed only after characteristics of significance
are defined and models of cause and effect are delimited. The debate
about rational analysis is therefore misplaced. It presumes agreement
on two prior concerns, agreement which does not exist. The technical
conception of risk suggests one form of coping, while the lay concep-
tion suggests different forms. These conceptions (and the perceptions
they generate) are currently at odds, but can conceivably be joined
together.
Measurement and analysis are the tools of engineers and sci-
entists. Without them, knowledge about hazards cannot be given
meaningful (and testable) structure. With them, hazards are poten-
tially predictable and controllable. To be useful to technical
experts, indicators of risk must be measurable and methods for han-
dling uncertainty analytic. Engineering principles of analysis, from
which much of risk analysis technique is derived, has consequently
given shape to an understanding of risk in which measures of unwanted
consequences such as death are estimated over a given period of time
to yield expected frequency. Implicit in these measures of riskiness
is the presumption that all risks are equivalent inasmuch as their
expected outcome is the same and that risks can be ordered by these
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measures of expected outcome. With this definition of significant
outcomes (i.e., expected deaths) and model of cause and effect (i.e.,
only physical properties are important causes of hazards, and these
properties are measurable, predictable and controllable) comes a
preferred method of coping. If risks are caused by predictable
physical reactions, then they are best prevented with predictable
physical systems. The coping mechanism is one of engineered controls,
of estimating the requisite probabilities, and designing for appro-
priate safety.
Within this model of risk management, much room for disagreement
exists. It is not just laypeople who perceive differently than
experts, but experts who argue among themselves. This is not sur-
prising: the scientific method is based on premises that theories are
held tentatively, contingent on the development of contrary evidence
and new interpretation. These debates are part of the evolution of
science. In an attempt to weed out error and inappropriate behavior,
the scientific community regulates which perceived facts and theories
are to be considered legitimate and which are not. The quality of
these debates are controlled by means of independent experiments and
peer review. For many of society's most fearsome risks, however,
agreed upon facts and criteria of competence are lacking. Quality
control is therefore difficult to ensure because quality is at times.
impossible to define. As in the Love Canal debate, the result is
polarization and suppression of tentative viewpoints, even within the
scientific community.
This is not to say that rigorous analysis has no place in
resolving ambiguities in risk problems. Rather, it suggests that
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technical analysis can make no claim to a precision it cannot offer,
for a problem it can only partially define. The power of technical
analysts to design risk management systems, and to convince a skep-
tical public of their reliability, is limited by their potential
fallability. Moreover, the scientific process for resolving differ-
ences of opinion among scientists, which is difficult to apply even
among those who espouse its value, cannot provide the sole support for
a risk management system in which entirely different processes make
claims to legitimacy.
Despite these limitations, technical experts can do much to
inform the risk management debate. Their methods of analysis yield
the most precise predictions of unwanted consequences and provide the
overview needed to design systems for preventing hazards. These
skills are essential to operators of facilities. In addition, resi-
dents of Worcesterville and Essexton do not claim that these skills
are unnecessary, but rather that they are insufficient as currently
conceived. To the guardians and preservationists of these communi-
ties, the risk management problem goes beyond the skills traditionally
employed by technical experts.
Because lay conceptions of risk are not bound to risks that are
measurable, they are neither as precise nor as restricted as those of
engineers and scientists. Laypersons are concerned less with expected
outcomes, which tend to average out rare events, than they are with
variability, the possibility of extreme outcomes, and uncertainty.
The characteristic that most powerfully separates the lay public into
sponsors, guardians and preservationists is the extent to which an
individual focuses on extreme outcomes rather than expected outcomes.
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Sponsors focus most strongly on expected outcomes, preservationists
most strongly on potentially catastrophic events, and guardians
moderately on both. These differences come about not because sponsors
are more rational than preservationists or even that they think more
like scientists and engineers. Rather, they come about because
sponsors trust the current systems for managing risks, and believe in
their spokespersons. They accept the logic of experts because manage-
ment of these risks is part of the standard operating procedure for
which experts are trained. The risks are simply not exceptional and
hence do not require special attention. As sponsors put it, "Hazard-
ous waste is less safe than nuclear power, but the risk percentages on
either are so low, I don't particularly pay attention to them."
To guardians and preservationists, on the other hand, the risks
associated with hazardous waste treatment facilities are exceptional
and do require special attention. These hazards are viewed as more
threatening than most. To introduce them into a community is to
invite loss of control. Guardians focus on health and safety conse-
quences. To place their town in jeopardy by accepting an unwarranted
hazard, even one in which the probability is small, is to shirk
responsibility to their community. "My responsibility is to protect
this town, and it is the plant operator's duty to make the changes
ncessary for this to happen," states the guardian. In addition to
these health and safety concerns of guardians, preservationists also
focus on aesthetic and cultural consequences. Much more pervasively,
an uncertain future provokes anxiety in preservationists. "We really
don't know much about the risks. It's like the atomic bomb: We know
it's terrible and potentially disastrous, but we've never been direct-
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ly confronted with it. We haven't had to raise our children with this
thing festering in our community," is the view of preservationists.
They are more prone to perceive hazards as uncontrollable and unpre-
dictable.
Because of this basic concern for extreme outcomes and loss of
control, guardians and preservationists do not find technical analysis
very compelling. These analyses, generally based on the premise that
expected outcome is the most appropriate indicator of risk and phy-
sical systems the most important causes of hazards, focus on neither
the consequences nor the causes of greatest concern to guardians and
preservationists. Rather, guardians and -preservationists focus on
systems for foreclosing worst case scenarios and for retaining com-
munity control over the processes that lead to these extreme outcomes.
For the most part, they believe that in well designed treatment
facilities, risks are most reliably controlled by means of systems for
detecting and mitigating hazards, and for managing the treatment
facility. These future-oriented, managerial based solutions form the
basis for coping with rare but extreme outcomes as well as more common
consequences.
In greater detail, seven principles for managing risk emerge
from the simulation studies and interviews. These principles, as
suggested most particularly by guardians but also by most preserva-
tionists and some sponsors, emphasize the outcomes and processes of
risk management. They are not oriented towards altering perceptions
or reeducating disputants (though learning is inevitably an element of
any attempt to resolve disputes), but rather on managing risks as
perceived by those disputants. Following a discussion of these
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principles, we shall examine their desirability.
II. Seven Principles for Managing Risk
This section presents and discusses seven principles for more
effectively managing risks, as envisioned by community residents. The
first three principles define the basic structure of the management
system: how should risks be predicted, prevented, detected, and
mitigated, and how much emphasis should be given each? The remaining
four principles define the relationship between the community and the
operator: how can openness and trust be ensured and what powers
should exist to protect the community in case problems do develop?
The prinicples are general; options can only be precisely defined
within the context of a particular siting dispute.
Basic Structure: Prediction, Prevention, Detection and Mitigation
1. Community residents and facility operators need not
agree on the precise likelihood of a risk. They must,
however, reach agreement on the characteristics of risks
to be managed and the standards of acceptable variation.
Perceptions of risk differ not simply because predictive analy-
sis differs, but also because different characteristics of risk are of
varying importance to different individuals. Facility operators and
community residents need not agree on the precise likelihood of a
particular risk to design effective prevention systems. At a minimum,
however, they must agree on what consequences are acceptable and what
consequences are not. In agreeing to standards of acceptability,
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operators can then rely on their own predictions to determine if the
standards can be maintained and at what cost. They need not convince
residents of the validity of these estimates as long as residents
believe that the standards are physically possible to meet. The
dispute is reduced from one centered around predictions of the future
(in which the rightness or wrongness of views is only known in the
future) to one centered around visions of desirable futures (which can
be answered today). Prediction becomes more a tool of analysis that
interest groups employ to answer their own questions and less. a tool
of persuasion that interest groups use to convince others.
State regulations that are perceived to be effective help
legitimize the facility siting process and augment local confidence in
the general safety of such facilities. State standards will serve as
a benchmark against which local communities will undoubtedly demand
more. Residents, however, are likely to make fewer demands when they
perceive facility operators and state regulators to be competent and
trustworthy.
While the problem of divergent perceptions of risk is simpli-
fied, it is not eliminated. The thorny question of cost-benefit
tradeoffs between more or less safe alternatives remains. The effects
of hazards, should they develop, are still uncertain. But by agreeing
to local standards before siting, communities and facility operators
can evaluate future performance based on mutually acceptable criteria.
This evaluation is essential if communities are to replace their power
to deny permission to site a facility with a more general power to
prevent significant deterioration of the community's health and
safety.
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2. Emerging hazards and variations in operating
conditions must be quickly and reliably detectable.
When knowledge is incomplete and predictions imprecise, then the
means for recognizing problems early becomes necessary. As conse-
quences evolve, they become increasingly predictable. If errors can
be detected and corrected as they evolve, the possibility of error
becomes less frightening. Repair and recovery are possible. By
coming to agreement on how detection will be integrated into the
ongoing operations of the facility, the standards established for safe
waste management (as discussed in principle one) gain meaning.
Protocols for collecting and evaluating data can be agreed upon
beforehand.
3. Once detected, a hazard or unacceptable shift in
operating conditions must be effectively mitigated.
Inasmuch as detective data indicates emerging hazards, mitiga-
tion becomes necessary. Mitigation is prevention adapted through
time, adjusted to new conditions as they evolve. The management of
risks are potentially more effective because the control systems are
open to unexpected changes and to mistakes. At the same time, the
reliability and trustworthiness of these systems are of paramount
concern. Unlike prevention devices that are engineered into the
facility, mitigation systems require conscious intervention and
changes in standard operating procedures. Detection can provide
information that is useful in aborting emerging hazards only if
management adapts to the new requirements.
From the perspective of community residents, this flexibility is
an essential component of effective risk management, but is also
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potentially unreliable if management fails to respond adequately. It
offers more fine tuned control over hazards (hence potentially reduc-
ing risks) by increasingly relying on managerial skills and good
intentions. This dichotomy is aggravated by community perceptions
that poor management is the predominant cause of hazardous conditions.
Only if competent and trustworthy management can be guaranteed will
these systems of prevention, detection and mitigation provide an
escape from the stalemate generated by differing perceptions of risk.
As a first step, then, expectations of how management will
perform within this highly flexible system must be forthcoming. Local
communities are not likely to give up control over the siting decision
in exchange for a system in which facility operators gain total
flexibility. This ambiguity creates precisely the "loss of control"
that community residents seek to prevent. The ambiguity can, however,
be greatly reduced through promises of specific actions contingent on
the detection of emerging hazards. These promises give structure to
an otherwise amorphous relationship between the community and the
facility operator. Contingent promises can assign responsibility
clearly, decrease the uncertainty over expected operator behavior in
everyday and crisis situations, and create a basis for evaluating the
operator's future performance.
On the other hand, promises do not in and of themselves guaran-
tee performance, nor do they ensure results. Planning cannot cover
all contingencies, nor can appropriate solutions be developed in the
absence of experience. Effective mitigation systems must therefore be
learning systems. Guardians and preservationists look beyond the
substance of agreements to relationships between parties. The
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relationship must inspire trust and be open to learning as new infor-
mation and concerns are raised. Only in this way can safety be
secured. Guardians and preservationists, while acknowledging the
difficulty of creating and maintaining a trustworthy and reliable
relationship, believe that such a relationship must exist. Moreover,
the relationship must be disciplined by an institutional framework
which continually reinforces the sense of responsibility that facility
operators feel toward the health and safety of the community. In the
absence of these reinforcements, competing corporate goals can at any
time weaken the resolve of facility operators to promote community
well-being.
The Relationship Between the Community and the Plant Operator
4. The technologies and management of these prevention,
detection and mitigation systems must be visible and
comprehendable to at least some locally trusted community
representatives and possibly to the community as a
whole.
The ability to monitor the facility and its operations is
essential if the community is to hold the facility operator account-
able. Reliable information, independently confirmed, must be avail-
able against which the community can judge the performance of the
facility operator. Community monitoring of emissions and ambiant
conditions forms one tier of an information exchange system, analysis
of these data a second tier, and onsite inspection of general condi-
tions still a third. The town is usually thought to need expert
assistance to examine and evaluate the ongoing conditions of the
plant. State or operator inspections, in the absence of local quality
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control, will not suffice. The state is perceived as overburdened and
hence unreliable. The facility operator has conflicting interests.
But either the state or the operator may form the mainstay of a
monitoring system as long as ready access to the facility and free
flow of information is guaranteed, and the community can ensure the
quality of the monitoring and analysis.
5. A' structure must exist for jointly solving problems
and resolving disputes as conditions and concerns evolve,
and for altering prevention, detection and mitigation
systems as knowledge improves.
All contingencies cannot be foretold before construction of a
facility. Consequently, learning is integral to the process of risk
management. Just as perceptions differ among various groups, so too
will learning differ. Does a leak in one tank mean that all tanks
must be relined? Of what use is a newly invented pollution control
device?
To ensure that these questions are answered with the community's
safety in mind, guardians and preservationists desire a voice in
decision making about safety. A joint safety board, with some process
for resolving irreconcilable differences, is seen as essential. At
the very least, such a board would keep issues of health and safety at
the forefront of corporate concerns and would provide some measure of
integration between community and corporate decision making.
Creation of a safety board is an acknowledgement of the deep
interdependencies between the community and the facility operator in
the management of uncertainty and risk. By committing future control
over resources and decisions to the board in exchange for resolving
current disputes, each creates limitations on its future flexibility:
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the community by acknowledging the legitimacy of the corporation to
locate a facility in the town, the corporate operators by acknowledg-
ing the legitimacy of a continuing community presence in discretionary
decision making and by providing resources to a safety board on an
ongoing basis. At the same time, the joint decision making process
creates a highly flexible system in toto for managing the hazardous
waste treatment process.
6. The community should be involved only in the overview
of safety operations, not in the minutia of plant opera-
tions.
Because safety and health concerns are so integrated into the
operations of a facility, the boundary between risk management and
facility management is difficult to delineate. Despite this diffi-
culty, delineation is considered to be essential by community resi-
dents. Ideologically, most residents believe that firms have the
right to control their internal workings as long as they do not impose
risks on the community. Practically, control implies responsibility
for error and residents are ambivalent about accepting this respons-
ibility. Rather, they look for clear demarcation of rights and
responsibilities, accepting discretionary power only when necessary to
achieve the primary objective of risk management.
To arrive at the most appropriate demarcation, however, will not
be easy. Disagreement over what is most appropriate exists not only
between the community and the facility operator, but also within the
community itself. Guardians, who emphasize community safety, are the
most willing to accept responsibility in order to retain control.
Sponsors, who emphasize a free market, are least willing. Yet most
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guardians prefer to limit their involvement to policy setting for risk
management, and few sponsors desire to give total discretion to the
operator.
Residents, especially guardians, demand control because they
perceive the plant as being safer with this control, but they do so
only hesitantly. The exact form of this control must be determined
between the community and the plant operator, on a case by case basis.
It is not the level of control that is ultimately essential, but
rather the level of trust.
7. The community must have the power to hold the operator
accountable for hazards as specified in a safety agree-
ment. The community must also have the power to move
decisively against hazardous conditions should the
operator fail to do so.
Cooperation, in and of itself, is inadequate for ensuring
safety. Residents believe that the firm must not be in a position to
profit from unsafe conditions. Residents envision a system of fines
for hazardous conditions, strict application of liability, and trust
funds set aside by the firm to cover the cost of these contingencies.
Equally important, sanctions must have a high likelihood of being
imposed. The criteria for imposition must be unambiguous: if such a
condition exists, whatever the cause or the intended consequence, then
a specified sanction can be invoked. By making the consequences of
hazardous conditions costly, the community seeks to create additional
incentives for the firm to improve risk management. If it is in the
best interest of the facility operator to act safely, the likelihood
of error decreases.
In the final analysis, however, the greatest risk to the
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community is a hazardous condition that is not corrected for want of
decisive action. The power to override corporate decision making in a
time of crisis is the most controversial of suggestions, and the most
difficult o envision. The time consuming judicial process is consid-
ered totally unacceptable to both guardians and preservationists. An
alternative is generally sought in arbitration. If the safety board,
which represents both community and corporate interests, is dead-
locked, the dispute is brought to an outside arbitrator. The arbitra-
tion system is established before the facility begins operations. The
system is state run (backed by appropriate state laws), but the
arbitrators are selected by all interested parties. A trust fund or
appropriate insurance program is established to ensure the availabil-
ity of funds to cover emergency actions.
Moreover, if impacts of hazards are to be limited to temporary
and reversable effects, potentially expensive guarantees (e.g., of
water supply, property values, and clean-up funds) must be made. The
state will probably need to financially back these guarantees of safe
plant operation. As an additional benefit, state guarantees also
provide financial incentives to the state to ensure proper waste
management.
In designing a risk management system, the tension between the
community and the firm is ultimately over who will bear what responsi-
bilities and risks under how much uncertainty. From the perspective
of the firm, the ideal condition is one in which it retains sufficient
control over its environment to ensure flexibility in goal setting.
While the firm may choose to promote safety above a minimum standard,
it is likely to also prefer to have the flexibility to reverse that
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decision or to shift emphasis from one form of risk management to
another. Only if a firm is unable to site a facility conventionally
is it likely to enter into relationships of joint policy setting.
At the same time, however, the community recognizes this
flexibility in goal setting as one in which safety goals can be
compromised. In the absence of a basic trust in the intentions and
capability of the firm, residents cannot be faulted for expecting the
worst. Alternative risk management systems, in which facility opera-
tors are allowed maximum flexibility within a clearly delineated
decision making process, are fraught with difficulties, but they offer
the potential for increasing our capacity to cope with risks. If
these systems increase the willingness of local communities to accept
potentially hazardous facilities while reducing the riskiness of
hazardous waste treatment compared to traditional approaches, then
they may prove viable. The next section explores these questions of
acceptability and risk mitigation.
III. Mitigating Risks, Promoting Acceptance
The seven principles for managing risks grow out of perceptions
of risk held by local residents. They are based on self-reflections
and opinions about what makes for a safer world. While this disserta-
tion has focused on perceptions, ultimately issues of actual conse-
quences must be addressed. Do intuitively plausible risk management
measures proposed by the lay public actually decrease total risk, or
do they lead to overly cautious and erratic behavior in ways that
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increase risk over time?
Reasonableness of the Seven Risk Management Principles
In a dissertation devoted to the uncertain nature and varying
significance of risks, I will not be so bold as to claim a definitive
answer to questions of reasonableness. In part, answers can only be
obtained after siting facilties that incorporate these principles, and
evaluating the experience. Until then, we can only speculate on what
the nature of such risk management systems will be. In judging their
reasonableness, however, two aspects of this new direction stand out
for consideration.
First, risk management as envisioned by community residents
emphasizes the organizational and managerial sources of risk. These
risk management systems are potentially costly. Resources must be
reallocated; other corporate goals may suffer. If the risk definition
is essentially faulty, or if new risks (such as an increase in bank-
ruptcy due to increased costs) emerge, then the new situation may
prove less desirable than the old.
The experience at Love Canal, numerous other hazardous waste
problem centers, and Three Mile Island, however, suggests than an
increased emphasis on management is essential. Few analysts contest
that better systems of managment are needed. Even federal regulations
of hazardous waste strongly emphasize managerial and organizational
considerations. Establishment of a system to track wastes from
production to eventual treatment or disposal, changes in concepts of
liability associated with clean-up of hazardous waste disposal sites,
and requirements for creating financial arrangements to cover contin-
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gencies and post-closure upkeep were among the earliest federal
regulatory changes proposed in the late 1970s. Historically, improper
management has clearly contributed to improper disposal; hence in-
creased emphasis on management is likely to create considerable
improvement.
Where the resources will come from to improve management remains
unclear. The impact of costs for an improved risk management system
are heavily dependent on regulatory environment. Strong regulations
will strengthen the financial position of firms promoting increased
safety; weak regulations will make such firms uncompetititve. More-
over, a facility with few operational problems will incur fewer
mitigation costs. Inevitably, the firm cannot survive if it incurs
excessive costs. From the perspective of many community residents,
however, if private enterprise cannot function under strict safety
requirements, then an alternative such as a public utility or state
financing is needed.
Second, the risk management system envisioned by community
residents is one in which power is shared. If the community proves to
be less responsible or competent than would the facility operator
acting in isolation of community representation, then risks may
actually increase. Will residents be reasonable in times of both
standard operation and crisis? Technical experts, who believe that
lay perceptions are inaccurate and laypeople too fearful, will also
doubt that residents will be reasonable. In this dissertation, I have
argued that laypeople act rationally to promote their best interests,
that they are consistent in their use of power to protect what they
value. This consistency and clear sightedness is easily maintained in
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adversarial relationships when the goal is to stop a proposed facili-
ty. It will be more difficult to maintain in cooperative relation-
ships, when differing goals must constantly be maintained in balance.
But relationships of this complexity have been created and
sustained in the past. In several European countries, public deci-
sions about local matters are sometimes made through face-to-face
negotiations between public officials and residents. Under these
conditions, residents have demonstrated the ability to sustain a
responsible involvement. The key has been in legitimizing resident
involvement and converting conflictual relationships into ones in
which public officials and residents seek to co-produce mutually
desirable outcomes (Susskind and Elliott, 1983). Under conditions
where the ability to affect decisions decreases over time, resident
groups must exercise points of leverage quickly and decisively. When
residents share in the ongoing responsibility (and control) for
producing and maintaining the mangement of safety, strategic action
becomes less important. By delineating risk management functions from
other functions of the firm and linking responsiblity to power, a
basis for mutual trust is created.
Carefully organized relationships can work: between some
parties, under some conditions. These relationships are shaped
throughout the siting process as communities and corporations clash,
negotiate, and achieve compromise. From initial encounters and
throughout facility operations, these relationships require a sensi-
tivity to and basic acceptance of the goals and perspectives of each
interested party. Ultimately, not only must the firm accept community
goals, but the community must accept corporate goals. How likely is
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this acceptance?
Acceptance of Risk Management
As this thesis has argued, the design of a risk management
system which does not lead to deadlock is essential if we are to cope
effectively with risks. Well designed systems that cannot be imple-
mented are of little use. The thesis has also argued that perceptions
of risk are a core determinant of acceptance: without a perceptably
safe facility, opposition is inevitable.
The reverse hypothesis, however, cannot be demonstrated. While
safe waste management is necessary for siting, it is unlikely to be
sufficient. No facility can be made completely safe, and hence all
facilities may well remain noxious and unwanted. In promoting the
acceptance of these facilities, attention must be paid to differences
among community residents and their varying responses to issues of
political legitimacy and compensation.
In general, risks that have impacts that are temporary and
reversible, or that are inconsequential and readily compensated, are
most likely to be accepted by local communities. Sponsors have a low
threshold of acceptance because they believe risks to be inconse-
quential. Compensation, when clearly tied to the operation of the
facility, is more important to some sponsors than are changes in risk
management. For these individuals, compensation strengthens their
incentives to openly and actively lend support to the proposed facil-
ity.
Guardians have a higher threshold of acceptance, but the criter-
ion for acceptance is relatively straightforward. For guardians, the
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only issue of major concern is safety. Guardians are generally very
aware of the need for treatment facilities and are supportive of their
construction in principle. If convinced that the proposed site was
selected with due attention for health and safety and the siting
process adequately incorporates their concerns, guardians are pre-
disposed toward accepting the facility. The seven principles of risk
management may therefore form sufficient basis for acceptance if the
impacts of remaining risks can be shown to be reversible should they
occur.
Preservationists have the highest threshold of acceptance. They
care most about protecting a way of life, one in which hazardous waste
treatment facilities have no part. Neither careful attention to risk
management nor compensation are likely to induce them to support the
siting of noxious facilities, but they can be effective in reducing
overt opposition. The seven principles are responsive to preserva-
tionist concerns about risk, local autonomy, and uncertainty. By
ameliorating these concerns, and promoting the support inherent in the
positions of sponsors (through compensation) and guardians (through
improved risk management), an effective coalition might be built.
The actual effectiveness of these principles cannot be known in
the absence of an attempt to employ them. Innovative modifications to
the systems for managing risks have not been an item of negotiation in
past siting disputes. Based on the reflections of local residents,
however, these principles cut to the very core of the current deadlock
in public risk management by working with differences in perceptions,
rather than assuming inevitable conflict between them. In so doing,
the principles hold open the promise of more effective risk management
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by both altering the sources of risk and promoting the acceptance of
treatment facilities.
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Appendix A
Materials Used in the Presentation of the Gaming Simulation
Appendix A contains many of the materials used in the simula-
tion. These materials include:
1. An outline of the presentation given by the research
staff during the simulation. The outline was written
to help participants who arrived late to quickly grasp
the discussion. See pages 293 to 295.
2. Several small facsimiles of wall posters used in making
the presentation and describing the process of treating
hazardous waste. Included here is a simplified diagram
of a rotary kiln incinerator, a photograph of such a
facility, and a skematic diagram of the waste manage-
ment process. See pages 296 to 298.
3. Miniature reproductions of the four quadrants of the
game board. Each quadrant lists safety and compensa-
tion options and designates prices. In the gaming-
simulation, budgets were established by use of pins
given to each team. A single pin was equivalent to a
$70,000 annual budget, and the cost of any given option
was fixed by the number of dots adjacent to the
description of the option. Participants were each
given 42 pins, for a total budget of $3 million.
Participants were free to move the pins into any
position they liked. The startup position included an
annual budget of $1.7 million in safety features
proposed by the company they had selected as a
negotiation partner, and $1.1 million in unrestricted
compensation (in the form of tipping fees). See pages
299 to 302.
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OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION
I. PURPOSE OF TONIGHT'S MEETING. Tonight's meeting is part of a
project designed to improve the Massachusetts hazardous waste facility
siting process. Several researchers from MIT and Harvard are trying to
better understand how the concerns of local communities can be met while
still siting facilities necessary for the safe management of hazardous
waste. We have developed several general approaches to meeting the
needs of local communities which will be presented tonight. We will be
discussing these approaches, asking you to both think about them from
the perspective of community residents and make choices as to which
approaches you prefer.
To do this, we have imbedded the approaches in "hypothetical"
proposals for siting a hazardous waste management facility. The
facility we will be discussing is a rotary kiln incinerator. The
facility is designed to burn hazardous wastes at very high temperatures.
We have created several waste management companies, each with their own
philosophy of managing wastes, to make proposals for siting this facili-
ty. In this way, we have tried to make the problems and opportunities
of hazardous waste facility siting very clear, so that your reactions
will be based on considerations that are as realistic as possible.
II. THE HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING ACT. The facility siting
law creates a framework for siting hazardous waste facilites through
open negotiation among all interested parties. The law is based on the
idea that only if the Commonwealth manages its waste disposal problems,
the host and abutting communities negotiate a siting agreement that
protects their interests and the developer builds an economically viable
facility can a long-term solution to hazardous waste in the state be
achieved. By requiring that developers and communities negotiate openly
over any major proposal made in the state, and by acting as facilitator
in this process, the Commonwealth hopes to achieve these objectives.
For our purposes tonight, five features of the law are most
salient. First, once a developer's proposal has passed through an
initial state review, the law requires the proposed host community to
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negotiate with the developer: the community cannot simply say "no" to
the proposal. Second, the state will provide technical assistance and
grants to the community to help it hire experts in technical, legal and
financial matters. Third, the developer is required to prepare detailed
reports describing the environmental and socio-economic impacts of the
project. Fourth, any agreement that is reached between the community
and the developer is legally binding. And fifth, if an impasse in the
negotiations continues for more than two months after the state has
accepted the impact reports, the Massachusetts Site Safety Council can
arrange for arbitration to establish a binding siting agreement.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE ROTARY KILN INCINERATOR. Tonight, we
will be discussing a particular type of hazardous waste treatment: the
rotary kiln incinerator. We have done this to make the issues of
hazardous waste management more concrete than we could have done by
talking about waste management in general.
Using today's technology, incineration can be the most effective
way to dispose of hazardous organic waste. The incineration of
hazardous waste involves controlled burning in a specially designed
kiln and furnace. A rotary kiln is a slowly rotating cylindrical
combustion chamber, slightly inclined to the horizontal. The rotation
of the kiln during combustion continually mixes the solid and semi-solid
waste material with air. This promotes uniform burning. The burn
temperatures are extremely high (approximately 1,700 degrees F).
A picture of the facility can be seen in the posted photograph.
The facility is large: approximately four stories in height and looks
much like an oversized industrial boiler. Like an industrial boiler, it
also has a tall stack.
The rotary kiln, together with a liquid injection unit for
introducing liquids into the furnace, can incinerate distillation
residues, oily wastes, chlorinated hydrocarbons, contaminated solvents,
pesticides and a variety of other organic materials. For the most part,
these materials are decomposed into carbon dioxide and water vapor.
However, any incineration system will also have gaseous, liquid and
solid emissions. In your packet you will find a diagram of these
material flows. The proper use of control equipment can greatly reduce
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the risk of emissions, but even under the best of circumstances, small
amounts of particulates and trace organics may be released to the
environment.
IV. THREE APPROACHES TO MANAGING HAZARDOUS WASTE. In order to
facilitate discussion about what local communities would want from
developers, we have created three companies with different approaches to
managing the risks of hazardous waste treatment facilities. The first
of these, Waste Technology, specializes in improved technologies. The
second, Pollution Control, specializes in early detection and mitigation
measures. And the third, Environmental Management, specializes in the
ongoing management of the plant and increased cooperation with the host
community. The proposals that each of these companies would make in a
first round of negotiations are outlined in your packet (stapled behind
the outline for the rotary kiln incinerator).
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ROTARY KILN INCINERATOR
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WASTE TECHNOLOGY, INC.
- vehicle safety standards 
required of all waste delivery trucks
- spill prevention and
containment measures
including double lined storage tanks,
dikes and ground material
- oversized "packed" scrubber
to further reduce chloride and sulfur
emissions 4
- buffer zone
located around the treatment facility
- best available technology
used for all bealtb and safety equipment 0
Ask 
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POLLUTION CONTROL CORP.
- emergency response corps *
to train employees in accident
containment
- manifest system for
tracking wastes 
to track waste from the source to the
treatment facility
- vehicle inspection
to detect problems In waste delivery..
- engineer for additional
waste stream analysis
and more creful ixing for incineration
- contingency and 
emergency response plan
for handling unusual events and training
the emergency response corps
- combustion monitoring and * *
automatic shutdown
should air pollution standards be
exceeded
air monitoring in neighborhood * *
to detect air pollution problems
- preconstruction groundwater
modeling to help pinpoint future changes
-groundwater monitoring
to detect pollution leaching from the
site
- spill containment measures 
Incuding die, low permeable round 
cover nd pump system S
- mitigation promises
agreements to take corrective action
shouldsafety and health standards be S .ce d~O
-, 301
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
- route restrictions
to specify delivery truck routes
- vehicle ownership
facility operator to own and maintain
all waste delivery trucks
- delivery hour limits
to restrict deliveries to daytime hours
- payment to town
fire department
to purchase emergency equipment and
train personnel in their use
- Safety Board with emergency
powers 
creation of joint community/company
board to oversee the plant's safe
operation
- budget for Safety Board
for making improvements in plant safety
- engineer for additional
waste stream analysis
and more careful mixing for incineration
- payment to town for safety
engineer with inspection rights
to be a watchdog for the town
- dispute resolution agreements
to pecify procedures for quickly
resolving disputes, emergency powers of
Safety Board and actions to be taken if
unsafe conditions develop
- emergency action trust fund
to cover cost of emergencies
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.COMPENSATION MEASURES
- community service
improvements
to improve roads and otber ervices used
by the facility
- II I I m 
_ 
I I I I I l .
- injury trust fund .
to cover damage due to an accident
- technical assistance
to support impact and planning studies
- land value trust fund
to guarantee land values of .adacentproperty
- water supply guarantees 0 0
to provide lternative water bshould 
groundwater be contaminated
0000
- community tipping fees 0000
to enhance comunity revenues 00000000
- free local hazardous waste
disposal
for industry and residents
- cogeneration energy
provided toadjacent industry "at cost"
- hiring local employees
- facility landscaping
to improve the aestbetics of the plant
* , . .. I , r .1 .........
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Appendix B
Questionnaires Used in the Study
This appendix contains the three questionnaires used during the
gaming simulation. They include:
1. A survey of attitudes, administered before the
simulation was begun. See pages 304 to 307.
2. A form used for rank ordering the proposals put forth
by Waste Technology Inc., Pollution Control Corp., and
Environmental Management Inc. See page 308.
3. A post-simulation review of the team proposal,
administered after individuals had broken into teams of
six individuals and reached agreement on a proposal.
See pages 309 and 310.
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Welcome. Tonight's meeting is part of a larger effort to rethink Massa-
chusett's policy for siting hazardous waste treatment facilities. We feel
that a "rethinking" that takes better account of the views of community resi-
dents is needed. We have organized this meeting to introduce you to the
problems of hazardous waste facility siting and to give you a chance to make
suggestions.
To help make our discussions more fruitful, we need some basic informa-
tion. Please take the next few minutes to answer the following questions.
YOUR VIEWS ABOUT HAZARDOUS WASTE AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION
The following 25 statements describe hazardous waste treatment facilities
and the government's role in managing industrial development. You will prob-
ably agree with some and disagree with others. Please circle the number that
best indicates YOUR OWN OPINION about each statement.
a. Local government best serves the community when
it limits its attention to "essential" services
like schools, roads, and fire protection.
b. Design and managment of hazardous waste treat-
ment facilities are best left in the hands of
experts.
c. Hazardous waste treatment plants present a
constant threat.
d. If improperly managed, even the best designed
treatment plant can be quite dangerous.
e. Hazardous waste treatment plants provide
benefits which are essential to society.
f. Only with more effective community control over
how treatment plants are designed and managed
can local residents be sure that these plant
will be safe.
g. Major health and safety problems can be
prevented from occuring in hazardous waste
facilities if they are designed with modern
technology and managed carefully.
h. Environmental quality should be protected even
when such protection is expensive.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
·P?
5
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i. Putting more money into trustworthy and
effective managment for a hazardous waste plant
will reduce risks more rapidly than spending
the same amount on additional safety devices.
j. If detected quickly, hazardous waste mishaps
can be handled so that major health and safety
problems do not develop.
k. Hazardous waste companies can be trusted to be
diligent in their efforts to make treatment
plants safe.
1. Businesses should be allowed to manage their
own affairs with minimal government regulation.
m. The federal government can be relied on to
protect the health of communities in which
hazardous waste facilities are located.
n. Generally, development and growth is good for
our community.
o. The natural environment is one of our
community's most important assets.
p. Hazardous waste treatment plants enhance
environmental quality and safety.
q. When environmental protection inhibits
industrial development, the regulations are
probably too stringent.
r. Localities ought to have more power to ensure
the safety of hazardous waste treatment facil-
ites located in their jurisdictions.
s. Hazardous waste plants cause more problems than
they solve.
t. State government can be relied on to ensure
that hazardous waste treatment plants are safe.
u. Scientists and engineers do not know enough to
design truly safe treatment plants.
v. New hazardous waste treament facilities are
needed in Massachusetts to solve the state's
hazardous waste problem.
w. Local government should take an active role in
promoting environmental quality.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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x. Dollar for dollar, safety in the operation of
hazardous waste plants is best secured by
improving the design of facilities rather than
through better management.
y. Industry cannot be trusted to provide impartial
information about the risks of hazardous waste
facilities.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
What do you think are the major problems and benefits of hazardous waste
ment facilities?
treat-
FAMILIARITY WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE
1. Below is a list of places and laws associated with hazardous waste. Please
circle the number that best indicates how familiar you are with what that
association is. Don't worry if you never heard of any of them: many
people haven't and your participation in tonight's discussion will be just
as valuable whatever your previous experience.
101 , 1
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
Love Canal, New York
Department of Environmental Management
Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act
Times Beach, Missouri
IT Corporation
toxic wastes in Holbrook or Woburn
Superfund
dioxin and PCBs
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
facility siting debate in Warren
2. How interested would you say you are in the problems of hazardous waste?
a. not at all interested.
b. casually interested.
c. quite interested.
d. extremely interested.
__ ___ __ _ _ ___
1
_ __
,rW-~C
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3. Where do you get information about hazardous waste (circle more than one
answer if applicable)?
a. nowhere f. public meetings
b. newspapers g. public documents
c. TV or radio h. personal experience
d. casual discussions i. other:
e. books or journals
4. Have you ever had any personal or professional experience with hazardous
waste or with the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act? If
so, please describe brielfly:
5. Do you know anything about the technical aspects of hazardous waste and its
treatment?
a. practically nothing
b. a little
c. a lot
INFORMATION ABOUT THE PERSON ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS
1. Statement of Confidentiality: I understand that the name of the community
and the participants will be kept confidential, and that no statements made
tonight will be publicly attributed to any individual.
Signed (and printed for legibility):
2. your phone number (day): (night):
3. your occupation:
4. the income of your family: less than $15,000 $15,000 to $24,999
$25,000 to $49,999 greater than $50,000
5. your age:
6. the ages of any children that live in Rockport:
7. length of residency in Rockport:
8. length of time that you expect to continue living in Rockport:
9. amount of land owned in Rockport:
10. Have you ever been active in town government (for example, by being an
active participant in town meeting, by running for office, or by serving on
a town committee)? If so please describe:
11. Do you belong to any organizations that have an interest in hazardous
waste (for example: League of Women Voters, Sierra Club or Chamber of
Commerce)? If so, please note the organization and the level of your
involvement:
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1. Name:
2. At this time, we would like to get your reaction .to each of the three
proposals that have just been discussing. In your opinion, which
proposal would be safest for the community? Why?
3. Which statement most accurately reflects your opinion about the
safety of your first choice?
a. The facility seems quite safe.
b. I have some reservations about the facility's safety but feel
these could be easily worked out.
c. I have major reservations about the facility's safety and would
like substantial changes in the proposal.
d. I feel the facility is basically. unsound and a totally different
approach is needed.
e. other:
4. In your opinion, which proposal would be your second choice and why?
5. How much of an improvement do you feel your most preferred choice is
over your second choice?
a. About the same
b. somewhat better
c. considerably better
6. How much of an improvement do you feel your second choice is over
your least preferred choice?
a. About the same
b. somewhat better
c. considerably better
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1. Your name:
2. Please indicate your sense of how acceptable the proposal you have just
worked on is to you:
a. strongly acceptable
b. somewhat acceptable
c. I could go either way
d. somewhat unacceptable
e. strongly unacceptable
3. What are its major strengths?
Its major deficiencies?
4. Attached you will find a smaller version of the board with which you were
just working. The list of proposals is the same. Please indicate the
mitigation or compensation measure that is most important to you by marking
"1" in the space adjacent to its description. Mark your second choice with
a "2". Continue marking until the package is MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE as a
proposal to site a hazardous waste treatment facility. Use the "other"
space to add measures not listed.
5. Do you have any comments you would like to add:
_ ___
WASTE TECHNOLOGY, INC.
VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
required of all waste delivery
trucks
SPILL PREVENTION AND
CONTAINMENT MEASURES
including double lined storage
tanks, dikes and ground
material
OVERSIZED PACKED" SCRUBBER
to further reduce chloride and
sulfur emissions
BUFFER ZONE
located around the treatment
facility
BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY
used for all health and safety
equipment
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COMPENSATION MEASURES
COMMUNITY SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS
to improve roads and other'
services used by the facility
INJURY TRUST FUND
to cover damage due to accident
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
to support planning studies
LAND VALUE TRUST FUND
to guarantee land values of
adjacent property
WATER SUPPLY GUARANTEES
to provide alternative water
should groundwater be
contaminated
COMMUNITY TIPPING FEES
to enhance community revenues
FREE LOCAL.HAZARDOUS WASTE
DISPOSAL
for industry and residents
COGENERATION ENERGY
provided to adjacent industry
"at cost"
HIRING LOCAL EMPLOYEES
FACILITY LANDSCAPING
to improve the aesthetics of
the plant
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Appendix C
List of Participants
designation
and town occupation
major town
offices held
1. M preservationist,
Essexton
2. M guardian,
Worcesterville
3. M undesignated,
Essexton
4. M preservationist,
Essexton
5. M sponsor,
Essexton
6. M preservationist,
Worcesterville
7. M sponsor,
Worcesterville
8. M sponsor,
Worcesterville
director of public
works
chief of police
engineer
realtor
Board of Selectmen
Board of Selectmen
Finance Committee
sanitary engineer
with specialty in
hazardous waste
architect Planning Board
fire chief
contractor
9. F undesignated,
Worcesterville
newspaper publisher Planning Board
10. M undesignated,
Worcesterville
11. F preservationist,
Worcesterville
12. M guardian,
Worcesterville
assistant to Board
of Assessors
mechanic Industrial Devel-
opment Commission
13. F guardian,
Essexton
museum director Board of Selectmen
Conservation Com-
mission, Solid
Waste and Recy-
cling Committee
sex
teacher
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sponsor,
Worcesterville
sponsor,
Essexton
fireman, specialist
in hazardous waste
Planning Board
retired
16. M guardian,
Worcesterville
assistant to select-
men
17. M sponsor,
Essexton
18. M guardian,
Essexton
19. F sponsor,
Worcesterville
20. M preservationist,
Worcesterville
21. M preservationist,
Essexton
22. F guardian,
Worcesterville
23. F guardian,
Worcesterville
24. F preservationist,
Worcesterville
25. F undesignated,
Essexton
26. M sponsor,
Essexton
27. F undesignated,
Essexton
28. M preservationist,
Essexton
29. M guardian,
Essexton
industrial process
engineer
industrial production
supervisor
salesperson
businessman
architect
editor
farmer
Board of Selectmen
Planning Board
Finance Committee
Industrial Devel-
opment Commission
Planning Board
Zoning Board of
Appeals
Planning Board
Board of Selectmen
Zoning Board of
Appeals, Recycling
Committee
Conservation Com-
mission
administrative
assistant
nurse Planning Board
retailer
retired
retired
planner Board of Selectmen
Planning Board
30. F guardian,
Worcesterville
business
manager
Conversation Com-
mission
14. M
15. M
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31. M preservationist,
Essexton
32. M guardian,
Essexton
process engineer
physician
Conservation Com-
mission, Economic
Development Com-
mittee
Board of Health
33. M undesignated,
Essexton
34. M undesignated,
Worcesterville
teacher
manager
